Hegemonic formation and public discourse: a case study of democratization in Hong Kong. by Chan, Chi Kit. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Communication.
Hegemonic Formation and Public Discourse 
---A Case Study of Democratization in Hong Kong 
CHAN Chi Kit 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Communication 
© The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
July 2005 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any 
person(s) intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed 
publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate School 
� ^ ^ ^ • t n V \ 
xf n fv, r丨； \ f \ 
u b.j L 1 产’j| 
iiSEiiTY“ 
Abstract 
Hegemonic Formation and Public Discourse 
---A Case Study of Democratization in Hong Kong 
Submitted by Chan Chi-kit 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Communication 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2005 
The return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 marks important changes in the power 
structure in Hong Kong, resulting in resinicization in various aspects. One key 
question is how China, as the sovereign master, builds up and maintains hegemony, 
within Gramsci's conceptualization in Hong Kong. This study is aimed at tackling 
this problem. The thesis takes the controversy over the democratization in Hong 
Kong throughout the transitory and post-handover years as a case study. It analyzes 
how the public discourse responded to the tension between state ideology and the 
local demand for democratization in the civil society in Hong Kong, so as to examine 
the hegemonic formation process in the public discourse. 
The study is based on a discourse analysis approach. The public discourse is 
scrutinized by textual examination of local newspapers representing various 
ideological and market positions, while the examination of the state discourse is 
supplemented by press releases of the state media, speeches from Chinese officials 
and scholars. 
While resistance against the state discourse continues to exist in the public discourse 
in Hong Kong after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, the discursive struggle 
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against China is alleviated, through the disappearance of the 'democracy against 
communism' discourse and the emerging compliance to Basic Law. The weakening 
of local resistance against China's state discourse marked the preliminary tendency 
for state hegemonic formation. 
The thesis offers insights to how China made use of popular public symbols in Hong 
Kong to justify the state discourse. The Chinese state articulated the most important 
discursive element by emphasizing 'obedience to the Basic Law’ over the concept 
‘rule of law’ so as to build up the authoritative image of the Basic Law. The study 
also contemplates how local dissidents resisted the hegemonic incorporation due to 
the rise of civil society in the transitory and post-handover years. 
Besides, the case of Hong Kong is an illustration of the significance of professionals 
in hegemonic formation. Professionals are credible as they produce knowledge of 
their disciplines. Their role is indispensable in the justification of existing ruling, or 
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This thesis originates from my concern of the future of my homeland, Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong caught the world attention because of the handover, the change of the 
sovereignty from Britain to China in 1997. Apart from the zealous showing off of 
national pride promoted by China and the ‘fall’ of an Oriental Pearl to a communist 
regime projected by the western camp, I always keep questioning: what else does the 
handover mean to Hong Kong, and above all, the rest of the world. World history is 
no stranger to the changes of sovereignties, or the rise and fall of cities. If what Hong 
Kong means to the world is just the handover (plus years of economic achievements), 
then she would be nothing more than a sinking stone in the river of human history: 
making a ‘pop’ sound and a little spray in the years around 1997 A.D., then fading 
away from world attention. 
As a student who believes in the importance of Hong Kong Study, I trust that Hong 
Kong can make a unique contribution to social study and humanity. The handover of 
an advanced capitalist city to a socialist state, which is struggling to modernize, is 
creating tremendous ideological clashes between capitalism and socialism in various 
domains, for instance, political development (e.g. democratization), legal difference 
(common law system VS Marxist law system), social and cultural practices (e.g. the 
integration and struggles between Mainland and Hong Kong identities in everyday 
life). These ideological clashes present numerous cases for long-term observation of 
discursive contestation, integration and resistance between a westernized community 
and a socialist state. Thus, Hong Kong serves as an on-going field for the study of 
the dynamics and interaction between capitalism and socialism, as well as the 
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rebuilding of Chinese Nationalism, and therefore should be a fruitful site for those 
who engage in academic interests including identity formation, hegemonic formation 
and discourse analysis. 
This thesis is an attempt to turn the belief above into a study, centering on my interest 
in the hegemonic formation process engineered by China pertaining to the political 
development of Hong Kong. Besides my academic ambition, I also hope to offer 
some predictive observation about the public discourse with regard to the 
democratization of Hong Kong: the formation of hegemonic tendencies in terms of 
the supreme status of Basic Law, and the flourishing of legal narration in the public 
discussion of political matters. The public discussion of the democratization of Hong 
Kong, to a certain extent, is becoming a war of words associated with legal jargons 
and phrases in Basic Law, with the rise of the importance of legal professionals from 
both central government and Hong Kong in local political matters. 
However, without the kind assistance from numerous mentors and colleagues, the 
completion of this thesis and the realization of my academic ambition most probably 
would remain a romantic dream. I must express my deepest gratitude to my thesis 
supervisor: Prof. Joseph Chan Man, for his kind offering of abundant intellectual 
dialogues, acumen and guidance; Prof. Eric Ma and Prof. Clement So, who are the 
members of my dissertation committee, for their critical but sympathetic reading of 
my thesis, as well as the constructive advice given. 
Apart from the professors from the School of Journalism and Communication, Prof. 
Chan Kin-man from the Department of Sociology also provided valuable suggestions 
pertaining to the resistance strategy practiced by some Hong Kong democrats against 
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the state discourse engineered by China. Mr. Tsang Chung-wing and Miss Wong 
Wai-yat, senior journalists from the Hong Kong Economic Times, also endowed my 
study with insightful discussions of the state discourse put forward by China and the 
evolution of the public discourse in Hong Kong during the transitory and 
post-handover years. Besides, my appreciation must extend to David Chong Chor-kit, 
my buddy who has been engaging in series of exhaustive academic discussions and 
brainstorming sessions with me throughout my study in graduate school. 
Last but not least, I owe a great deal to my family: father, mother and two little 
brothers. Only with their years of warm support and tender tolerance I am able to 




DEMOCRATIZATION OF HONG KONG 
The constitutional structure of government is the distribution of ruling power in 
society. Changes in that structure mean the reshuffle of political power between 
different parties. 
Democratization, to a certain extent, refers to the constitutional reform leading to 
democracy. Even though the value, substance and definition of democracy are 
debatable, generally it is a political concept inextricably tied in with a manifested 
political structure that enables the people to alter the government by popular election. 
Those countries which are recognized as 'democratic' usually offer extensive voting 
franchises and have governments in power that may be rotated through general 
elections. Nevertheless, democratization, by changing the existing political structure 
to a more democratic one, involves power reshuffle in the society. 
For Hong Kong, democratization takes place under a specific historical background: 
the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997. Democratization in Hong 
Kong thus is not only the power reshuffle in the local society, but also involves the 
power distribution between Hong Kong and her masters, Britain before and China 
after 1997. Moreover, during the transition period before the handover (1984 to 
1997), the democratization of Hong Kong was the key battlefield in the struggles 
between Britain and China for gaining the upper hand in controlling this Oriental 
Pearl. After the handover, democratization in Hong Kong becomes a key issue in the 
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relationship between the central government in Beijing and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) under the framework of 'one country, two 
systems' ^. Therefore the democratization of Hong Kong involved numerous 
stakeholders both inside and outside the territory: local social elites, business groups 
and dissidents from the civil society in Hong Kong, as well as Britain and China. 
The struggles over the democratization of Hong Kong in the local public discourse 
closely relate to the power realignment and social formation in different periods. 
Whether a particular discourse can enter the media agenda and become public largely 
depends on the dynamics between the powers of the parties it represents, and also the 
social context. Local public discourse therefore would respond to the changes of 
social power distribution over Hong Kong, involving the two state powers, China 
and Britain, over time. A vivid illustration is the fading British power and rising 
Chinese influence in Hong Kong throughout the transition period that was 
accompanied by the emergence of a dual-power structure (i.e. Britain and China) in 
the local journalistic paradigms (Chan and Lee, 1991), and journalistic paradigm is a 
key component of the public discourse. 
Nevertheless, Hong Kong is a capitalist city, different from socialist China in many 
aspects, socio-economic contexts, culture and beliefs, as well as the political 
structure. To incorporate not just the territory but the legitimacy to rule, China has to 
build up her state hegemony over Hong Kong, particularly pertaining to the 
democratization process in relation to the distribution of power between the central 
1 One country, two systems: the framework constructed by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, in 
the bid to regain Hong Kong, meaning that there are two systems under socialist China, socialism in 
Mainland and capitalism in Hong Kong, that would preserve the autonomy of Hong Kong after 1997. 
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government and the local HKSAR administration. In fact, since the transitory period 
before the handover, China has been exerting her influence over the democratization 
of Hong Kong in terms of both the discursive contestation and social power 
realignment, in order to ensure that the local political reforms do not threaten the 
exercise of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, and more importantly, the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the Mainland. That makes the 
democratization of Hong Kong an excellent case study to scrutinize how a 
nation-state builds up her hegemony in the public discourse of a newly incorporated 
city, and how to maintain and consolidate her hegemonic discourse thereafter. 
To deal with these inquiries, it is crucial to trace the history of democratization in 
Hong Kong, and the corresponding public discourse over different critical periods, in 
particular, the changing impulse of public discussion concerning local 
democratization vis-a-vis China before and after the handover, in order to capture the 
evolution of local public discourse under the increasing force of resinicization. 
Through doing so, this study aims at examining whether state hegemonic discourse 
appears in the public discourse of Hong Kong, and how the local dissidents and other 
social forces interact with China via the public discourse. 
Content of this thesis 
The notion of hegemony originated from Gramsci's study on peasant revolution and 
Fascism in Italy scrutinizes how the ruling elites synthesized a common ideology and 
won the consent of the subjects. Subsequent studies, apart from the exposition of the 
notion of ideological interpellation that put forward by Althussser, gradually adopted 
the approach of discourse analysis to examine the hegemonic formation process via 
3 
observations of the dynamics between social formation and the articulation between 
signs and practices. Chapter 2 scrutinizes the origins, development of the concept of 
hegemony, and successive inspections on its formation process. 
Nevertheless, the focus of this thesis is the hegemonic formation process in the 
public discourse, a space which is crucial to the formation as well as the 
disarticulation of hegemony. The public discourse is the source of social imagination 
(Ku, 1999; 2001), a space where the discursive struggle between major social powers 
(including the state) takes place. In addition, the discursive struggle in the public 
discourse is inextricably tied to the realignment of social power. Chapter 3 
contemplates the concept of the public discourse and its role and significance in 
hegemonic formation. 
Chapter 4 introduces an indicator for the examination of the hegemonic formation in 
the public discourse, in terms of the discursive boundary of social resistance against 
the state discourse, and states the research questions of this thesis:. 
參 What is China's state discourse on democratization of Hong Kong and how 
is it established in the public discourse in Hong Kong? (RQl) 
參 How does the public discourse in Hong Kong serve to build up or resist 
China's hegemony over Hong Kong? (RQ2) 
This chapter also states the methodology with reference to the research logic and 
sampling strategy. 
Chapter 5 consists of an introduction to the history of the democratization of Hong 
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Kong, with illustrations of critical moments of the constitutional development. 
Chapter 6 and 7 contain the data analysis of textual materials, empirical evidence and 
social facts that seek to answer the research questions posed in chapter 4. Chapter 6 
scrutinizes the discursive logic of China's state discourse toward Hong Kong, the 
origins and background of such discursive formation, and the corresponding social 
formation in both China and Hong Kong. The discursive strategy employed by China 
to establish her state discourse in this former British colony, including how China 
manipulated the concept 'rule of law' to strengthen the main discursive element or 
the nodal point (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985): Basic Law, within the state discourse is 
also investigated. In addition, this chapter contemplates the discursive formation of 
China's state discourse and its dynamics with social formation in both China and 
Hong Kong, scrutinizes the maneuvers carried out by China (including co-optation 
and policies) in the implementation of China's state discourse in the public discourse 
in Hong Kong. 
Chapter 7 scrutinizes the discursive struggle over the democratization of Hong Kong 
in the public discourse before and after the handover. This chapter aims at giving a 
comprehensive and analytical account on the major prevailing discourses with regard 
to democratization of Hong Kong, the differences between the pre- and post-
handover periods. Above all, the key findings of this thesis, the disappearance of the 
discourse ‘democracy against communism 民主抗共’ and the emerging compliance 
to Basic Law in the discursive struggle in Hong Kong public discourse, are evidence 
that illustrates a preliminary tendency of hegemonic formation after the handover. In 
other words, social resistance against the ruling of the state, China, is weakened in 
the representation of the public discourse. 
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Chapter 8 applies the analytical model constructed in chapter 3 to elaborate the 
findings in chapter 7, demonstrating how the changing social formation in both 
China and Hong Kong interacted with the discursive formation in the public 
discourse and resulted in this preliminary tendency of hegemonic formation i.e. the 
lowering of social resistance against China's state discourse in the public discourse 
of Hong Kong after the handover. The rise of China since 1990s and the downturn of 
Hong Kong after the handover caused the shift of bargaining power between China 
and Hong Kong. With flourishing Communist China's influence over Hong Kong, as 
well as the increasing dependence on China by Hong Kong, the conventional 
anti-communist feeling is gradually under cultural challenge that led to the 
diminishing of the discourse ‘democracy against communism' after the handover. 
The enhanced popularity and image of China offers impetus to the formation of state 
hegemony in Hong Kong, yet due to the rise of civil society in this city over the past 
decades, local dissidents are still able to resist the state discourse, despite the fact that 
their resistance is subject to higher pressure after the handover. 
Apart from elaborating the findings, this chapter also pinpoints the lesson leamt from 
the case study of Hong Kong pertaining to hegemonic formation. The social trust of 
professionals in advanced capitalist society gives rise to their leadership in discursive 
struggles. The professionals have intellectual power to synthesize knowledge in their 
specialized fields, earn social respect and thereafter moral leadership in society. Thus 
their role in the hegemonic formation is crucial, particularly in advanced capitalist 
societies where the myth of professionalism prevails. Chapter 9 is a concluding 
remark, pinpointing the significance and limitations of this thesis, and suggested 
directions for further researches on hegemonic formation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HEGEMONY: ITS ORIGINS AND FORMATION 
Before examining the democratization of Hong Kong and to what extent China has 
built up her state discourse as hegemony in the public discourse in Hong Kong, it is 
crucial to scrutinize the notion of hegemony, its origins and formation process. 
The concept, hegemony, originated from Antonio Gramsci, and is now generally 
understood as a situation where the ruling elites exercise authority over the 
subordinated classes and social groups by the combination of force and above all, 
consent, forming a historical bloc which temporarily excludes alternative 
articulations other than those of the authority (Hall, 1988; Grossberg, 1996; Barker, 
2003). To explain this notion simply, hegemony is naturalized and unchallenged 
daily common sense (i.e. popular consensus and thoughts). The birth of this notion 
was inextricably tied with the development of Marxist theory, particularly in relation 
to the evolution of history and revolution. Viewing from the perspective of discourse 
analysis, the formation of hegemony necessitates a process of discursive contestation, 
in which various social forces compete for moral leadership in the society. Those 
discourses that are able to articulate the common sense of the society will be popular 
amongst the masses, and gain impetus in the discursive struggle for hegemonic status. 
Thus hegemonic formation is an on-going discursive struggle in pursuit of public 
credibility, subject to the dynamics of power realignment in the social formation. 
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Section 2.1 
The origins: Gramsci's ideas of Hegemony 
Traditional Marxist Theory takes a deterministic view on how state exercises control 
over her subjects. As part of economic determinism, the ruling classes' (i.e. 
capitalists') control of the production forces in the infrastructures and the intellectual 
force are considered simultaneously within Marxist theory, and the elements of the 
superstructure, ideologies, culture, religion, legal and education system, simply 
serves the economic base (Marx and Engels, 1968, 1976; McMahan, 1999). Through 
ideology, the ruling class fabricates false consciousness in the superstructure in order 
to justify their ruling legitimacy over the subjects (Marx and Engels, 1968; 1976; 
Eyerman, 1981; Torrance, 1995; Larrain, 1996). Within Marxist theory, the society 
operates as an infrastructure/ superstructure framework. Historical development 
depends on the evolution of the production forces and production relations in the 
infrastructure via class struggle. Those controlling the economic forces will become 
the ruling elites, and utilize the ideological superstructure to create a false 
consciousness in order to justify their ruling legitimacy. 
Hegemony; turning point of Marxist theory 
However, Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist theorist, offered another revelation on 
how the ruling elites gain their legitimacy, the famous milestone concept as a turning 
point of the development of Marxist theory in the 1970s, hegemony. 
Gramsci's hegemony was rooted in his observation during Mussolini's regime in 
Italy. The fact that Fascism gained national support in Italy is paradoxical, as the 
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exploited class, the peasantry, should be devoted to Marxist revolution and not an 
extreme right wing ideology. The theory of hegemony was cultivated under 
Gramsci's explanation of this paradox. Subsequent scholars also further interpreted 
and modified Gramsci's version of hegemony (e.g. Hall, 1988; Slack, 1996). 
To Gramsci, historical development is not purely economic deterministic, ideological 
superstructure plays a role other than the evolution of the production forces and 
production relations in the infrastructure (Bobbio，1979; Hall, 1988; Slack, 1996). 
Early interpretation of Prison Notebooks suggests that, to Gramsci, hegemony refers 
to the situation that the ruling class has to exercise leadership over the society by 
winning the consent of subordinated classes/ groups (Mouffe, 1979). Subsequent 
literature contends that hegemony is formed when the ruling bloc (not only particular 
class or group) articulates its interest to the ‘common sense' of the people, and 
accordingly asserts its legitimacy through populism (Hall, 1988), resulting in a 
temporary closure of other alternative articulations in the society except those 
endorsed by the authority (Baker, 2003). On the other hand, Gramsci's highlight of 
the role of ideology does not mean that the economic forces are not important for the 
maintenance of ruling elites (Hall, 1988; Grossberg, 1996), he merely filled in the 
gap that traditional Marxists neglected, namely the contribution of the superstructure 
to historical development. 
Drawing out the differences between false consciousness and hegemony, Mouffe 
(1979) argues that Gramsci had used the idea of hegemony to describe a condition in 
which the ruling class exerts their leadership over the subjects by winning the 
consent of the latter, and concludes that hegemony is different from false 
consciousness in the sense that in the former, ideology is the collective agreement 
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from the negotiation for a genuine consent between the ruling class and the subjects; 
while in false consciousness, ideology is no more than a fraudulent meaning system 
produced by the dominating class to fool the subordinated classes. 
Nevertheless, Gramsci's emphasis on gaining ruling legitimacy by cultural power 
and moral leadership adds new elements to the materialism of traditional Marxists, 
shifting the focus from the class struggle between the capitalists and the proletariats 
for the control of economic forces to the war of position i.e. competition of different 
ideologies for leadership legitimacy (Hall, 1988; Slack, 1996). 
Besides, the ruling bloc has to respond to day-to-day challenges against their 
hegemony from the subjects, other elites or even internal struggles within the ruling 
bloc. That's why hegemony has to be sustained by continuous negotiations, and no 
ruling elites can gain hegemony once and for all, as Gramsci asserts: 
'A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership “ before 
winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions 
for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it 
exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 
“lead” as well' 
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (1971:57-8) 
Therefore, hegemony should never be understood as a static situation. The ruling 
bloc who holds the hegemonic force, as well as the content of the hegemony will 




Hegemonic formation and ideological interpellation 
War of position and ideological interpellation 
Gramsci and subsequent scholars also contemplate the formation process of 
hegemony. Gramsci's original ideas stressed how the ruling bloc could win the 
ideological consent of the masses, and focused on the consensus attained between the 
ruling bloc and the subordinates after the war of position between various ideologies. 
Gramsci pinpointed that the ruling class (i.e. Fascists) in fact had to incorporate the 
interests of other subordinated classes into a collective will through continuous 
negotiations (Gramsci, 1971; Bobbio, 1979; MoufFe, 1979). The dominating class 
has to win the consent of the subjects and legitimize their ruling by turning various 
interests into a collective ideology, and sustain the ruling legitimacy by on-going 
negotiations with challenging forces. This process of ideological struggle for 
legitimacy is called the ‘war of position' (Mouffe, 1979). 
Subsequent scholars (e.g. Hall, 1988) interpret the formation process of hegemony, 
'war of position', by employing the idea of interpellation. The concept of 
interpellation in the political sense came from Althusser's explanation of the function 
of ideology. Althusser points out that the ruling class utilizes both Repressive State 
Apparatus (RSA) (legal power and forces) and Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) (e.g. 
education system, media, religion) to control the subjects (Althusser, 2001/1971). 
The function of the latter apparatus (i.e. ISA) is to legitimize the ruling class by the 
formation and strengthening of ideology through interpellation, a process in which 
the subjects are produced by the naturalization of their subordinated power relations 
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to the ruling class as a reality through creating and recreating the existing social 
positions by ideological calling (Althuser, 2001/1971; Resch et al, 1992; Davis, 
2004). The concept is best illustrated by Althusser's own often cited example: 
'...interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the 
most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: "Hey, you 
there!，’…[t]he hailed individual will turn around [and] by this mere 
one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. 
Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was “really ” addressed to him, 
and that "it was really him who was hailed”, 
(Althusser 1971:174) 
Interpellation is the process in which ideology produces subjects by the 
naturalization of the social positions that favor particular parties in society, and it is 
inextricably connected to the war of position in the formation of hegemony. In the 
war of position, various ideologies simultaneously interpellate same group of 
subjects. Each ideology tries to disarticulate the targeted subjects from other 
competing ideologies, and rearticulate itself to them, in order to attain the hegemonic 
status in society (Mouffe, 1979; Hall, 1988). 
The ideological interpellation in the war of position is not necessarily class-based as 
Gramsci had described. Class is only one of the interpellations from ideologies. 
Other interpellations, for instance, in the struggle for nationalism, race, ethnic tie and 
nationality may also be articulated by ideologies in the interpellation of the subjects 
(Laclau, 1977) as part of the war of position. Therefore, the war of position stands for 
the contest between ranges of ideological discourses to interpellate individuals as 
subjects. 
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Moral leadership and intellectuals 
In order to interpellate the citizens as subjects, the ruling elites rely on intellectuals, 
who have the intellectual power to synthesize and manipulate the interests of various 
classes into a common ideology, and articulate it to the ruling of existing elites, and 
build up the moral leadership (i.e. credibility and authority to rule) of the dominating 
class (Bobbio, 1979). Gramsci therefore urged the subordinated classes to cultivate 
their own intellectuals, so that the subjects can have the intellectual power to 
challenge existing mainstream ideology and the moral leadership of the ruling elites 
(Mouffe, 1979). 
Philosophy and common sense: penetration of ideology in the masses 
Besides, ideology can only become popular through the articulation to common 
sense. Gramsci argued that there are two 'floors' to political ideology, philosophy 
and common sense. The former is the logic, the system of thoughts that is difficult to 
be understood by the laymen, while the latter is the everyday conceptions of the 
world that are practical enough to be known without grand labels (Donald and Hall, 
1986). Gramsci (1971) argued that ideology cannot be confined to the 'philosophical', 
but must enter the common sense so that it can be effective among the masses, in 
order to compete with other ideologies for legitimacy in society. 
A particular ideology can only be effective in society when it articulates to the 
common sense among the masses. Common sense, which maybe the historical traces, 
incomplete borrowings, diluted concepts or even prejudices, inherited wisdom and 
other popular thoughts prevailed in the society, is where various ‘great systems' of 
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thoughts can be incorporated (Donald and Hall, 1986). For example, capitalism can 
be embodied by some popular thoughts, such as 'free market is good’，‘private 
property right is a must for prosperity'. If an ideology can articulate to, and even 
outdo other ideologies and dominate the common sense in society, then it may 
become hegemony. 
War of position: ideological contestation for articulating common sense 
Therefore, the war of position stands for the contest between ranges of ideological 
discourses to interpellate individuals as subjects. When introducing the notion of 
'authoritarian populism' to critique Thatcherism, Hall puts forward that hegemony is 
the struggle of the ruling bloc for the position of leadership across the entire cultural 
life, through articulating the common sense of society to its particular ideological 
discourse, thus creating populist support (Hall, 1988; Glossberg, 1996). Once an 
ideological discourse succeeds in articulating the common sense in society and hence 
interpellating the masses as subjects, it can raise populist support and block 
alternative articulations of other ideologies, forming the hegemony, albeit 
temporarily (Hall, 1988; Barker, 2003). 
Section 2.3 
Discourse analysis and hegemonic formation 
While Gramsci and some later scholars employ the concept ideology to explain 
hegemonic formation, other subsequent studies adopt the approach of discourse 
analysis to scrutinize the process of ‘war of position, (ideological struggles between 
the ruling bloc and challenging forces for leadership), and give an illustrative account 
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of the interaction between linguistic signs, social practices and power realignment in 
the hegemonic formation (e.g. Laclau and Moffue, 1985; Hall, 1988; Fairdough， 
1992). The study of ideological struggles, power realignment and social formation 
through the concept of discourse, the approach of discourse analysis, can substantiate 
the understanding of hegemonic formation with the scrutiny of the dialectical 
evolution between the power relations in the social context and the war of words at 
discursive level. 
Informed by discourse analysis, the formation of hegemony can be understood in a 
more precise and tangible way. Hegemony is formed when a particular discourse is 
popular enough to become the naturalized common sense in the society, temporarily 
blocking alternative articulations from other discourses (Hall, 1988; Grossberg, 1996; 
Barker, 2003). In other words, hegemony is the discourse which can fix the 
discursive elements, generate provisional stable meanings and dissolve the discursive 
struggle temporarily (Laclau and MoufFe, 1985). 
Discourse: articulation between signs, practices and social contexts 
Discourse is one of the terms that are frequently cited and attract a variety of 
interpretation in the academic world. In general, discourse means the production of 
knowledge by giving meanings to social practices and physical objects through the 
language system, thus linking up languages and practices (Foucault, 1972; Barker, 
2003). 
To understand discourse analysis, the concept of articulation is indispensable. The 
notion of articulation is neither essential to economic or class determinism, nor 
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totally subject to the deconstructionist approach of Derrida (Slack, 1996). 
Articulation refers to a contingent unity between various discursive elements (e.g. 
different practices, texts, social contexts or even larger structures, etc) under certain 
conditions so as to formulate different meanings (Hall, 1988; Slack, 1996; Barker, 
2003). The meanings signified by a particular discursive element, say a sign (e.g. a 
word, vocabulary, gesture or any other icons), depend on its linkage to other signs， 
and the meanings carried by the signs will be reproduced by social practices (i.e. how 
that sign is used), subject to the corresponding social contexts and historical 
moments. Thus, the signs, practices and social contexts are inevitably tied together in 
the production of meanings, yet their unity i.e. articulation is conditional: changes of 
social practices, signs or contextual evolution will certainly have an impact on the 
articulation between the discursive elements in meaning production. For example, 
the alternation of social practices pertaining to certain signs would result in changes 
of the meanings carried by those signs. Thus, in this sense, the notion of articulation 
implies that our meaning system is contingent. And the inspection of articulation 
between signs, practices and social contexts in the meaning system is the crux of 
discourse analysis, as illustrated by Foucault: 
' I f , in a particular period in the history of our society, the delinquent was 
psychologized and pathologized, if criminal behaviour could give rise to a 
whole series of objects of knowledge (homicide, suicide, crimes passionels, 
sexual offences, certain forms of theft, vagrancy), this was because a 
group of particular relations was adopted for use in psychiatric 
discourse. ’ 
(Foucault, 1972: 43-4) 
Foucault points out that the psychiatric discourse assigns meanings (i.e. a group of 
particular relations) to criminal behavior (and the behavior becomes the practices of 
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the psychiatric discourse), formulating a series of knowledge (i.e. various types of 
crimes). Discourse therefore is constitutive, mobilizing languages to construct 
meanings for practices or physical objects and signifying reality, rather than 
passively referring to a reality out there (Fairclough, 1992). In short, discourse is the 
contingent articulation between signs (e.g. texts/ languages) and practices, generating 
meanings with power implication under specific social and historical contexts. 
Discourse is constituted by people, practices and social context, but is simultaneously 
constitutive once it is able to enter the meaning system in society (Fairclough, 1992). 
Discourse analysis and hegemonic formation 
Foucault's reflection on knowledge and power is vital to the scrutiny of findings 
brought by discourse analysis in the understanding of hegemonic formation. Power, 
according to Foucault, is not limited to the exercise of control over others, but the 
force to create a social world and make it meaningful for us, and thus power creates 
knowledge, including identities and how one relates to another as groups and 
individuals (Foucault, 1979, 1981; Jorgensen and Philips, 2002). On the other hand, 
knowledge itself is embedded with power, illustrating the power relations in the 
corresponding social context (Foucault, 1979, 1981; Fairclough, 1992). 
Inspired by Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) contend that discourse analysis is 
the examination of the struggles over the creation of meanings. Discourse creates 
knowledge (e.g. social understanding) with the articulation of signs and practices, 
and is inevitably political (involving power relations under corresponding social 
context). Discourse analysis thus implies antagonism amongst various discourses, 
competing for the creation of meanings by fixing the articulation of discursive 
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elements (e.g. signs, practices). Hegemony is when a discourse is able to dissolve the 
antagonism between discourses i.e. temporarily suspending discursive struggles by 
fixing the articulation between discursive elements and hence generating transitory 
stable meanings (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Jorgensen and Philips, 2002). Certainly 
the fixation is temporary. A new discourse may intervenes the existing articulation 
between discursive elements and fix them in another way, thus disarticulating the 
previous hegemony. 
Applying the approach of discourse analysis to scrutinize the hegemonic formation, 
the war of position between ideologies can be illustrated by the disarticulation and 
rearticulation between various signs, social practices under the corresponding social 
contexts. Ideologies have to be embodied by discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Fairclough, 1992) so as to enter the meaning system and be represented by signs (e.g. 
languages and texts). Different ideological discourses (discourses that embody 
ideologies) have different articulations of signs and social practices, subject to social 
context at the time. The competition between those discourses over the articulation of 
existing signs and practices in the meaning system would result in discursive 
struggles. 
Thus, the war of position between ideologies can be explored through the discursive 
struggle among various discourses. For example, capitalism generates numerous 
related discourses, such as the admiration and affirmation of market economy in the 
field of economics, whilst socialism nurtures the discourse that advocates the welfare 
state. The discourses 'market economy’ and 'welfare state' then have different 
articulations to the words and notions (i.e. signs) such as 'market force’，‘role of 
state', ‘utility,’ ‘values’ and so on, as well as practices e.g. welfare and economic 
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policies, and result in wars of words regarding the understanding of the above 
notions (i.e. discursive struggles). 
Therefore, the discourse analysis approach, the examination and investigation of the 
articulation between signs, practices and social contexts, can offer a vivid illustration 
of how different ideologies are competing to interpellate subjects. The discursive 
struggles present a demonstration of how the war of position operates: discourse that 
embodies ideologies synthesized by the ruling bloc competes for the articulation of 
signs and practices, in order to produce meanings that justify and uphold the existing 
ruling elites. On the other hand, the resistant forces would generate discourses that 
have contradictory articulations to those of the ruling discourse, so as to challenge 
existing moral leadership and the legitimacy of the ruling elites. If a particular 
discourse (e.g. the one synthesized by ruling elite) can successfully fix the meanings 
carried by the discursive elements (e.g. signs, practices) in society, then it would 
become hegemony, the discourse that is understood as naturalized common sense. 
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CHAPTER3 
FORMATION OF HEGEMONY 
AND THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE: 
ARGUMENTS AND CRITICISMS 
The public discourse: strategic battlefield for hegemonic formation 
Informed by discourse analysis, the formation of hegemony can be examined in a 
more precise and tangible way. Hegemony is formed when a particular discourse is 
popular enough to become the naturalized common sense in society, temporarily 
blocking the alternative articulations from other discourses (Hall, 1988; Grossberg, 
1996; Barker, 2003). In other words, hegemony is the discourse which can fix the 
discursive elements, generate provisional stable meanings and dissolve the discursive 
struggle temporarily (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
However, a particular discourse must go through the war of position, defeat other 
competing discourses before developing into hegemony. To fight for moral 
leadership and articulate to the common sense, to exert impact on the society 
(including those who belong to rival camps), or at least to be known by the masses, 
discourses have to be ‘public’： enter the public sphere, so as to compete with other 
discourses in order to acquire leadership among the masses. Representation in the 
public sphere is the source of public imagination of what the society is, and hence 
public discourse is a strategic battlefield for the discursive contestation of various 
social forces to gain public credibility (Ku, 1999). 
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Yet, not all discourses in the society are equally powerful due to varied resources (e.g. 
cultural capital, political influence and economic power) possessed by different 
discourse sponsors, their discursive strategies as well as social and historical contexts. 
Therefore only those discourses which are powerful enough can enter the public 
sphere and enjoy privileged status: to be known by the masses, and have the 
opportunity to fight for public credibility. The process of discursive contestation for 
public credibility is the war of position in the public discourse, in which various 
social forces, including the ruling bloc and resistant forces, compete for or resist 
hegemony in the public domain. 
Certainly, forming the mainstream in the public discourse does not necessarily mean 
a successful hegemonic formation: the war of position in everyday life i.e. the private 
sphere is also crucial. Nevertheless, 'hegemonizing' the public discourse is an 
indispensable step to build up hegemony in society. 
Section 3.1 
The public discourse and media representation 
The concept of public is conventionally understood by its contrast with private as a 
dichotomy. Ancient Greek and Roman philosophers already employed this 
dichotomy to distinguish the public life (e.g. joining courts, assemblies and theaters) 
and private life (e.g. household) (Peters, 1995). Habermas (1989/1962) further points 
out that ‘public’ in medieval period was synonymous with the notion of state i.e. only 
those holding state authority and authoritarian rituals as public symbols (e.g. fame, 
honor held by excellent warriors, feudal landlords and nobles) can have visibility in 
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society. Therefore, the deprived (e.g. slaves, women) were not able to join the public 
life (Habermas, 1989/1962; Peters, 1995). Public in this sense is the visibility to 
others in society by possessing public symbols, and the dichotomy of public/private 
is also a division between the privileged and the unprivileged. 
Habermas (1989/1962) then draws attention to the emergence of the 'public sphere', 
with the rise of the bourgeoisie after Enlightenment. He argues that the bourgeois 
construct a space (i.e. public sphere) which allows rational and deliberate debate 
among members of society without coercion from the state, and the public sphere 
also serves as the mediation between state and civil society where public opinion can 
be formed (Habermas, 1989/1962; Peters, 1995; Ku, 2001; Barker, 2003). 
The public discourse: source of social imagination 
Ku (1999; 2001), influenced by Benedict Anderson (1993), fiirther elaborates the 
visibility of ‘public’ as a source of social imagination of a community, and hence 
public discourse is where public opinion is crystallized and represented, as well as 
being a space for various social parties to vie for public credibility. 
The cultural system provides meaning-carrying symbols (e.g. rituals, aesthetic 
objects, semiotic signs, text...etc) for people to practice and create meanings in 
everyday life (Bourdieu，1977; Swidler, 2002). To make their discourses public 
(visible to the society), the ruling bloc, different social groups and individuals have 
to mobilize or generate cultural symbols that are known and adopted commonly by 
the society i.e. the public symbols that are clearly shared by people who use them 
(Swidler, 2002). The ruling bloc, social elites and other social groups utilize or create 
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public symbols to generate cultural meanings in order to take part in the ‘public’ and 
compete with the discourses of the other parties. 
As a result, inherited from Habermas' conception of the public sphere, Ku (2001) 
argues that the 'public' constitutes a space where discourses from various 
communities, hegemonic groups (i.e. the ruling bloc) and its challenging forces 
converge and re-articulate the discursive elements (e.g. social context, practices, text, 
symbols...etc) in order to achieve public credibility. Therefore, if the ‘public’ is 
understood as a discourse i.e. the public discourse, then it is where the discursive 
contestation between various social forces, including the state, takes place in order to 
fight for public credibility and moral leadership. 
In this sense, the public discourse is a crucial strategic battlefield for hegemonic 
formation in the society. The public discourse serves as a visible theater for various 
social forces (including the state and its dissidents) to compete for credibility and 
moral leadership by discursive struggles. Ruling elites (even autocratic rulers) have 
to justify their ruling and leadership in the discursive formation in the public 
discourse before the people, while dissidents have to disarticulate the ruling 
discourse in front of (i.e. visibly to) the whole society through discursive struggles in 
the public discourse. Various social forces articulate to the public symbols that are 
widely acceptable to the society i.e. the notion of common sense discussed in chapter 
1 in order to make their discourses comprehensible to the people, hence take part in 
the war of position in the public discourse and compete for public credibility. 
2 3 
Mediated discourse as public discourse 
From the point of ‘public’ as social visibility, public discourse is inextricably tied to 
the mediated discourse in modem society. A particular discourse can become visible 
in society and take part in the public discussion by media exposure, and thus join the 
public discourse. Therefore, the public discourse is often represented in the mediated 
discourse. 
It is not feasible for people to get information from every part of the world 
themselves, and the world is too complex for them to understand, so the media is a 
crucial source for people's imagination of the outside world (Lippmann, 1965/1922). 
The spiral of silence theory further indicates that the media even serve as the ‘social 
skin' for people to feel the public sentiment, and illustrates that what happens in the 
mediated world is visible to many. Above all, people generally regard what's 
happening in the media as public opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). The media is the 
key vehicle for social groups to be public (visible in society), and hence participate in 
the discursive contestation with others. For the state, elites or other social groups, the 
key way to make them visible in society, to let their discourses become public, is to 
make use of media exposure. In a word, the media serve as the social imagination of 
‘public,，as well as the platform for the participation of the public discourse via 
reportage, commentary, columns and editorials (Ku, 1999). 
Section 3.2 
Public discourse and social formation 
Since various social forces compete to participate in the public discourse in order to 
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gain public credibility, the discursive struggles in the public discourse is inextricably 
tied in with the corresponding social formation. Social groups have to be visible in 
society if they want to have a say in social discussions. However, social groups are 
not equally powerful politically, economically and culturally, and hence not all of 
them are equally visible in society. A concrete example is the fight for media 
exposure among the social parties, and the journalistic deference that favors the 
powerful elites due to 'news value': reporting those ‘worthy’ opinions i.e. comments 
given by powerful figures (e.g. see Allan, 1999; Curran, 2002; McNair, 2003; Benett 
et al., 2004; Lee, 2004; Boyle et al, 2004). Therefore, the social formation i.e. power 
realignment in society is crucial for the discursive struggle in the public discourse. 
Public and Publics 
Apart from social visibility, there is another concept of 'public': the active 
participation and involvement of the masses (Peters, 1995). When putting forward 
the concept of public sphere, Habermas mobilizes the above concept of ‘public’ by 
contending that the public sphere should be equally accessible by members in society, 
although the masses are only limited to the bourgeois (Habermas, 1989/1962). 
Subsequent critics also use the concept of ‘public’ as the active participation of the 
masses to criticize Habermas for he assumes the involvement of the bourgeois as the 
equal and active participation of members of the whole society (e.g. Ku, 2001; 
Curran, 2002). 
Instead of constructing a single public sphere, scholars also modify the concept of 
‘public’ to 'publics' by asserting the notion of the multiple public spheres and the 
subaltern (e.g. Squires, 2002; Curran 2002). They complain that Habermas' public 
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sphere ignores the plurality of the public, particularly for those social groups that are 
in weak positions or even marginalized (e.g. Garnham, 2000). Although not all social 
groups are able to compete with the dominant culture in the public sphere, some of 
them may even avoid appearing before the powerful mainstream discourse so that 
they can preserve themselves in the subaltern. Yet, these social groups should not be 
reduced to 'private' and be neglected from public attention (Garnham, 2000; Squires, 
2002). 
As a result, the dichotomy of public/ private can be regarded as a spectrum indicating 
the ability of social groups to make them visible (e.g. getting media exposure) in 
society. The more powerful the social groups, the more visible they are in society, 
hence have greater say in the social discussion (i.e. become public), and vice versa, 
as indicated in figure 1: 
Figure 1: The Public/ Private spectrum 
Mainstream Private 




參 Visibility in society, voice in social discussion 
參 Power, resources and skills needed 
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Thus, social formation is a crucial factor for the discursive struggles in the public 
discourse. The rise and fall of classes or other social groups (e.g. ethnic and racial 
groups), the extension or retreat of state power, the rise of civil society all have 
impact on the power realignment in society, and determine which social forces enjoy 
the advantage of being visible in the public discourse, as well as their bargaining 
power in the discursive struggles. 
Journalistic paradigm: role of media in the public discourse 
Besides social formation, journalistic paradigms also play an indispensable role in 
the discursive formation in the public discourse. As discussed in the previous section, 
public discourse is represented in the mediated discourse, where the latter is the main 
source of social visibility. Among various media texts, the news is the credible one 
that is kept up-to-date with social changes quickly, and social forces are eager to 
participate in social discussions via the news media. Due to its credibility over other 
media texts, representation by the news media is a significant vehicle to naturalize 
and routinize the hegemonic legitimacy as common sense (Hall, 1978 et al; Allan, 
1999). 
Contrary to common belief that news is the objective reporting of truth, news can be 
ideological packages constituted by the force of the state, political economy, 
organizational practices, daily routines and norms (e.g. Hall et al, 1978; Tuchman, 
1978; Allan, 1999)，as Hall suggests: 
'The social identification, classification and contextualization of news 
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events... is a social process — constituted by a number of specific 
journalistic practices, which embody (often only implicitly) crucial 
assumptions about what society is and how it works. ’ 
Stuart Hall etal. 1978:54-5 
Informed by the constructionist approach, representation in the news media is not a 
neutral reflection of the world out there. The selection and exclusion of news already 
inevitably involve the media's own stand in the struggle among social forces 
(McNair, 2003). The media thus is where various social forces (including the media) 
compete for public exposure, and above all, to join in the discursive contestation at 
societal level. In this sense, the media is a decisive platform where the public 
discourse is located, as well as being an important player of the public discourse. 
Therefore, news is embedded in the ideological contexts of journalists, news 
organizations and various explicit and implicit social forces (e.g. the imagination of 
the audience by the journalists, market forces and sources from different affiliations 
unclear, whose affiliations to what?) (see Allan, 1999 for more details). Thus, Chan 
and Lee (1999/1984; 1991) propose the theory of the ‘journalistic paradigm' to 
capture the dynamics between news-making, news organizations and social power 
realignment from a constructionist approach. 
Origins of the journalistic paradigm 
'Journalistic paradigms' is a notion developed from Thomas Kuhn's concept of 
paradigm by Chan and Lee (1999/1984; 1991). The Kuhnian paradigm originally 
refers to the general principles and conceptual assumptions that govern the growth of 
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scientific knowledge. Chan and Lee adopt it under the news-making context, using 
the term ‘journalistic paradigms' to articulate ‘the holistic core assumptions that the 
press makes about reality，(Chan and Lee, 1991). They define 'journalistic 
paradigms' as follows: 
'A journalistic paradigm thus is a way of 'seeing，that defines the entities 
of journalistic concern and results in patterns of selective coverage, 
interpretation, emphasis, and exclusion. ’ 
Chan and Lee, 1991:23 
Journalistic paradigm hence is a notion that articulates to the basic assumptions or 
‘worldview’ of news making. As news making inevitably involves selection, 
exclusion and interpretation of events and information, news is hardly the mere 
reflection of 'objective' reality, but rather is a process of meaning production, as the 
social power realignment, the market force, the journalistic professionalism (e.g. 
objective and balanced reporting) and ideologies affect the underlying assumptions 
of news making i.e. the journalistic paradigm (Chan and Lee, 1999/1984; 1991). That 
makes the study of the journalistic paradigm an indispensable component when 
seeking to understand the ideological packages and social powers operating in the 
formation of news content or even the society. 
Journalistic Paradigm and the Public Discourse 
Since journalistic paradigm is the key in the dynamics between the production of 
news content, news media and social power realignment, it also performs a crucial 
role in the discursive formation in the public discourse. As discussed in previous 
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sections, various social parties want to put their discourses into the public discourse 
of the society via media exposure, in order to join in the war of position, and 
compete with other parties' discourses for moral leadership. The news media is one 
of their strategic interfaces. Journalistic paradigm definitely affects what, and how 
the various parties can gain exposure in the news media and participate in the public 
discourse. 
In other words, journalistic paradigm of the news media is also a key factor in the 
determination of whether hegemony can emerge in the public discourse. Journalistic 
paradigm conveys the basic assumptions and world views of news-making. It serves 
as a significant yardstick to decide which discourses should gain exposure in the 
news and which should not, and also the way of representing such discourses. The 
evolution of the journalistic paradigm will change the criteria that determine how 
discourses participate in the war of position in the public discourse. 
Media: site and social actor 
The notion of journalistic paradigm implies that the media plays a dual role in the 
discursive formation of the public discourse: as site and social actor. As previously 
discussed, the media is the main site for the gaining of visibility in modern societies. 
In this sense, it is the site where the discursive struggles between various social 
actors take place. On the other hand, the existence of journalistic paradigms means 
that the media is hardly a totally neutral site among the conflicting social actors. The 
journalistic paradigm is ingrained in journalists and it, to a certain extent, modifies 
the representation of opinions from other social actors in the media discourse. By 
the same token, the media could also be understood as one of the social actors in the 
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public discourse. The media arena, if understood as a social institution, is an actor 
who contributes to the construction of social reality (including the public discourse), 
as well as a site where other social actors use in their attempt to achieve media 
exposure and social visibility (i.e. publicness). 
Media, social power realignment and formation of the public discourse 
Besides the dual role (i.e. site and social actor) played by the media in the formation 
of the public discourse, journalistic paradigm also contributes to the sensitivity of the 
media to social power realignment. Media reportage has always been criticized for its 
deference to power: 'newsworthiness' often drives journalists to hunt for opinions 
and information from those who are in power and, at least partially, ignore the 
oppositional voices and underprivileged groups who enjoy less influence in society 
(e.g. see Allan, 1999; Curran, 2002; McNair, 2003; Benett et al., 2004; Lee, 2004; 
Boyle et al, 2004). 
Hence, journalistic paradigm gives impetus to the media to respond to social power 
realignment, to represent those who are in power as well as their opinions. As the 
media sphere, to a large extent, is where the public discourse is nurtured, journalistic 
paradigm is a factor in the sensitivity of the public discourse to social power 
realignment. Those who are in power (e.g. the state) gain the upper hand in the 
discursive formation of public discourse. However, journalistic paradigm also 
consists of other values e.g. balanced reporting which, to some degree, encourages 
journalists to find contrasting viewpoints from various social actors, and thereby 
alleviate deference of the media to existing power. 
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Section 3.3 
Social formation and discursive struggles: an analytical model to 
contemplate hegemonic formation in the public discourse 
Hegemonic formation is the process in which discourses strive to become the 
naturalized and unchallenged common sense in society. Whether a particular 
discourse can successfully struggle for hegemonic status depends on whether its 
sponsors are credible enough (i.e. whether they have moral leadership in the society) 
so that the discourse they sponsor can gain public credibility. Achieving hegemony 
also depends on whether that particular discourse can articulate itself to the 
prevailing common sense i.e. the existing consensus and other popular public 
symbols in society, so it can be understood and accepted by the masses (Donald and 
Hall, 1986; Swidler, 2002). 
The public discourse performs a key role in the competition for public credibility and 
the articulation to existing consensus, since it is the source of social imagination (Ku, 
2001). Any social forces that would like to be visible in society have to participate in 
discursive struggles in the public discourse. Thus discursive struggles in the public 
discourse determine which discourses could enjoy public credibility, as well as which 
could successfully articulate to the prevailing consensus in society. Journalistic 
paradigm is also a crucial factor in the discursive struggles in the public discourse, 
since it plays a significant role in determining how discourses can gain media 
exposure and enter the public discourse. 
However, one must not ignore the role of social formation in discursive struggles in 
the public discourse. Only those social groups which are powerful enough (in one or 
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more of the political, economic and cultural spheres) can attract or manipulate media 
exposure and hence take part in discursive struggles in the public discourse. Thus the 
social power realignment has an impact on discursive struggle in the public 
discourse. 
Social power realignment depends on several factors: 
State power 
State power definitely is a crucial player in the social formation. State enjoys 
constitutional power for legal enforcement, military power to use violence as the last 
resort, as well as taxation for financial support. Apart from the Repressive State 
Apparatus (RSA), state power also includes manipulating the Ideological State 
Apparatus (ISA) such as schooling and propaganda machines as the weapons for 
advancing the state discourse in the war of position in the society. 
However, state power may not be a unified entity. There are internal fractions: 
legislature, executive branches and judiciary for instance. Thus there are many 
cliques inside the state power, which may struggle against each other. For example, 
during the June incident in 1989, the struggle between conservative and liberal 
fractions of China became explicit, and resulted in chaos inside the central power. 
The confusion was an opportunity for the leftist papers in Hong Kong to express 
critical opinions on the rallies in Beijing for a time (Fung, 1999). 
Besides, state power also involves interaction with foreign states. Individual states 
may be subject to the pressure of foreign states, and the latter may even directly 
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sponsor some local affiliated parties that seek to exert influence on the local social 
formation. 
Civil society formation 
The origin and development of the notion ‘civil society' is inextricably tied to the rise 
of the ‘public,, its contraposition to state power, and democratization. As previously 
discussed, the idea of ‘public’ includes active participation of citizens in governance. 
John Locke (1946 [1679J/2005) articulates that the emergence of civil society 
depends on the participation in political matters and the pursuit of public good by the 
citizens. Alexis de Tocqueville (1899/2005) further argues that the desire of citizens 
to pursue common desires is crucial to the fostering of active social participation, 
governance and the development of democracy. 
In the discussion of the formation of civil society and the active participation in 
governance by the citizens, some scholars argue that the concept civil society should 
be distinguished from the notion of government, as the latter does not represent the 
whole society (e.g. Thomas Paine, 1944[1792]/2005). Subsequent scholars contest 
that civil society is an 'intermediate associational realm between state and family 
populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in 
relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or 
extend their interests or values' (Bumell & Calvert, 2004) and ‘a domain of non-state 
social activities which are voluntary and public' (Ip, 1997). A mature civil society 
consists of robust non-state interest groups and non-governmental organizations 
which are capable of counter-balancing the state power in the social formation, and 
maintain a pluralistic public discourse with the participation of various social groups. 
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The formation of civil society is crucial to counter balance the state power. A robust 
third sector and market force enable different interests groups to check and balance 
the exercise of state power. 
Formation of class and social groups 
The concept of class originates from Marxist understanding of historical evolution. 
Those who control the production forces (e.g. natural resources, plants) would 
exploit the surplus values of the laboring classes, thus resulting in the distinction 
between the classes of haves and have-nots. Different historical periods have 
different classes of haves and have-nots: landlords and peasants for the feudal age, 
capitalists and proletariat in the industrial age. Class thus generally refers to a 
hierarchical concept defining the social status of people based on wealth, prestige or 
even blood tie (e.g. nobles). However, as in previous discussions, class is just one of 
the forms of interpellation creating subjects. Other aspects such as kinship, 
nationalism and race can also be the discursive tools for constructing subjects. 
The rise and fall of social classes, ethnic and racial groups and any particular strata in 
society will ignite changes in the social formation. Economic development leads to 
the rise of the middle class, which is regarded as the stabilizing force in society since 
this better-off stratum often seeks stability in order to secure their interests. Major 
immigration of a particular race or clan of people may give rise to corresponding 
social force in the society. 
3 5 
Media ownership 
Media is an indispensable player as well as platform of the public discourse. The 
ownership pattern of the media industry in society is a significant factor in the 
journalistic paradigm, and the latter is decisive in the mediation of the discursive 
contestation between various social forces in the public discourse. Media ownership 
is subject to state control, statutory regulation over the media and market forces. The 
less concentrated the pattern of media ownership, the more pluralistic the media 
discourse represented. 
The ownership pattern of media closely relates to corresponding social formation. 
The distribution of social power (e.g. the expansion of state power or particular 
social sector) exerts impact on the media ownership pattern, while such pattern 
catalyzes the power realignment by affecting the discursive struggle in the public 
discourse. Lee and Chu (1998) took Hong Kong during transitory period as an 
example, pointed out that the flourishing influence of China in Hong Kong, to a 
certain extent led to the concentration of media ownership in the hands of 
businessmen with affiliations to Chinese authority. So even most of the media 
organizations in Hong Kong are subject to market force, tendency of sympathizing 
China already appeared in media discourse when approaching handover. 
Historical contexts 
The social formation maybe triggered by social movements or events, such as the 
July demonstration in 2003 that gave a strong impetus to the rise of 'people power' 
in Hong Kong i.e. the setback of the HKSAR administration, the popularity of the 
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public opinion discourse (claims in the name of public opinion) and professionals 
(e.g. the senior councilors) (Chan, 2004); the June massacre in 1989 gave rise to 
the discourse 'democracy against communism'(民主抗共）(Tsang, 1997) and 
marginalized the Chinese state as a detestable figure in Hong Kong, and thereafter 
the rise of some local democrats. 
A summary of the analysis of social formation, its dialectic relationship with 
discursive formation, with regard to the hegemonic formation in the public discourse, 
is as follows: 
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Figure 2: Formation process of state hegemony in the public discourse 
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Inspired by Fairdough (1992, 1995b): the tier format between social and discursive 
formation 
# Public discourse is represented in mediated discourse. Since the case study of this thesis is 
Chinese state hegemony over the public discourse of Hong Kong pertaining to local 
democratization, the measurement scale for the hegemonic formation is the social resistance 
against China (see fig 3) 3 8 
The model consists of two layers: the discursive contestation in the public discourse 
(the inner oval ‘discursive formation') and the corresponding social formation in 
society (the outer oval ‘social formation'). The factors for hegemonic formation in 
the public discourse are all encompassed in these two ovals. Journalistic paradigms 
(discursive formation includes professionalism and ideologies embedded in the 
practices of media, F2), moral leadership of the state and various social groups 
(discursive formation of public credibility and trust, F3) and existing consensus in 
society (key discursive tool for hegemonic formation, F4) are located in the oval 
'discursive formation'. 
The oval ‘discursive formation, is embedded in the 'social formation, oval, because 
the discursive formation of a society is inextricably connected to the corresponding 
social formation (Fl, another factor affecting the hegemonic formation in the public 
discourse). Social power realignment between various segments e.g. the state and 
various social groups in the civil society affect the discursive contestation. The 
discursive contestation results in the changes of moral leadership held by various 
parties, social consensus and journalistic paradigms, determining the hegemonic 
formation in the public discourse i.e. whether a discourse can become hegemony in 
the discursive struggle in the public discourse. 
The model aims at illustrating the dynamics between the discursive formation in the 
public discourse and the corresponding social formation in the hegemonic formation 
process. Various social parties e.g. government (state power) and dissidents fight for 
the moral leadership in the society, and also compete with each other to articulate 
their discourses to the consensus and popular thoughts via media representation or 
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other means, thus affecting the content of these discursive elements. On the other 
hand, social parties who gain moral leadership have an effect on the power 
realignment in social formation: those parties who are trustworthy in the eyes of the 
public, those groups whose discourses are consistent with the prevailing consensus, 
have the upper hand when struggling with competing rivals in the social formation. 
Moral leadership is a general conception of the trustworthiness of social actors. This 
concept, to a certain extent, may be reflected by the popularity shown by polls 
pertaining to the level of support enjoyed by the administration and political leaders. 
Media plays a special role in this model. Media organizations are the participants of 
the social formation, yet they are also the main platform providing a space for the 
public discourse, as well as being the interface between various social groups and 
their representation in the mediated discourse. Thus, the journalistic paradigm has a 
crucial role in the mediated discourse, which is the space for the emergence of the 
public discourse in modem society. 
The model demonstrates how the discursive elements i.e. moral leadership and 
prevailing consensus/ popular thoughts, together with their interaction with the social 
formation and media, serve as factors affecting the hegemonic formation in the 
public discourse. 
Section 3.4 
Criticisms and implication on resistance strategy 
The above logic will allow researchers to focus, or at least pay close attention to the 
public discourse when scrutinizing the hegemonic formation in a society (e.g. Ku, 
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1999, 2001). The emergence of a mainstream discourse in the public discourse 
reflects the formation of hegemony, or at least the tendency towards it. The key task 
of the researchers is thus exploring how the state/ authority builds up her discursive 
bloc in the public discourse so as to establish the ruling hegemony i.e. the ruling of 
the existing authority as the ‘common sense'. 
Grassroots resistance 
However, the validity of the public discourse as the illustrative battlefield 
representing hegemonic formation in society is questioned by scholars from the 
resistant perspective. Scott (1985) argues that the exploited groups in fact are able to 
practice everyday forms of resistance against the domination groups, which are 
invisible in the public discourse. Scott (1990) even puts forward the contention that 
even in the public discourse where the domination has the upper hand; resistance still 
exists in an implicit form. Dissidents hide their resistant discourses under the ruling 
ideology in order to escape explicit attacks. Therefore, he argues that past studies of 
hegemony are inadequate in providing strong evidence of the existence of ideological 
incorporation from the domination over the subordinates. The concept of hegemony, 
to Scott (1985, 1990), is only an affirmation of allegiance within the ruling bloc via 
‘public transcript' (i.e. discourse that is employed publicly), because the consequence 
of domination is stirring up resistance (whether implicit and explicit) instead of 
ideological consent. 
My argument: public discourse is the key step for hegemonic formation 
While adding insights and reflections on the theory of hegemony, Scott's findings 
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and arguments are not powerful enough to overthrow the notion of hegemony, as 
well as the significance of the public discourse in hegemonic formation. 
Firstly, Scott reveals how the subordinates in a weak position resist against 
domination, and argues that domination results in resistance instead of ideological 
incorporation. However, there are counter-examples that illustrate that there are 
'subordinates' i.e. people who comply or even consent to the ruling bloc, such as 
those under Thatcherism in Britain (see Hall, 1988). Scott is not able to nullify the 
existence of ideological incorporation in the world, as hegemony also includes 
securing the allegiance of parties within the ruling bloc. 
Secondly, according to Gramsci (1971), the existence of hegemony does not imply 
the eliminating all resistance. On the contrary, the hegemonic discourse has to 
negotiate constantly in order to continue to ‘lead’. Thus, though Scott discovers the 
existence of resistance exist in many ‘dominated’ scenarios in which the authorities 
are believed to be winning the hegemonic status, these phenomena are not 
contradictory to the concept of hegemony , and can be understood as situations 
common in the existence of hegemony. 
Thirdly, though resistant forces maybe preserved, or grow in everyday life, they have 
to enter into the public discourse (whether via adopting official transcripts or 
explicitly) when they come to a final showdown against the ruling bloc. On the 
contrary, although the ruling bloc may not able to observe or control what is 
happening in everyday life, it has to try its best to maintain its ‘hegemonic status, in 
the public discourse, through justifying the authority to rule or responding to the 
challenges from resistant forces. Therefore, the public discourse may only be a 
4 2 
theater for the ruling bloc and other social forces. It is an important theater since the 
whole society is watching. Colonizing the public discourse is an indispensable step 
(not the only step) for a ruling bloc to build up hegemony in society, and occupying 
the public discourse is also the key step for resistant forces to challenge or dissemble 
the existing hegemony constructed by the ruling bloc. As a result, the public 
discourse is still a key battlefield for the war of position among social forces, 
including the ruling bloc, to build up their hegemony in the society. Even though 
colonizing the public discourse does not equate to building hegemony successfully, it 
is an important step in doing so. 
Nevertheless, Scott's thesis is significant with regard to the discursive strategy 
practiced by the resistant forces: practicing resistance by employing the official 
transcripts (i.e. discursive tools such as languages, signs that are created by the ruling 
bloc), but twisting the meanings in daily conversation, thus preserving resistance in 
everyday life. The former strategy gives a key insight in the scrutiny of how the 
dissidents resist the state hegemonic force in the public discourse: adding own , 
I 
resistant meanings to the official transcripts, whilst protecting themselves from 
explicit attacks from the state. 
Conclusion: Hegemony formation in the public discourse 
This chapter discusses the concept of public discourse. With regard to hegemony, the 
public discourse is where the discursive contestation (i.e. war of position) between 
various parties in the society takes place e.g. the ruling bloc and oppositional 
dissidents. Since mediated discourse (particularly the news media) is where the 
public discourse is represented in modem society, journalistic paradigm hence serves 
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as an essential factor in what and how discourses contest with each other, or how 
hegemony is formed in the public discourse. 
However, when scrutinizing the public discourse pertaining to hegemonic formation, 
researchers must also pay attention to the resistant strategy of the dissidents: whether 
the resistant discourses are 'hidden' under the official transcripts in order to avoid 
explicit attacks. The awareness of resistant forces can offer researchers extra 
sensitivity when scrutinizing the public discourse with regard to hegemonic 
formation, thus avoid jumping to conclusion by superficial reading of public texts 
such as media content. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODLOGY 
Theoretical concern 
The theoretical concern of this thesis is to inspect how a nation-state builds up and 
maintains hegemony in the public discourse. Informed by hegemony theory, this 
thesis is aimed at examining how a state makes her ruling a naturalized ‘common 
sense' to the people. The research focuses on the discursive contestation in the public 
discourse, which is a key step for the state to build up hegemony in society, as well 
as a strategic battlefield for other social forces to challenge the moral leadership of 
the state. 





The democratization of Hong Kong is an illustrative case study to scrutinize how a • 
state builds up hegemony in the public discourse of a newly incorporated city. 
Socialist China incorporated a capitalist city, Hong Kong, in 1997, the latter is so 
different from the Mainland in terms of socio-economic contexts (capitalism VS 
socialism) and political structure (approaches to democracy VS autocratic). The 
democratization of Hong Kong affects both China and Hong Kong, in that political 
reforms of Hong Kong relevant to power distribution are not only between parties 
inside the territory, but also between the central authority (i.e. China) and local 
administration (i.e. HKSAR). 
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To ensure that she is not only gaining the territory, but also the substantive power to 
exercise her sovereignty over it, China has been exerting her influences over Hong 
Kong，especially towards the reforms of the political structure since the transitory 
period (1984 to 1997) before the handover, via discursive contestation in the public 
discourse and in the social power realignment in Hong Kong. This historical context 
provides an opportunity to capture how the state attempts to build up hegemony in 
the public discourse of a newly incorporated city, as well as how the public discourse 
responds to the rise of the state discourse. 
To scrutinize the representation and penetration of the Chinese state ideological 
discourse over the Hong Kong public discourse with regard to local democratization, 
this thesis would contemplate the war of position (i.e. discursive contestation) 
between the Chinese discourse and other competing discourses before and after the 
handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China. 
Research questions 
Turning the theoretical concern into research questions with reference to the context 
of the democratization of Hong Kong, this thesis attempts to tackle the two specific 
enquires below: 
參 What is China's state discourse on democratization of Hong Kong and how 
is it established in the public discourse in Hong Kong? (RQl) 
參 How does the public discourse in Hong Kong serve to build up or resist 
China's hegemony over Hong Kong? (RQ2) 
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Section 4.1 
Formation of state hegemony in the public discourse: an indicator 
Hegemony refers to the historical bloc that dominates the common sense and blocks 
other alternative articulations temporarily (Hall, 1988; Grossberg, 1996; Barker, 
2003), or putting this simply, unchallenged and naturalized common sense. Since the 
target of this thesis is to scrutinize the formation of state hegemony by China in the 
public discourse of Hong Kong, the research focus will be fine tuned to the state 
hegemony that China is attempting to build up in the public discourse of Hong Kong. 
The understanding of state hegemony in this thesis originates from the notion of 
hegemony: the ruling of the state as a naturalized common sense. In fact, Gramsci's 
notion of hegemony, to a large extent, refers to how the authority can win the consent 
of the subordinates in order to justify the existing ruling (Mouffe, 1979). An 
；k 
illustrative indicator is the nature of social resistance: the lower the level of social ！ 
t 
resistance against the ruling legitimacy of the state，the more successful the building ； 
丨'| 
V 
and maintenance of state hegemony. 
With regard to the social context of Hong Kong, the empirical yardstick for 
articulating the formation of state hegemony is based on the level of social resistance 
against the state i.e. China as represented in the public discourse of Hong Kong. This 
does not mean that resistance in everyday life that may not be visible in the public 
discourse is negligible in the study of hegemony. However, the research focus of this 
thesis is on the public discourse due to the following reasons: 
參 Building hegemony in the public discourse is an important step for the ruling 
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bloc to extend her hegemony into the whole society; 
參 Evolution of the public discourse is a helpful indicator to trace the historical 
development of the discursive contestation between the state and local resistant 
forces (at least those prominent) over a period of time. 
Therefore the indicator to articulate the formation of state hegemony in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong is mainly constructed on the level of resistance represented 
in the public discourse against China in accordance to the political and social context 




Formation of state hegemony: encapsulating social resistance 
HK context --- one country, two systems 
Level of social resistance Encapsulation 
State 
Central Regime One Country 
Basic Law (Boundary) 





Note: modified from Li (1997), including the four types of resistance (originally 
identified as four hierarchies of political conflicts: state, regime, rule and policy) and the 
notion of encapsulation. 
State: Resistance that involves the '\ve-group' feeling of nation-hood and slate, such 
as HK independence and objection to handover. 
Central Regime: Resistance that relates to the political system which determines 
how and under what conditions and limitations the power of the state is exercised in 
China. In the case study of this thesis，this means the Chinese constitution and 
political system i.e. the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in China. 
Basic Law: Resistance to this mini-constitution, which is the base and stronghold of 
the Chinese ruling over Hong Kong, the foundation of 'one country, two systems' 
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that stipulates the power distribution between central authority (China) and HKSAR. 
Local Regime: Resistance that involves the political system which determines how 
and under what conditions and limitations the power of the HKSAR administration is 
exercised, for instance, protests against the election mechanism of the chief 
executive. 
Local Rule: Resistance of the local institutional rules, arrangements and 
decision-making procedures (i.e. conflict resolution mechanism) in HKSAR e.g. 
particular legal procedure; 
Local Policy: Resistance that is more specific in content, within the decision-making 
procedures 
‘One country, two systems' is the framework promised by the ex-Chinese leader, the 
late Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平）as the condition for the handover of Hong Kong from 
Britain to China. This means that socialist China (i.e. one country) would allow the 
existence of two systems i.e. socialist system in Mainland and capitalist system in 




Basic Law is the realization of the framework ‘one country, two systems' in a legal 
form, stipulating the power distribution between the central authority and the local 
HKSAR administration. It is the embodiment of Chinese sovereignty over Hong 
Kong, and the interface between the ‘one country ‘i.e. central authority and ‘two 
systems' i.e. HKSAR. 
The higher the level of resistance is，the more damaging to the political entity (i.e. 
The People's Republic of China as well as the Chinese Communist Party). 
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Encapsulation is whether the state can alleviate social resistance to a lower level to 
safeguard her ruling by gaining consent and understanding from the other social 
parties via discursive contestation i.e. the building of state hegemony. 
Research logic 
The indicator of state resistance i.e. whether the state can encapsulate the social 
resistance to a lower level, is an indispensable part in the analytical model that 
scrutinizes the hegemonic formation process (see figure 2 in chapter 3). Variations of 
the factors i.e. social formation, journalistic paradigm, moral leadership of various 
parties and consensus/ popular thoughts of society will exert different impacts on the 
hegemonic formation process in the public discourse. Whether the state can build up 
her discourse, and encapsulate the resistant force to a lower level in the public 
discourse depend on the dynamics between the factors that are discussed above. 
The thesis thus will compare the public discourse in Hong Kong before and after the 
！ 
handover with regard to the discussion of the democratization of Hong Kong, and 
observe the evolution of resistance against the Chinese discourse represented in the 
local public discourse with the following aims: 
參 Whether local resistance against the China discourse has changed e.g. shift to a 
lower level after the handover; 
• Account for such changes (if any) with reference to the development of those 
factors of hegemonic formation (see the analytical model in chapter 3) in the 
public discourse before and after the handover. 
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From the data obtained from the public discourse and documentation, together with 
the analysis of the contextual factors, the thesis endeavors to offer some observation 
pertaining to what China's state discourse is, how China attempts to build up her 
discourse as hegemony in the public discourse in Hong Kong, and the responses 
(particularly the resistance) in the local public discourse. 
Section 4.2 
Methodology: textual analysis and documentation analysis 
This thesis adopts textual analysis to examine the key elements of the public 
discourse i.e. media texts (including news reportage, editorials and commentary) 
during the three milestone periods of the democratization of Hong Kong (i.e. the 
constitutional review from 1984 to 1988, Pattern reform package from 1992 to 1995, 
the controversy over universal suffrages for the election of the chief executive and all 
legislators in 2007 and 2008, the Debate on Patriotism and interpretation of Basic 
Law by NPCSC in early 2004, see chapter 5 for more details), in order to find out the 
evolution of the public discourse in Hong Kong with regard to local democratization 
throughout transitory period and post-handover years. 
Besides, the documents and literature of China's state ideological discourse over 
Hong Kong, such as speeches of Chinese leaders, Basic Law, comments from 
Chinese legal experts will also be examined, so as to scrutinize China's state 
ideological discourse toward democratization in Hong Kong, its origins and 
development. Hence, by comparing the dynamics between the Chinese state 
ideological discourse and the evolution of the local public discourse, the thesis aims 
at giving insights to whether, or to what extent and how, China can build up her 
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hegemony over the local public discourse on the issue of democratization. 
In this sense, the crux of the findings is not the frequency of particular words, 
phrases, issues or people that appear in media text. A term that comes into view many 
times in newspapers maybe as illustrative as a notion that put forward by some 
prominent participants of the Hong Kong public discourse which formulates a 
significant discourse at that time, though the latter may only appear occasionally. 
Thus, this thesis is not going to construct a numerical schedule to quantify the 
content of media texts. 
Concerning the validity of textual analysis, this thesis attempts to explore 
inter-subjectivity via referencing documents other than media texts: the 
bibliographies, testimonies and books composed by significant participants of the 
democratization of Hong Kong from the transitory period to the post-handover years, 
I 
such as Xu Jiatun (許家屯）(ex-director of Xinhua News Agency, China's highest 丨 
I 
ranking representative in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1990); Siu Weiyun (蕭蔚雲）(the | 
I i 
late professor from University of Beijing, who took part in the drafting of Basic Law, 
and the opinion war against Chris Pattern's reform in the early 1990s, and the Debate 
on Patriotism in early 2004); Martin Lee, Yeung Sum, Emily Lau (famous Hong 
Kong democrats); Allen Lee (politician and outspoken opinion leaders throughout 
the period under study); and also Chris Pattern (Hong Kong last governor). Besides, 
literature with regard to the democratization of Hong Kong would also be scrutinized. 
The author hopes to obtain triangulation relevant to the discursive contestation over 
the democratization of Hong Kong by making references to the testimonies of 
prominent participants of local public discourse. 
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Textual approach for discourse analysis 
The analytical approach of textual analysis that this thesis bases on is the discourse 
analysis model offered by Fairclough (1992, 1995b). Fairclough constructs a succinct 
model to demonstrate that discourse is a dynamic entity embedded within the 
articulation between social practice, discursive practice and text as follows: 









(Fairclough, 1992, 1995b) 
Fairclough, with his linguistic background, advocates the approach that takes text as 
the sampling units when studying discourse. However, his innovative approach is 
different from conventional linguistic scholars in that the meaning of text is not only 
within linguistic features and structures, but also embedded in discursive and social 
practices which are outside the text, as illustrated in the model (Fairclough, 1992, 
1995b). By taking discursive and social practices into account when interpreting text, 
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Fairclough provides a strong impetus to the reflexivity of discourse analysis to social 
context and the role of agency respectively. 
Therefore, the textual analysis of this thesis, apart from the content of media texts 
and other relevant documents and press releases，would also be employed in the 
study of the corresponding discursive practice (journalistic paradigm) and social 
practice (power realignment, e.g. united front initiated by China and resistance 
launched by local dissidents) before and after the handover. 
Section 4.3 
Sampling of media text 
The theoretical unit of analysis in this thesis is the public discourse. As discussed in 
chapter 2, different social forces become visible in the society and take part in the 
public discussion via media exposure, and hence the public discourse is often | 
I 
|i 
represented in the media. Therefore, the unit of observation in this research is media j 
texts, which carry ‘a web of inter-textual references between competing 
interpretations' (Ku, 1999) that become the public discourse. The sampling will 
concentrate on the printed media, since it is infeasible to retrieve the broadcast news 
from electronic media over many years. Thus the sampling units will be newspaper 
articles, including reportage, commentary and editorials. 
Sampling strategy 
Basically, the sampling strategy is based on two criteria: 
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1. Timeline: critical events of the democratization of Hong Kong 
The main objective of sampling is to capture the media discourse concerning the 
critical milestones of the democratization of Hong Kong: the constitutional review in 
the 1980s; the controversy of Chris Pattern's reform package in the early 1990s; and 
the controversy over holding universal suffrages for electing the chief executive and 
all legislators in 2007 and 2008, the Debate on Patriotism and interpretation of Basic 
Law by NPCSC in early 2004 (see chapter 5 for more details). 
2. Corresponding journalistic paradigms to the critical events above 
Journalistic paradigm in Hong Kong has changed throughout the transitory period to 
post-handover years. In order to select newspaper articles that can widely represent 丨 
different ideological standpoints in the public discourse, the sampling procedure is ！ 
going to be divided into two parts: media texts before and after the handover of Hong ; 
Kong. I 
Sampling of media text before the handover 
There are two milestone events pertaining to the democratization process of Hong 
Kong before the handover: constitutional review in the 1980s and the controversy 
over Chris Pattern's political reform in the early 1990s. Thus, when selecting media 
texts to review the public discourse at that time, the corresponding journalistic 
paradigm during that period should be considered. 
The journalistic paradigm before the handover, especially during and before the early 
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1990s, basically can be measured by two yardsticks: the political ideological 
spectrum and target audience/ content of news media: 
• Political ideological spectrum: due to the local partisan affiliation to the KMT in 
Taiwan and CCP in China, partisan newspapers were widespread in Hong Kong 
since the 1960s. Examples of leftist (CCP-sponsored) papers include Tai Kong 
Pao (大公報)，Wen Wei Pao (文匯報).Examples for rightist papers (Pro-KMT) 
are Wah Yiu Yat Pao (華橋日報)，United Daily (聯合報）and Sing Tao Daily 
(星島曰幸艮）(Sing Tao Daily later changed to a pro-CCP line approaching the 
handover), which are critical of Communist China. Yet, with the rising economy 
and press market in Hong Kong, some commercial centrist papers also appeared 
in the 1970s e.g. Ming Pao (明幸艮)• (For the origins and development of Hong 
Kong's journalistic paradigms, see Chan and Lee, 1991) j 
參 Target audience: Newspapers in Hong Kong can be divided into mass and elite 
papers when refering to their target audience/content. Papers which strategy ； 
1 
targets the general public and consists of pluralistic and juicy content are mass 
I-
papers, such as Oriental Daily (東方曰幸E). Papers intend to capture the middle 
to upper class and intellectuals in society with knowledge-intensive content are 
elite papers e.g. Hong Kong Economic Journal (信幸艮）and the South China 
Morning Post. 
Thus, to appraise the public discourse in Hong Kong with a representative 
ideological spectrum, this thesis selects samples of media texts from the following 
papers: Tai Kung Pao (大公報)，Wen Wei Pao (文匯報）（leftists), Ming Pao (明報） 
(centrist), Wah Yiu Yat Pao (華僑曰報）and United Daily (聯合幸艮)(rightist), Oriental 
Daily (東方曰幸艮）(mass paper) and Hong Kong Economic Journal (信幸g) and South 
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China Morning Post (elite papers) to scrutinize the two milestone events in the local 
democratization, constitutional review in the 1980s and controversy over Pattern's 
reform in the early 1990s. 
Sampling of media text after the handover 
The launch of Apple Daily (蘋果曰幸艮）in 1995 brought a 'revolution' to the press 
market in Hong Kong, particularly the subsequent price wars that caused a big blow 
to many newspapers. Apple Daily takes a pro-democracy view and has a 
market-oriented mindset, modeling on the popular paper in the United States, USA 
Today by putting readers' interests first. To increase her market share in Hong 
Kong's press industry, Apple Daily launched two price wars in Hong Kong: to sell 
the paper at $2 each, that was much cheaper than the price of newspapers at the time, i 
I 
i 
at $5 a copy. Many papers couldn't resist this brutal commercial battle and closed | 
丨i 
down. (See Sze, 1999 for more details on the price wars in the press industry in Hong i 
I.. 
•7 
Kong and the emergence of Apple Daily) 
i! 
The heavy loss resulted from the commercial war, together with the approach to the 
resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, the rightist papers either 
retreated from Hong Kong (Wah Yiu Yat Pao 華僑曰報，United Daily 聯合報)，or 
changed to a commercial and pro-China line gradually (Sing Tao Daily). Besides, 
some commercial papers, such as Oriental Daily, also become more sympathetic 
towards China (Lee and Chu, 1998). However, the role of the rightist papers as the 
fiercest critics of China in the press in Hong Kong was then substituted by Apple 
Daily. Apple Daily takes a pro-democracy stand, and becomes the exemplar of a 
critical paper against China amongst the Hong Kong press after 1997. 
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Nevertheless, the media landscape after the handover changed a lot from those of the 
early 1990s. Therefore, to scrutinize the public discourse in early 2004, concerning 
the Debate on Patriotism and NPCSC's interpretation and decision over the Basic 
Law in Hong Kong and universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008, the selection of media 
texts should take the corresponding journalistic paradigm at that moment into 
account. Therefore, the papers below are cited for analysis: 
• Apple Daily (most critical of China, mass paper); 
• Oriental Daily (pro-China, mass paper) 
• Ming Pao (centrist) j 
I 
參 Wen Wei Pao (leftist partisan paper) j 
j 
• Hong Kong Economic Journal (elite paper, critical of China) i 
I 
� 
The sampling strategy aims at avoiding biased reading of the media discourse in | 
iV i'； 
Hong Kong and thus intends to ensure that the media texts selected can represent 
丨i 
In 
opinions from various spectrums in the public discourse of Hong Kong. 
Media text 
The media text selected includes news reportage, commentaries and editorials. As 
previously discussed, the media has a dual role in the discursive formation in public 
sphere, site and social actor. Media is the arena where social actors engage in 
discursive struggles, while it is simultaneously an indispensable participant in the 
public discourse. Thus the selection of media text should fully reflect the media's 
dual role. 
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News reportage and commentaries are where local opinion leaders (including 
democrats and local dissidents) and government officials (including those from 
China, Britain, the colonial Hong Kong government and HKSAR government) put 
forward their discourses. News reportage is the amalgamation of opinions from 
interviewees (including social actors), journalistic paradigms ingrained in the 
reporters and organizational cultures of news agencies. Hence it is an illustration of 
the dynamics between the social actors and the media itself in the discursive 
formation in public discourse. Commentaries are the articles contributed by social 
actors to the newspapers, which discussion can be deeper and lengthier than those in 
news reportage. Yet moderation from the media and journalists still exists in j 
I I 
commentaries through the processes of amendment and selection. Therefore a critical 
and close examination of them can reveal the discursive contestation among the 
public discourse participants over the democratization of Hong Kong. I� 
I 
i . 
Besides, the news media itself is also a player of the public discourse. Its editorials (I 
丨:i 




THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF HONG KONG: 
A BRIEF REVIEW 
To examine the formation process of state hegemony in the public discourse, this 
thesis selects the democratization of Hong Kong as a case study. 
Hong Kong is now a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). She returned to Chinese sovereignty from British colonial 
administration in 1997. Britain seized the Hong Kong Island from the Qing Court in 
1842 after the Opium War, and extended this colony from Hong Kong Island to 
Kowloon Peninsula in 1856. In 1898, Britain ‘leased’ a large piece of land adjacent I 
to Kowloon, area from the north of Boundary Street in Kowloon to the south of 
Shenzhen River for 99 years. Accordingly, the lease would terminate in 1997. j 
！: 
1 
The study period of this thesis covers the ‘transitory period' of Hong Kong i.e. from 
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December, 1984 to the handover 
of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997 and the post handover era up to early 
2005. The focus is the establishment of the Chinese state ideological discourse 
towards Hong Kong, her participation in the contestation with other competing 
discourses in the local public discourse with regard to the democratization in Hong 




Establishing the state ideological discourse 
Democratization in Hong Kong has been nurtured under the rising influence of China 
since the transitory period, and after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over this 
Oriental Pearl in 1997. The democratization process grew up under the tug of war 
between China and Britain over the control of Hong Kong's constitutional 
development during the transitory period. After the handover, the local aspiration of 
democratization in Hong Kong is subject to the Chinese state ideological discourse 
and policy towards HKSAR, which is encapsulated in China's interpretation of the | 
j 
Basic Law, the mini-constitution for the HKSAR. Due to the above historical and ; 
I 
I 
social context, democratization in Hong Kong, to a large extent, is subject to the 





China has been exerting her influence over the democratization of Hong Kong, either , 
via opinion war or state behavior e.g. United Front works, the setting up of the U 
t 
political structure of the HKSAR (i.e. the drafting of Basic Law, the establishment of 
the provisional legislative assembly) and exercising constitutional power (i.e. 
interpretation of the Basic Law by the National People Congress Standing 
Committee NPCSC^). As a result, there have been many occasions when the state 
ideological discourse clashes with and penetrates the local public discourse with 
regard to the democratization of Hong Kong. Thus, democratization of Hong Kong is 
a vivid illustration of how state hegemony is established and maintained through the 
public discourse, and how the public discourse serves to facilitate or resist the 
2 The National People Congress NPC is the national legislative body of the People's Republic of 
China. The standing committee of NPC is called the National People Congress Standing Committee 
NPCSC. 
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establishment of a state hegemony. 
Section 5.2 
Democratization before and after the handover 
After the Second World War, thanks to the weakening of the old colonial powers, 
Britain, France and Netherlands for instance, the wave of decolonization swept over 
the world. The decolonization process was usually accompanied by democratization, 
the colonial masters often tried to leave democratic governments whilst retreating 
I 
from their colonies. Yet, Hong Kong is an exception. 
I I 
I 
The civil war between Kuomingtan (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
in China after the World War II gave Britain an opportunity to retain Hong Kong, her i. 
！ 
i 
fragile colony on the coastline of southern China, since KMT was not powerful ’ 
I；' 、 
enough to reclaim Hong Kong. Neither was CCP willing to do so after the civil war |; 
V： 丨;: 
(Hook, 1997). Subsequent attempts to introduce a more representative government in il 
I 
Hong Kong were abandoned due to objection from the local elites (Hook, 1997; 
White III，2001) and London's concern over penetration from KMT and CCP in 
Hong Kong (Hook, 1997). Even facing the social uprisings in the 1960s and civic 
movements in the 1970s (see Lui and Chu, 1999), the Hong Kong colonial 
government, instead of introducing democracy, formulated a strategy of 
'Administrative Absorption of Polities' (King, 1981) to co-opt more social elites and 
dilute the oppositions in the society, so as to maintain the stability and legitimacy of 
colonial rule. 
6 3 
The handover and democratization of Hong Kong 
The turning point was when Britain and the Communist China negotiated to solve the 
'Hong Kong question' in the early 1980s. The New Territories and the zone that is 
the north of the Boundary Street in Kowloon, 92% of the whole area of Hong Kong, 
were ‘leased’ to Britain for 99 years in 1898 by the Qing dynasty. The lease was 
going to terminate in 1997 accordingly, and Britain started to test whether 
Communist China would let the colonial rule to continue after that year in the late 
1970s (Roberti, 1996). 
I 
Margaret Thatcher, the Iron Lady who became the Prime Minister of Britain in 1979, j 
丨, 
I 
visited Beijing in 1982 to negotiate with China over the above issue. However, 
I 
China's de facto leader at that time, Deng Xiaoping, gave the Iron Lady an emphatic j , 
answer: China was not prepared to talk about sovereignty over Hong Kong or 




return . At last the two leaders agreed to initiate negotiation over the Hong Kong 
question with the prime aim to maintain the prosperity and stability of this tiny 
colony4，followed by subsequent talks between the Chinese and British governments 
over the future of Hong Kong lasting 17 months from July 1983 to the Joint 
Declaration (JD) between these two countries, signed at the end of 1984. Britain 
finally agreed to abandon her administration over Hong Kong in 1997, with China's 
promise of preserving capitalism, autonomy and the way of life in Hong Kong within 
the framework of 'one country, two systems': capitalism in Hong Kong can 
3 See the memoirs of Margaret Thatcher: (1993) Margaret Thatcher --- the Downing Street Years, pp 
259 to 262; HarperCollins, USA and also DengXiaoping's talk with Margaret Thatcher: Our Basic 
Position on the question of Hong Kong, 24 September, 1982 in (1993) DengXiaoping on the question 
of Hong Kong, New Horizon Press, HK. 
4 ibid 
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simultaneously exist under socialist China for 50 years. 
However, the Joint Declaration (JD) did not mean that the handover had settled. On 
the contrary, it was just the beginning of Sino-British confrontation over the control 
of Hong Kong, particularly the constitutional development of the transitory period 
that lasted beyond 1997. The local aspiration of democratization developed under the 
tug or war between China and Britain. 
1) Constitutional review in the 1980s 
Chinese influences over the democratization in Hong Kong can be traced back to the ‘ 
controversy over representative government and direct election of the Legislative ‘ 
Council from the mid to late 1980s. Just after the signing of JD, the colonial Hong 
Kong government initiated the constitutional review of the political system in Hong ‘ 
•I 
Kong. Governor Edward Youde's administration issued the Green paper and White 丨 
！?i 
paper with regard to the constitutional development of Hong Kong in 1984 and 1985 "丨 
. . t! 
respectively, and stimulated large scale discussion about democratization in Hong 
Kong in the public discourse. The focus of public discussion turned to whether Hong 
Kong should introduce direct election in the legislative council election in 1988, 
when the colonial Hong Kong government issued the green paper again in 1987. 
Various opinion leaders, including some vocal legislators, pressure groups, the legal 
professionals and clergy, advocated direct election in 1988 so as to ensure that public 
opinion would be represented and respected by the administration^ 
5 For example, see South China Morning Post, Szeto Wah's comments (22""^  June, 1987), report on 
Hong Kong Law Journal (25山 June, 1987)，Bishop John Baptist Wu (26山 June, July 1987)， 
commentaries written by David Chen (30^ June, 1987)，Tim Moore (26* June, 1987), and also report 
on 'group of 130’（an alliance of more than 130 political and community groups that supported direct 
election as early as possible) on Febraryl987. 
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Simultaneously, China tried to co-opt the local elites of Hong Kong and exert her 
influence over constitutional development in Hong Kong by the drafting of Basic 
Law which stipulated the political structure of HKSAR after the handover (Tsang, 
1997). The drafting of Basic Law then became one of the focuses in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong with regard to local democratization, particularly when 
Chinese officials and the pro-China camp insisted on the 'convergence' discourse (銜 
接論)：all political development before the handover should comply with the 
parameters in the Basic Law (see chapter 6 and chapter 7 for more details). The Basic 
Law, which was finished and approved by the National People Congress (NPC) in 
April 1990, subsequently became a fundamental base for China to exert her 
I 






Under Chinese influence, the colonial Hong Kong government backed down to a 
I : 
certain extent, refused to bring in direct election in the 1988 legislative council j； 
election (Roberti, 1996) . In fact, John Chan, the deputy chief secretary of colonial p 
Hong Kong government, confessed that the drafting of the Green paper in 1987 was 
under Chinese influence?. Yet, finally direct election was introduced to the Hong 
Kong legislative council in 1991 after the compromise between China and Britain 
(Roberti, 1996; Tsang, 1997). 
2) The 4th June incident: a turning point for local support of democratization 
In the midst of controversy over democratization in Hong Kong, China herself was 
6 Also see Chris Patten, (1998) East and West: The last governor of Hong Kong on power, freedom 
and the future, Macmillan Publishers Limited, London, pp 29 to 37. 
7 South China Morning Post, 28, May, 1987 
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also shocked by the demand for political and social reforms in the 1980s in the 
Mainland. The mounting demands for democracy in China finally led to large-scale 
rallies in Beijing, and resulted in the Tiananmen Massacre on the June 1989: the 
Chinese Communist Party ordered the army to crush the crowds brutally. Chinese 
government did not only crush the bodies of the civilians in Tiananmen, but also the 
heart of people in Hong Kong, ignited tremendous diatribes and anger from nearly 
every level in Hong Kong: from the leftists to the rightists, businessmen to the 
grassroots. During the climax of furious sentiments against the Chinese Communist 
Party and sympathy to the Mainland students, even the leftist papers attacked China 
(Fung, 1999), as did the local leftists^. Even Hong Kong business leaders were 
reluctant to see the Chinese leaders after the tragedy^. ‘ 
After the 4 June incident, confidence of Hong Kong people was at the lowest. At 
the same time, local desire for democratization and support for the local democratic ‘ 
I 
丨 
forces were boosted (Hook, 1997; Tsang, 1997), in order to build up a democratic [ 
”丨。 
administration as a barrier against Chinese interference (the discourse ‘democracy \% 
I 
against communism'民主抗共，see chapter 7 for more details). It led to the victory 
of the democratic camp in the 1991 legislative council election (the first time since 
the introduction of direct election in Hong Kong) (Tsang, 1997; Ku, 1999). 
3) Patten's constitutional reform package: Sino-British conflict in the early 
1990s 
The 1991 legislative council election was followed by the arrival of Chris Patten in 
8 See Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 2, 
United Daily News, Taiwan, pp 363 to 370. 
9 Ibid, pp 380 to 385 
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October, 1992 as the last governor of Hong Kong. Chris Patten speeded up 
democratization in Hong Kong, that resulted in Sino-British quarrels over Hong 
Kong's constitutional development during the late transitional period and ended in 
the breaking of the 'through train, (i.e. a metaphor refers to allowing the Legislative 
Council which was elected in 1995 to continue her tenure beyond 1997 until 1999): 
China set up 'alternative stove' (refers to the HKSAR'^ preparatory committee and 
provisional legislative assembly, the statutory bodies set up by China) to replace the 
elected legislative council in 1995 after the handover. i 
The constitutional reform launched by Chris Patten in 1992 for the election of the 
Legislative Council in 1995 nevertheless was a milestone for democratization in ‘ 
I 
I 
Hong Kong. After the passing of the Basic Law in April, 1990，the number of ‘ 
directly elected seats for the first term of the legislature in the future HKSAR was 
fixed at 20, this limit became a de facto ceiling for the number of directly elected ‘ 
seats in the 1995 legislative council election, as China insisted that the political 
structure before 1997 should be in accordance with the parameters in Basic Law. 丨 
t： 
However, Chris Patten made full use of the 'gray area' in Basic Law: there are no 
stipulations for concrete definitions of ‘functional constituency' and 'electoral 
college' in the legislature of future HKSAR (Ku, 1999). Functional constituency in 
the past was dominated by corporate votes and limited franchise. Patten abolished the 
corporate votes, extended the franchise of the functional constituency to 2.7 million 
working population in Hong Kong, which actually turned the election of the 
functional constituency into quasi-direct-elected seats. Besides, under Patten's 
reform package, the electoral college consisted of all members of the District Board, 
� HKSAR stands for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
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who were all directly elected at the They elected among themselves to get the 
seats in the Legislative Council in 1995. Through this arrangement, the seats in the 
Legislative Council generated by the electoral college, were in fact by a process of 
non-direct universal suffrage (for more details about Patten reform, see Cheng, 1995; 
Ku, 1999). 
The three violations and 'alternative stove' 
Patten's reform received popular support from the general public in Hong Kong 
(Cheng, 1995; Lo, 1995), some local democrats even urged Patten to adopt a faster ； 
I 
pace in democratization (Ku, 1999). Yet, Chris Patten and his reform ignited China's ‘ 
I ' 
furious attacks. Pattern was framed as a ‘man of eternal villain (千古罪人)’，and his ‘ 
reform was criticized as 'three violations,(三違反）by China, as follows^^: 
t/� / 
• Violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration: Patten hadn't consulted China 
over the constitutional development of Hong Kong in advance; | 
• Violation of the Basic Law: Patten's maneuvers of extending the franchise of 
functional constituency, and the arrangement of electoral college were not 
consistent with the parameters of Basic Law. Lu Ping, the director of the Hong 
Kong of Macau Affair Office under the state council of China at that time, 
insisted that the interpretation of Basic Law was up to China, not Chris Patten, 
11 The District Board was a local consultative body in Hong Kong, and its members had been all 
directly elected since the 1990s. However, the HKSAR government re-arranged the appointed seats in 
the District Board when re-naming it the District Council in 1999. 
12 See the speech by the spokesmen of the Chinese Foreign Affair Ministry, 28^ February, 1994 [載於： 
(1997)袁求實編，「香港過渡時期重要文件匯編」，香港，三聯書店(香港)有限公司，頁一四二至 
一六二] In English: Yuan Qiushi (ed) (1997), Xianggang guo du shi qi zhong yao wen jian hui bian, 
Hong Kong, San lian shu dian (Xianggang) Limited, pp 142 to 162. 
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and therefore claimed that Pattern couldn't interpret the Basic Law^^ 
參 Violation of the understanding between the foreign ministers of China and 
Britain on the pace of Hong Kong's constitutional development. China claimed 
that the documents exchanged between the foreign ministers of China and 
Britain were the understanding between both sides with regard to the election 
arrangement of Hong Kong, which didn't include the provisions in Pattern's 
reforms. 
When China and Britain failed to reach agreement on Patten's reform, China set up 
an ‘alternative stove’（另起爐灶)：established the HKSAR preparatory committee 
and the Provisional Legislative Assembly to counteract the Legislative Council ‘ 
I ] 
elected in 1995. The elected councilors in 1995 could not enjoy the 'through train' ‘ 
beyond 1997: they had to step down after the handover, and the remaining tenure 
would be taken over by the Provisional Legislative Assembly, a legislature elected by 
an electoral committee with limited franchise under China's arrangement. | 
u 
I 、 
4) The Debate on Patriotism and interpretation of Basic Law in early 2004 
After the handover, social attention shifted to socio-economic conditions of the 
HKSAR due to the Asian financial crisis, the subsequent collapse of property prices, 
stock market and economic downturn, the political agenda became a less prominent 
public concern during the early years of the Tung Chee Wah (”�Chie f Executive of 
HKSAR) administration^'^. On the other hand, the central government in Beijing also 
seldom appeared in the public discourse in Hong Kong since the handover (except 
13 See Lu Ping's speeches, in Wen Hui Pao，24* October, 1992 and January, 1993. 
14 See HKU pop site: http://hkupop.hku.hk/ (Index of agenda that the citizens concern) 
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for the right of abode issue in 1999^^). Therefore, democratization was not an 
important issue in the local public discourse during the first few years after 1997. 
The ist July demonstration: turning point for local aspiration of 
democratization 
However, the massive July demonstration in 2003 put the political agenda of 
democratization in Hong Kong at the top of the public discourse. Due to the turmoil 
of SARS in early 2003 and furious local sentiments against the enactment of the Bill 
of National Security, which was initiated by the HKSAR government to fulfill the 
requirement of the Basic Law Article 23, 500000 Hong Kong citizens joined the rally 
and marched to show their discontent towards the HKSAR government. 
Since then the local aspiration for democratization gained a strong voice in the public 
I 
ij 
discourse in Hong Kong, the victory of the pro-democratic camp in the District j 
1: 
Council election at the end of 2003 further triggered the local democrats to urge for a j 
m 
faster pace of democratization in Hong Kong. Support for universal suffrages to elect 
the next Chief Executive and all members of the Legislative Assembly in 2007 and 
2008 respectively (i.e. the double universal suffrages 雙普選）soon became the most 
prominent political agenda in Hong Kong, particularly when the HKSAR 
government decided to launch a constitutional review at the beginning of 2004. By 
15 In 29, January, 1999, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) made a ruling, granted the 
children of Hong Kong people who stayed in the Mainland the right of abode in Hong Kong. The 
controversy is: the CFA claimed that the court of Hong Kong should not follow the decision of 
National People Congress (NPC, national legislative body of China) if the latter breached the Basic 
Law. This ruling antagonized the central government, since this implied that the court of Hong Kong 
could judge, or even challenge NPC authority and decisions. This issue gave rise to a series of debates 
in the public discourse in Hong Kong with the vocal participation of the central government, 
particularly with reference to the NPCSC's (National People Congress Standing Committee, standing 
committee of the national legislative body of China) interpretation of Basic Law in June 1999，to 
nullify the right of abode of many abode-right seekers. (See Fung, 2004 for more details) 
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the end of 2003, opinion polls illustrated that over 70% of citizens supported 
universal suffrages for the next Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly in 2007 
and 200816. demonstration of 100000 citizens on the January 2004 also 
vividly indicated the keen demand for democracy in the civil society. 
The intervention from central government 
However, the Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤)expressed deep concern over the 
constitutional development of Hong Kong when Chief Executive C. H. Tung 
reported duty to him in December 2003. The constitutional review was then 
I 
suspended by the Central Government, followed by a large-scale opinion war: the j 
I I 
Debate on Patriotism initiated by Mainland legal experts, scholars, officials and state 
1 
media from January 2004. As indicated by the Hong Kong Journalists Association, ！ 
the Central Government did this deliberately and 'cauterized local aspirations by ‘ 
I 
deciding that fiill democracy could not be implemented in 2007 and 2008，(HKJA, ； 
2004). I 
\ 
Then, with precautious steps, the central government decided to close the door on 
universal suffrages: in late March, the National People Congress Standing 
Committee (NPCSC, the standing committee of the national legislative body in 
China) announced that it would interpret relevant articles in Basic Law with regard to 
the constitutional development of Hong Kong, and did so on the April, 2004 to 
proclaim that constitutional development in Hong Kong should comply with the 
principle of ‘gradual and orderly manner'(循序漸進）and ‘balanced participation' 
16 HKU pop site: http://hkupop.hku.hk/ 
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(均衡參與）of all social sectors, and take full account of the 'actual situation'(實際 
情況）in Hong Kong. 
Two weeks later, Tung's administration drafted a report and denounced the holding 
of universal suffrages to elect both the Chief executive and Legislative Council in 
2007 and 2008 (the double direct election). The report was soon endorsed by the 
NPCSC as the base to make decision to ban ‘double universal suffrages' on the 
April 2004 ‘in accordance with the Basic Law'. The democratization of Hong Kong 
is still moving towards the ultimate goal, universal suffrage, but without a concrete 
timetable and subject to the principles of 'gradual and orderly manner'(循序漸進） 
and ‘balanced participation'(均衡參與)from all social sectors. j 
I 
Section 5.3 
Hegemony and democratization in Hong Kong 
f 
i'： 
Therefore, democratization in Hong Kong involves China and Hong Kong (and i! 
丨、 
Britain before 1997). Democratization, by changing the existing political structure to 
a more democratic one, implies power reshuffle in the society. To make things more 
complicated, the democratization of Hong Kong involves numerous stakeholders 
both inside and outside the territory: China and Britain, particularly the former, who 
is now the ruler of Hong Kong. China, together with numerous parties in Hong Kong, 
including local dissidents, business and social elites, leftists (pro-Beijing camp), try 
to articulate the local democratization to their concerns and interests. China took part 
actively in the public discourse in Hong Kong by opinion war and state behavior 
during the three milestones of local democratization: 
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Before the handover: 
參 The constitutional review of Hong Kong in the 1980s: China took part in it by 
the drafting of Basic Law and stipulating that any political reform before the 
handover must be 'convergent' to the parameters in Basic Law; 
參 Patterns reform: China attacked the reform as ‘three violations', emphasizing 
that the right to interpret Basic Law was owned by China, not Chris Patten, and 
even set up 'another stove' (the HKSAR preparatory committee and provisional 
legislative assembly) to close the elected legislative council in 1995 after the 
handover; 
After the handover: 
• The Debate on Patriotism to restrain aspiration in Hong Kong for 
democratization in early 2004, and the subsequent interpretation of Basic Law 
and decision made by the NPCSC to reject universal suffrages for the election 
of the chief executive and all legislators in 2007 and 2008 respectively. 
The research focus of this thesis is how China, the state that resumes sovereignty 
over Hong Kong in 1997, builds up her ideological discourse over democratization in 
Hong Kong in the local public discourse, and above all, whether or to what extent 
China could build up her ideological discourse as hegemony in the public discourse 
of Hong Kong throughout the period under study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
NEVER BE A BASE OF SUBVERSION: 
CHINA'S STATE DISCOURSE TOWARDS HONG KONG 
Chapter 6 is going to answer the following research question: 
RQl: What is China's state discourse on democratization of Hong Kong and 
how is it established in the public discourse in Hong Kong? I 
1 ) I 
f 
To scrutinize the establishment of China's state hegemony in the public discourse of j 
I 
I 
Hong Kong, it is crucial to have a reflexive account of what China's state discourse ‘ 
is and how it is formulated and developed. The crux of the examination is to employ |, 
the discourse analysis approach to investigate the discursive elements of China's 广 
j 
state discourse, their articulations as well as the power relations implied, with full 
regard to the corresponding social context and empirical data. Besides, the discursive 丨丨/ 
• ^ 
strategy for China to build up her state discourse in the public discourse of Hong 
Kong, a newly incorporated city in 1997, also serves as an illustrative case study of 
the discursive strategy for the building of the state discourse in a recently claimed 
territory. 
Discursive strategy often goes hand in hand with social participation, as discursive 
struggle and social formation are inextricably tied together. Thus, apart from 
investigating China's discursive strategy, her maneuvers to strengthen the state power 
and influence in Hong Kong e.g. United Front works 統戰 will also be explored, so 
as to examine how China enhanced the social back-up for her state discourse. 
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Discourse analysis aims at scrutinizing the articulation between discursive elements 
(e.g. signs and practices) and the implied power relationship and social identity 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). When investigating the articulations of the discursive 
elements of a discourse, one should pay attention to the ‘nodal points' i.e. the 
privileged signs that are employed most often to articulate other discursive elements 
in the discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The nodal points serve as the flagships 
of the discourse as they are usually the 'centers' surrounded by the articulations from 
other discursive elements. Besides, discourse analysis should also be reflexive of the ； 
dynamics between discursive and social practices so as to take into account the social 
and historical context beyond linguistic features in the process of understanding the 
articulations of discursive elements (Fairclough, 1992, 1995b). Therefore, when 
) 
I 
scrutinizing the fixation of meanings of particular signs or practices, one must be 
reflexive of the corresponding social power realignment and historical context of that 
i • •tj 
discursive formation. 
i 
Articulation to public symbols: entry of everyday conception | 
The examination of the discursive formation process must also involve the 
distinction between the philosophical moment and the common sense level (Gramsci, 
1971; Donald and Hall, 1986): The philosophical moment refers to the ideological 
logic of the discourse i.e. the power relations and identity implied, while the common 
sense level refers to how that discourse articulates to existing consensus (i.e. those 
public symbols that are popular among the masses) in society, in order to be 
comprehensible and acceptable to the people. If the nodal points of a discourse are 
able to articulate to those existing popular public symbols in society, then the 
discourse will be known and acceptable to the masses. Yet, many other discourses 
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would also try to articulate their nodal points to those popular public symbols, 
resulting in discursive struggles among discourses. 
Discursive strategy of the building of the state discourse 
Communist China has to cultivate her state discourse in this former British colony in 
which anti-communist feeling prevails. Therefore, the discursive strategy for China 
to alleviate this circumstantial obstacle; her discursive logic; the structure of her state 
discourse (nodal points，discursive elements); and above all, the tactics that China 
employs to articulate her discourse to the existing public symbols in Hong Kong to I 
make the state discourse more appealing under the social context of Hong Kong all 
J . 
serve as illustrations in this study. The examination of the discursive strategy 
1 
practiced by China to build up her state discourse in the public discourse in Hong 丨 
Kong, can to a certain extent provide insights to the construction of the state 
I ' 
discourse in a newly claimed territory. 
i!/：. 
However, before scrutinizing the discursive package and strategy of China's state 
discourse, it is crucial to have a factual account of its discursive logic and the 
background of China's concerns over Hong Kong. 
Section 6.1 
Discursive logic of China's state discourse: 
its background and formation 
The crux of section 6.1 is to give a thick description of the discursive logic of 
China's state discourse, and the social background of the formation of such 
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discursive logic. This section aims to provide robust textual evidence and arguments 
for the observation in section 6.2, and offer a factual account of the discursive logic 
of China's state discourse, and above all, explain why China has such concerns. 
The discursive logic of China's state discourse towards Hong Kong in the past 
two decades basically emphasizes the power relationship between China and 
Hong Kong as an unequal one: China is the master over Hong Kong, reflected 
by these two main themes: 
• Securing the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in China while i 
I 
incorporating Hong Kong: Hong Kong can never be a base of subversion of | 
I 
China; 
參 Securing the control over Hong Kong by the central authority (i.e. China), 
therefore China will not allow ‘democracy against communism'(民主抗共） 
li 
(building a barrier against China in Hong Kong by democratization) and try to 
prevent local dissidents i.e. democrats from seizing the local administrative f： 
power (奪權). 
China promises Hong Kong to preserve her way of life after the handover under the 
framework of ‘one country, two systems', but definitely does not allow capitalism in 
Hong Kong to become the ‘Trojan Horse': a base to subvert or initiate peaceful 
evolution against Communist China. This is summed up precisely by the Minister 
Mentor (ex-Prime Minister) of Singapore, Lee Kuan-yew: 
‘Beijing has no intention of allowing Hong Kong to be a pacesetter or a 
Trojan horse, or whatever metaphor you wish to choose, to try to change 
7 8 
the system in China.‘ 
Lee Kuanyew (李光耀)，Singapore's Minister Mentor, ex-Prime 
Minister, South China Morning Post, 31'^  March, 2005 
The discursive logic above reflects an obvious power relation between China and 
Hong Kong: China is the master of Hong Kong, and Hong Kong by no means should 
attempt to affect the political leadership and system in China. Why China has such 
discursive logic in her state discourse? 






The Chinese Communist Party was not popular, and was even regarded as a ！ 
I 
detestable stigma in Hong Kong before the handover. Most of the people in Hong 
Kong are the second generation of refugees from the Mainland. The latter suffered a 
J 
lot in the Cultural Revolution ^^  and other chaos in the Mainland, leaving an 
anti-communist feeling to the next generation^Besides, the taking off of Hong fi 
• X a i 
Kong's economy and social life from the 1970s also resulted in the building up of a 
Hong Kong identity at the expense of the people's allegiance to Communist China. 
The ex-director of Xinhua News agency Hong Kong branch (Chinese highest ranking 
representative in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1990) Xu Jiatun (許家屯)asserts: 
‘During my contact with people from various places in the (Hong Kong) 
17 The Cultural Revolution took place in Mainland China from 1966 to 1976，which was launched by 
the first President of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, to seize the power from his 
political enemies in 1966. The whole nation then was in extreme chaos due to political and social 
disturbances. This disaster terminated with the death of Mao and the fall of the 'gang of four' 
(political clique which obtained power during the late period of Cultural Revolution) in 1976. 
See Xu Jiatun (1993)，Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1，pp 
91 to 94. Also see Chris Patten (1998) East and West: The last governor of Hong Kong on power, 
freedom and the future, Macmillan Publishers Limited, London, pp 28 to 29. 
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society, I have a strong feeling, many of them said "You the Chinese ”，"We 
the HongKongers ”. It seems that Hong Kong is no longer a part of China, 
but an independent political entity. ’ 
Xu, Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatun 's Hong Kong Memoirs, vol 1, p. 90 
Due to the unpopular image of the Chinese Communist regime in Hong Kong in the 
1970s and 1980s, the Sino-British negotiation over the future of Hong Kong stirred 
up heated debate among the local public discourse. Though China repeatedly 
promised there would be no changes in Hong Kong after the handover, Lin Xinzhi 丨 
(林行止),the founder of Hong Kong Economic Journal (信幸艮）and a famous writer 
in Hong Kong, exposed the doubts and distrust of Hong Kong people towards the 
11 
handover and Communist China vividly: 丨 
‘Beijing should understand that Hong Kong people clearly know that the ‘ 
capitalist system is not perfect, most of the Chinese who live in Hong Kong J' 
are not admirers of the west. However, the acceptable record of 
governance in the past hundred years gives them confidence of the \ 
political structure, rule of law and the currency system here (in Hong ！ 
Kong); but according to the records, people are always doubtful of the 
promises and guarantees made by the Beijing authority. This is the crux of 
the problem' 
Lin, Xinzhi (林行止)，commentary in the Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
30* November 1982 
In fact the Chinese authority at that time also realized that most of people in Hong 
Kong actually didn't support the return of their homeland to China, though they 
might not dare to express this idea explicitly^^. There are similar observations from 
19 See Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1, pp 
80 
foreigners in Hong Kong pinpointing the distrust and fear of Communist China 
amongst the people of Hong Kong (e.g. Roberti, 1996), as late as the eve of the 
handover in 1997^^ 
China's requirement of the HKSAR administrative leaders: the patriots 
In view of the general deep-rooted distrust of the Hong Kong people towards the 
communist regime in the Mainland before the handover, China was determined to 
safeguard her control over the future HKSAR government by ensuring that those 
administering Hong Kong are ‘patriots’，as suggested by the ex-Chinese leader Deng 卜 
Xiaoping (鄧小平)2i: f 
11 
I 
'Some requirements or qualifications should be established with regard : 
to the administration of the affairs in Hong Kong by the people of Hong : 
Kong. It is essential that patriots form the main body of administrators, 
J. 
that is, of the future government of the Hong Kong special region.， 
I丨V 
Ik 
So, what are the criteria of a ‘patriot，？ Deng continues: 
'The qualifications for a patriot are respect for the Chinese nation, 
sincere support for the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong and a desire not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and 
stability. Those who meet these requirements are patriots, regardless of 
whether they believe in capitalism or feudalism or even slavery. We don ’t 
91 to 94 
20 Chris Patten (1998) East and West: The last governor of Hong Kong on power, freedom and the 
future, Macmillan Publishers Limited, London, pp 29 
21 Deng Xiaoping's talk with industrial and commercial delegation, and with Sze-Yuen Chung (鐘士 
元)and other prominent Hong Kong figures: One Country, Two systems, 22-23 June 1984, New 
Horizon Press, HK pp 6 to 11. In fact, some prominent dissidents in Hong Kong also observed China's 
distrust of Hong Kong people, see Yeung Sum (楊森)(1988) Xianggang min zhuyun dong (香港民主 
運動)，Hong Kong, Wide Angle Press Ltd, pp 150 to 153; Martin Lee (1989) Li Zhuming min zhu yan 
lunji (李柱銘民主言論集)，Hong Kong, Tian yuan shu wu (田園書屋）pp 195 to 205 
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demand that they are in favour of China，s socialist system; we only ask 
them to love the motherland and Hong Kong ‘ 
Deng Xiaoping's concern over the future leadership of the HKSAR government 
echoed the doubts of Xu Jiatun, the observation by Lin Xinzhi and Chris Patten (see 
previous paragraphs and footnotes) before the handover: an implicit，but significant 
portion of Hong Kong people did not actually support the handover, distrusted China 
and pledged their affiliation to Hong Kong rather than China. To guarantee her 
control over the future HKSAR, China was determined to make sure that the future 
administrative leaders would be loyal to her by specifying that the leaders are 
'patriots', who support the handover, even if they do not believe in socialism j 
I' 
I 
practiced in China. 1； 
China's anxiety over the democratization of Hong Kong 
•丨 
J 
China's determination to ensure that the future HKSAR leaders would be 'patriots' 
i 
induced her hostility toward the democratization of Hong Kong, since facing the k 
anti-communism sentiment, her supporters i.e. the pro-China camp in Hong Kong 
would most probably be doomed to failure in a general election, as indicated by Lin 
Xinzhi: 
'Basically Hong Kong people resist communism, and in fact are 
anti-communist. Yet this term may sound too severe now, therefore is 
substituted by a more moderate phrase “resisting communism ”. All those 
who want to do well in a popular election that is not directed or 
manipulated by Beijing should avoid being too pro-communism, at least 
they have to do this on the surface. ’ 
82 
Lin Xinzhi (林行止)，founder of Hong Kong Economic Journal, Hong 
Kong Economic Journal, 25^ and 26出，April, 1984 
Facing this unfavorable condition, China did not endorse the practicing of western 
democracy in Hong Kong, such as general election, since she was determined to 
safeguard the control of the future HKSAR government. Deng Xiaoping revealed 
this concern exp l i c i t l y^�： I 
‘ Would it be good for Hong Kong to hold general elections? I don ’t think f 
so. For example, as I have said before, Hong Kong's affairs will 
naturally be administered by Hong Kong people, but will it do for the \ 
administrators to be elected by a general ballot? We say that Hong 
Kong's administrators should be people of Hong Kong who love the ‘ 
motherland and Hong Kong, but will a general election necessarily 
bring out people like that?, 、： 
'丨i 
j； 
Here, the reason for Deng's doubts over practicing western democracy in Hong Kong 
•>i 
was obvious: a democratic constitutional system, particularly a general election, may 
V 
not elect the right people in the eyes of China, those who love the motherland and 
Hong Kong (according to China's standards). To put it in another way, China didn't 
have confidence in Hong Kong people's loyalty to her, which is why Deng Xiaoping 
didn't favor general elections in Hong Kong. Even during the debate on Patriotism in 
early 2004, Beijing's legal expert again endorsed this concern by articulating to 
Deng's speech above, questioning whether a general election can bring up patriotic 
administrators for Hong Kong^^. 
22 See Deng Xiaoping's speech at a meeting with the members of the committee for the drafting of 
Basic Law of the HKSAR, (1993) Deng Xiaoping on the question of Hong Kong, New Horizon Press, 
HK, pp 46 to 58. 
23 See the article written by Xu Chongde (許崇德)，Beijing legal expert n Renminribao, 29出 February 
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Apart from the concerns over general election, Deng Xiaoping also expressed his 
worry over the democratization of Hong Kong, questioning whether democracy in 
Hong Kong might cause disturbance in China: 
‘/ should like to ask you to think this over and take it into consideration 
when drafting the Basic Law. You should also consider a few other things. 
For example, after 1997 we shall still allow Hong Kong people to criticize 
the Chinese Communist Party and China, but what if they should turn 
their words into action, try to convert Hong Kong into a base of 
opposition to the Mainland under the pretext of "democracy"? Then we j 
ji 
would have no choice hut to intervene. ’ j 
I 
Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平)，speech at a meeting with the members of the 
committee for drafting the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 




Deng's worry coincided with the unpopularity of the communist regime in Hong 
Kong before the handover, since to China, full democratization would under this -
context result in an elected local Hong Kong government whose administrators may 
not be loyal to China, thus turning Hong Kong into an independent or 
semi-independent political entity that may be out of the control of Beijing^" .^ Chinese 
officials called this scenario 'giving power to people'(還政於民)，which means a 
general election of the administrators will give Hong Kong to the Hong Kong people 
2004 In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 107 to 
112 [載於（2004)愛國論爭’明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁一百零三頁至一百一十二頁]。 
24 Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1，United 
Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 169 to 177，184 to 188; also see the interview of Zhou Nan (周南)， 
ex-director of Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch, the successor of Xu Jiatun. In (2004) 
AiGuoLunZhen. Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 47 to 52.[載於(2004) 
愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁四十七至五十二] ° 
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whose allegiance was doubtful, instead of the handover of sovereignty to China i.e. 
'giving power to China'(還政於中 
The worry of 'giving power to people'(還政於民)’ together with China's suspicions 
towards Britain's motive in turning Hong Kong into an independent or 
semi-independent political entity by democratization^^ (China believed that Britain 
in fact did not want to handover Hong Kong from the very beginning )，as well as 
the enthusiastic support to the democratic movement in the Mainland in Hong Kong ‘ 
since the June incident in 1989 and the rise of the discourse ‘democracy against 
I I 
communism' (Tsang, 1997) , ignited China's hostility towards democratization in |,； 
‘I 
Hong Kong, as democratization would allow those who were hostile to Communist 
• • I 
J . 
China to be elected as the administrators. 
China in the early 1990s: a critical moment for the communist regime 
j'； 
As well as dragging the confidence of the Hong Kong people down, the period after 丨；丨 
V 
the 4th June incident, was ironically also the lowest ebb of China's own 
self-confidence due to the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and 
Russia and the threat of the 'peaceful evolution'(禾口平演變）to subvert communist 
regimes launched by the democratic world in the west (Tsang, 1997). In view of the 
25 Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1，United 
Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 169 to 177, 184 to 188 
26 Ibid. Also see the interview of Zhou Nan (周南)’ ex-director of Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong 
branch, the successor of Xu Jiatun in (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao 
Publishing Limited, pp 47 to 52.[載於（2004)愛國論爭’明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁 
四十七至五十二] 
27 See (1999) Deng Xiaoping in critical historical moment, pp 398 to 411，Chinese Communist Party 
Central partisan educational institute publisher [官力、周敬青、張曙（1999)「部小平在重大歷史 
關頭」’頁 398 至 411，中共中央黨校出版社];Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu 
Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1，United Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 92 to 106，184 to 186. 
28 Also see Xu Jiatun (1993)，Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 
1, United Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 89 to 94; as well as chapter 4. 
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threat to her own security from the ‘peaceful evolution', the enthusiasm of the people 
in Hong Kong in support of democracy in China during and after the June 
incident was intolerable to the Chinese authority. One example of the support was the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Alliance in support of Patriotic Democratic 
Movement (香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會，簡稱支聯會)，an voluntary 
organization which supports the Mainland dissidents, whose members included many 
local politicians and legislators, such as Szeto Wah (司徒華）and Albert C. Y. Ho (f可 
俊仁). 
I I；. 
Therefore after the June incident in 1989，China turned to a hard line approach : 
towards Hong Kong and Britain, in fear of Hong Kong becoming a base of 
subversion against the Mainland (Roberti, 1996; Tsang, 1997). The most obvious ； 
evidence is in the second draft of the Basic Law (proclaimed in February 1989): � 
I 
there was an additional clause in addition to Article 23, requiring the HKSAR } 
s 
J , 




China's hostility against the western world, and her anxiety over Hong Kong's 
support of the democratic movement in the Mainland, as well as the buoyancy of the 
discourse 'democracy against communism' after the June incident, furthered her 
hesitation towards democratization in Hong Kong. China was determined not to 
allow the democratization of Hong Kong to become the obstacle to her taking back 
of Hong Kong (with reference to the rise of the discourse ‘democracy against 
communism'). 
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Discursive logic of China's state discourse 
Due to the historical trajectory and contextual factors above, China was determined 
not to allow Hong Kong to be a base of subversion against her, and was intolerant to 
the discourse 'democracy against communism': building a barrier against China's 
influence by a democratic system. She tried to prevent local dissidents (whom China 
does not regard as patriotic) from ‘seizing’ the local administrative power of Hong 
Kong. The discursive logic is clear: China's power over Hong Kong is not subject to f 
discussion, and Hong Kong must do no harm to the political leadership and system of I , 





One may ask, whether these main themes have changed after the handover. Perhaps ；, 
；'I 
the articles published by the state media during the debate on Patriotism in early 
2004 can provide a hint: 丨: 
I 
I ’,. 
'A minority of Hong Kong people, based on their visions of "democracy ！^ 
against communism，’（民主抗共),adopt an "anti-China” (逢中必阅 又』 
oppositional attitude towards the central government. This is going 
exactly in opposite to democracy. Hong Kong is part of China. Before 
she contemplates democracy, respect the choice of 1.3 billion people on 
the path of development in my country first. Uphold the central 
government, which represents the basic interests of 1.3 billion people, 
then the democratic development of Hong Kong can be discussed: 
Xu Chongde (許崇德)，Mainland scholar, member of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, commenting in Renminribao (人民日幸g), 29出， 
February 2004 
Obviously, Mr. Xu urged the dissidents in Hong Kong to abandon the 'vision' of 
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‘democracy against communism' and their 'anti-China' attitude while talking about 
democratization. The tune is similar to the concerns of China before the handover. In 
fact, during the opinion war i.e. debate on Patriotism in early 2004, the articles 
published by the state media, Beijing's legal experts, officials and ex-officials still 
articulated to China's discourse and even the speeches of Deng Xiaoping before the 
handover29. China reinforced this discursive logic during the debate on Patriotism 
and the interpretation of the Basic Law in early 2004. What changes after the 
handover are not the discursive logic of China's state discourse, but the discursive � 
elements employed under the nodal point of 'Basic Law’ in response to the context of 丨' 





Historical context and social formation 
To conclude, the discursive logic of China's state discourse towards Hong Kong is :: 
1 
rooted in her worry of Hong Kong becoming a Trojan horse. This concern originated : 
•�.� f V 
from the historical moment and local social context in Hong Kong during the 
transitory period before the handover: 
參 The widespread anti-communist sentiment and unpopular image of the 
communist regime in the society in Hong Kong; 
• The suspicions towards and confrontation with Britain over the democratization 
of Hong Kong (also see Chapter 5); 
• The international boycott against China after the June incident in 1989; 
29 See the speeches and articles composed by Beijing's legal experts, officials, ex-officials and state 
media: In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 3 to 116 
[載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部’明報出版社有限公司，頁三至一百一"h六];also see the 
article written by commentator of Renminribao (人民日幸g評論員文章）on 20出 February 2004. 
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參 The fear of being overthrown by 'peaceful evolution'(禾口平演變)in view of the 
collapse of the communist world in Eastern Europe and Russia in the early 
1990s; 
參 The buoyancy of the discourse ‘democracy against communism' and 
enthusiastic support of the Mainland dissidents in Hong Kong after the 
Tiananmen massacre. 
Under the local anti-communist sentiment and the discourse of 'democracy against r 
I 
communism', full democratization in Hong Kong would mean that it was extremely 
difficult for China to guarantee that the elected administrative leaders would be ：丨 
1 
'patriots' (loyal to China). Moreover, under the shadow of 'peaceful evolution' and 
the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Russia, China was 
afraid that Britain and other western democratic powers would turn Hong Kong into 
a ‘Trojan horse', by democratization before the handover, turning Hong Kong into an ：•‘ 
independent or semi-independent political entity against China�。； nurturing local 
彳、, 
I 
pro-democracy dissidents or even inserting some 'foreign spies' into the 
vli 
governmental bodies of Hong Kong via general election; allowing them to spread the 
democratic seeds in the Mainland after the handover. 
The above context together with the enthusiastic support to the Mainland dissidents 
in Hong Kong after the June incident, in particular the establishment of the Hong 
Kong Alliance in support of Patriotic Democratic Movement (HKAPDM 支聯會)， 
which is aimed at terminating the one party dictatorship in the Mainland and 
Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1，Hong 
Kong United Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 169 to 177，184 to 188; also see the interview of Zhou Nan 
(周南)’ ex-director of Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch, the successor of Xu Jiatun. In (2004) 
AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 47 to 52.[載於(2004) 
愛國論爭，明報編輯部’明報出版社有限公司，頁四十七至五十二] 
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establishing a democratic China (Tsang, 1997)，was the background of the 
formulation of China's state discourse towards Hong Kong, particularly with 
reference to democratization: Hong Kong can never be a base of subversion and 
'democracy against communism'(民主抗共）is not allowed. China will not allow 
Hong Kong to serve as a base to challenge the communist regime in the Mainland via 
democratization, and the democratic development of Hong Kong must never affect 
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The ex-president of China Jiang 
Zemin (江澤民）expressed this concern explicitly by the following metaphor after \. 
the 4th June incident^ 1: ；  
‘ The well water (Hong Kong) must never infringe on the river (Mainland � 
V 
C h i n a ) 丨 
..1 






Discursive strategy of China's state discourse: | 
Building up the authoritative and professional image 
The following section will scrutinize the discursive strategy employed by China to 
build up her state discourse in the public discourse in Hong Kong, in response to 
challenges from local dissidents under the social context of Hong Kong. Besides, 
textual evidence pertaining to how China articulates the discursive logic of her state 
discourse to the discursive elements of the Basic Law (i.e. principles and stipulations 
of Basic Law), and how she substantiated the discursive elements of the Basic Law 
in the central conflict in Hong Kong in early 2004 with reference to the local social 
31 Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 2, pp 432 
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context, are also discussed. 
Building state discourse in an unfavorable social context 
As Gramsci points out, there are two 'floors' to the political ideology: system of 
thoughts and everyday conceptions (i.e. common sense) (Gramsci, 1971; Donald and 
Hall, 1986). To establish hegemony, the philosophical moment of a discourse (i.e. 
discursive logic) must be able to be familiar, acceptable or even popular among the ‘ 
general masses (understandable on the 'common sense level'). However, this is 
exactly the difficulty facing Communist China: there is a conventional :;丨 
I 
I 
anti-communist feeling in Hong Kong (see previous section). Thus, it is crucial for 
• I 
China to rebuild her image in the public discourse in Hong Kong so as to restore her 





From the discursive package of China's state discourse, China has been building up " 
an authoritative image in Hong Kong since the transitory period, cultivating an 
authoritative icon in Hong Kong (i.e. Basic Law) as the nodal point of the state 
discourse, and articulating other discursive elements (i.e. principles and stipulations 
of Basic Law) to it. China manipulated the interpretation of those principles and 
stipulations as the discursive elements of a state discourse, narrated those legal terms 
and abstract principles in ways that are consistent with the discursive logic (i.e. 
political end) of her state discourse: the power relation between China and Hong 
Kong is not an equal one, Hong Kong can never be a base of subversion and 
'democracy against communism' is not allowed. 
91 
Professional image 
However, during the controversy over universal suffrages in early 2004, apart from 
reiterating the authoritative image, China also attempted to ally her authority with a 
professional image: articulating the nodal point of her state discourse (Basic Law) to 
a popular public symbol in Hong Kong, the rule of law, stressing that obeying the 
Basic Law is ‘rule of law，，then manipulating the legal terms in Basic Law (e.g. " 
1 
‘gradual and orderly order' and 'actual situation') in order to make her state | 
j f i 
discourse more appealing to 'rule of law，，the conventional consensus in Hong Kong. :: 
I : 
V 
l' • l' 
China deliberately articulated her state discourse to 'rule of law’ after the handover to i: 
"I 
appeal to the social context in Hong Kong: the admiration of 'rule of law’ and the 
trust of professionals (including the legal professionals). The building of a : 
professional image assisted the building up of China's authority in Hong Kong by 
• 
enhancing her public credibility in the representation in local public discourse. /j 
V 
Discursive strategy 1: building up authoritative icons as nodal points 
China has been establishing the supreme status of the Basic Law in Hong Kong as 
the nodal point of the state discourse since the transitory period. The notion ‘Basic 
Law’ articulates many discursive elements (i.e. principles and stipulations of Basic 
Law) that incorporate the discursive logic of the state discourse i.e. the unequal 
power relation between China and Hong Kong and China's indisputable power over 
Hong Kong. Thus, establishing the authoritative image as a nodal point, the Basic 
Law, is crucial for China to put forward her state discourse in the public discourse in 
9 2 
Hong Kong. 
Supreme status of Basic Law: establish the nodal point of state discourse 
By incorporating her state ideologies into the legal narration of Basic Law, China 
attempts to confine the discussion with regard to local democratization in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong to the parameters of Basic Law, in which China has the final 
say on the interpretation of the principles and concrete stipulations. In China's 
. i 
narration, Basic Law is the bedrock of ‘one country, two systems', which is supreme | 
in Hong Kong and even in China : no laws should be against it, and all aspects of 
i . j 
Hong Kong, including the political structure and its development (democratization) v' 
! 
must comply with the parameters in Basic Law. In fact, Chinese officials have been ； 
reiterating the overriding status of Basic Law since the transitory period, urging ,� 
Hong Kong to be ‘convergent to, the Basic Law before 1997. For example: ••'{ 
} 
•1 
‘In the coming five years, (I) hope the development in all domains of 
Hong Kong, including political, economic, cultural, educational, � 
technological and social lives, can gradually be convergent to the 
trajectory of Basic Law.’ 
‘Only by being convergent to Basic Law, the handover will be secure 
and there will be nothing out of order when the year 1997 comes. Basic 
Law in Hong Kong is the legal foundation of the great idea "one country, 
two systems “ that was constructed by Deng Xiaoping, as well as the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration signed by the Chinese and British 
governments. It [Basic Law] will be our mini-constitution when we 
resume our sovereignty of Hong Kong, and the parameter for every 
32 See Li Peng's speech on March 1997，In Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, 
Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) Zhongguo ling dao ren tan Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing 
Limited, pp 47 [載於：趙睿、張明瑜(主編）’宋璧、張培忠(編）（1997)�中國領導人談香港」， 
香港，明報出版社’頁四十七] 
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resident of HKSAR in future： 
Zhou Nan (周南)’ ex-director of Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong 
branch, 12出 June, 1992^^ 
By putting forward the discourse of 'convergence'(銜接論)，China urged that any 
political reforms in Hong Kong before the handover should be 'convergent' to those 
stipulated in the Basic Law. Even before 1990, when the drafting of Basic Law was 
accomplished, during the constitutional review launched by the colonial Hong Kong 
i 
government in the mid-1980s, some pro-China local social elites already expressed .；'：! 
f! 
doubts over the introduction of direct election in the 1988 legislative council election 
� i 丨：丨 
by articulating to the convergence to Basic Law "^^ . During the early 1990s，when 丨丨 
乂丨 
Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong decided to speed up the pace of the : 
,1丨: 
democratization of Hong Kong, China again attacked Patten's reform and scrapped it ’ 
. � � 
(i.e. setting up ‘another stove': the provisional Legislative Assembly to substitute the A 
I 
elected Legislative Council in 1995, see chapter 5) with the argument that political 
reform before the handover should be convergent to the stipulation of Basic Law: ！辽 
‘Now the problem is we want Mr. Patten to seriously consider the 
opinion of the China side, turn back to the trajectory of Basic Law, and 
refrain from trying any new inventions or creations 
Lu Ping (魯平)，ex- director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs 
Office, China. Speech at the Press Conference on October 1992， 
Beijing, in Wen Wei Pao, October 1992 
" i n Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) Zhongguo ling dao 
ren tan Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 124 to 125 [載於：趙睿、張明瑜(主 
編），宋璧、張培忠(編）(1997)�中國領導人談香港」’香港，明報出版社’頁一二四至一二五] 
34 See the commentary written by Vincent Lo (羅康瑞)，the business and professional groups, 
Convener, Basic Law Consultative Committee, South China Morning Post, May 1987. 
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From the narrations of Chinese officials and pro-China local elites, apparently China 
attempted to confine the democratization of Hong Kong to the parameters in Basic 
Law, put an end to the constitutional development before the handover by the 
stipulating the political structure of the future HKSAR. China continues to do so 
after the handover, upholding Basic Law when dealing with the democratization of 
Hong Kong, asserting that the constitutional development of HKSAR must follow 
the stipulations in the Basic Law strictly: 
1 
‘After listening to Tung Chee Wah's opinion on the recent discussion in 
Hong Kong pertaining to the “constitutional review ”，Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) ^ 
(The president of China) expressed high degree of concern by the central 
government with regard to the development of the political structure in :|丨 
Hong Kong, and the principles and standpoints are clear: Political ) 
structure of HKSAR must follow the stipulations in the Hong Kong Basic | 
Law, begin from the practical situation in Hong Kong and develop . j 
gradually and orderly. (The central government) believes that Hong Kong \ 
society can formulate a board consensus on this.， 
i 
Press release from Xinhua News Agency, December, 2003 
i 
President Hu Jintao，s affirmation of the supremacy of the Basic Law in the 
development of Hong Kong's political structure is a vivid conclusion to China's state 
discourse over the past two decades. China has been intending to build up an 
authoritative image of the Basic Law, establish her state discourse around this nodal 
point and confine local discussion of democratization to the ‘bird-cage，parameters of 
Basic Law. 
9 5 
Deng Xiao-ping: the authoritative figure in China's narration 
Besides the Basic Law, during the controversy over universal suffrages in early 2004, 
China's state discourse also articulated to the late Chinese leader Deng Xiao-ping as 
an authoritative icon, particularly during the debate on Patriotism. Deng's definition 
of 'patriots' (see previous section for reference) was often cited by Chinese scholars 
and the state media as the definition of the principle 'Hong Kong people administer 
Hong Kong，，illustrated by the press releases from the state media^^: 
I 
‘“One country, two systems ” is an important speech published by comrade Jj 
'I： 
Deng Xiao-ping twenty years ago. Review this important speech today, (i 
, j ； 
particularly the discourse about "one country, two systems ”，which relates 
！：! 
to the concept of "Hong Kong people administer Hong Kong", the 
:丨丨, 
standards of patriots, and still have a strong pragmatic significance., 
• ！ 
Deng Xiao-ping's speeches and definition of China's principles towards Hong 丨 
r 
Kong, particularly his definition of 'patriots', were employed as an authoritative j 
• I , 
citation to attack the credibility of the local democrats, accusing the latter for ! 
not fulfilling the requirement of 'patriots' and criticizing their legitimacy to hold 
the administrative power of HKSAR^^. In a word, Deng Xiao-ping was quoted 
as an authoritative figure to empower the charges waged by the state discourse 
against local democrats. 
See the press releases by Xinhua News agency on 19^ February 2004; 29^ February 2004, in 
(2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 76 to 81 [—於 
(2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁七十六至八十一頁]。 
乂 See the article written by Chinese scholar Xiao Tien-ren (召天任）which was published by Xinhua 
news agency on 29^ February 2004, in (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao 
Publishing Limited, pp 107 to 112 [載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部’明報出版社有限公司，頁 
一零七至一百一十二頁]° 
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Discursive strategy 2: establishing an unequal power relation between China 
and Hong Kong by the articulations between Basic Law and its discursive 
elements 
Besides establishing the supremacy of Basic Law in Hong Kong in order to 
consolidate this nodal point of China's state discourse, China also articulates other 
discursive elements (i.e. principles and stipulations of Basic Law) to the discursive 
logic: the unequal power relation between China and Hong Kong, to transform her j 
political end into legal narration under the notion of Basic Law. | 
丨丨 
China insists that the understanding of Basic Law, including concrete stipulations, 
must give full regard to the fundamental principles, rather than the interpretation of t； 
the stipulations through the superficial wordings.^^ In China's narration, her major / 
, I 
\i 
principle towards Hong Kong: 'one country, two systems', is realized and \ 
•L 
incorporated in the Basic Law, and the other two key principles, ‘Hong Kong people •J 
administer Hong Kong' and ‘high degree of autonomy', are often discussed together 'j 
• m i 
with Basic Law^^. As discussed in the previous paragraph, Chinese scholars and state 
media articulated Deng Xiao-ping's speech to re-state the definition of the above 
principles when discussing Basic Law. 
One country, two systems (一國兩制） 
To China, the Basic Law is the legal realization of the framework ‘one country, two 
37 See the article written by commentator of Renminribao on April 2004. 
38 See Siu Weiyun's speech in (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing 
Limited, pp 20 to 34[載於（2004)愛國論爭’明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁二十至三十 
四 ] �. A l s o see Siu, Weiyun (1996), A guide to Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao 
Publishing Limited pp 78 to 83. 
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systems,39. However, in Beijing's narration, ‘one country' and ‘two systems' are not 
equally weighted: 'one country' (the existence of socialist China) is the premise for 
the existence of ‘two systems' (the existence of capitalist Hong Kong), that means 
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party must never be threaten by the 'two 
s y s t e m s ,，T h i s narration of ‘one country, two systems' orchestrates the discursive 
logic of the state discourse of China: Hong Kong can never be the base of subversion, 
and ‘democracy against communism' is not allowed, the power relation between 
China and Hong Kong is not an equal one. As pinpointed by Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉 "J 
I 
陽)，the deputy Secretary-General of the NPCSC, the constitutional development vt 
(democratization) in Hong Kong must never challenge the principle of 'one country' 
• A 1 ' > ' 
i.e. the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong by China and her basic interests. 
丨’ I 
丨; 
• i r ' 





To China，‘Hong Kong people administer Hong Kong’ means that Hong Kong should 
J 
be ruled by patriotic Hong Kong people. Deng Xiaoping has stated that those 辽 
administer Hong Kong must be patriots in the early (also see section 5.2), 
and Deng's idea was cited by Beijing's legal experts, officials and ex-officials during 
the debate on Patriotism in 2004 to interpret the principle of 'Hong Kong people 
39 See Jiang Zemin's speech on May 1997，In Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, 
Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) Zhongguo ling dao ren tan Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing 
Limited, pp 112 to 113 [載於：趙睿、張明瑜(主編）’宋瑩、張培忠(編）(1997)�中國領導人談香 
港」，香港，明報出版；社，頁一百一十二至一百一十三] 
40 See Siu, Weiyun (蕭蔚雲）（1996)，A guide to Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao 
Publishing Limited pp 1 to 5; Siu Weiyun's speech on 16& January, 2004 In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, 
Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 20 to 34 [載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報 
編輯部’明報出版社有限公司’頁二十至三十四]° 
41 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)’ deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC, 26出 April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong. 
42 Deng Xiaoping's talk with industrial and commercial delegation, and with Sze-Yuen Chung (鐘士 
元)and other prominent Hong Kong figures: One Country, Two systems, 22-23 June 1984, New 
Horizon Press, HK pp 6 to 11. 
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ruling Hong K o n g ’ 43. The meaning is clear: China wants to ensure that those 
administering of Hong Kong will not do any harm to the communist Regime. 
During the debate on Patriotism in early 2004, China's official state media 
substantiated the content of 'patriots' by pointing out that some local dissidents and 
legislators were ‘unpatriotic,，so as to deny their qualification as the administers of 
Hong Kong44. Some semi-official press even described those ‘unpatriotic behaviors' 
conducted by the dissidents'^^, namely, inviting foreign intervention (mocking Martin j 
Lee, a prominent local dissident who attended the testimony held by US congress | 
h 
pertaining to Hong Kong); joining organization which are aimed at overthrowing the ：;； 
'1 
central government (mocking the HKAPDM 支聯會，in which many members are '丨 
democrats); supporting Taiwan's independence (mocking Emily Lau, a famous i 
'丨I丨 
democrat who attended a conference held by a pro-Taiwan independent think tank in 
Taiwan in March, 2004) and those opposing the enactment of the bills for national 1 
L 
security (mocking the democrats and legal professionals who objected the enactment 
of the bill of national security by HKSAR administration in the fulfillment of the ! 
requirement of Article 23 of Basic Law in 2003). 
Obviously, China did not want those dissidents to obtain the administrative power of 
Hong Kong, therefore she named them ‘unpatriotic, in accordance to the local social 
43 For example, see the article written by Xu Chongde (許崇德)，Beijing legal expert on Renminribao, 
29^ February 2004 In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing 
Limited, pp 107 to 112 [載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司’頁一百零三 
頁至一百一十二頁]。 
44 See the article written by commentator of Renminribao, February 2004 In (2004) 
AiGuoLunZhen. Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 83.[載於（2004)金國論 
爭’明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司’頁八十三]° 
45 See the editorial of China Daily on 20出 February 2004; the article written by Tong Wah (湯華)， 
deputy chief editor of Liaowang (瞭望)magazine on 24* February 2004. In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, 
Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 85 to 87; 100 to 106.[載於（2004)愛國 
論爭’明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁八十五至八十七’ 一百至一百零六]。 
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context at that time. In this sense, the debate on patriotism was actually political 
censorship, as local senior council Audrey Eu points out: 
'Basic Law has not stipulated what is 'patriotic and loving Hong Kong 
(愛國愛港)‘，it is unrealistic to define this from a legal perspective... to 
be honest, the hidden meaning is: ensure that those administers of Hong 
Kong are acceptable to the central authority.' 
Audrey Eu (余若藤)，Senior Council, legislator, member of Article 45 
concern group, Ming Pao, 17^ Feburary 2004 
I 
� I 
High degree of autonomy (高度自治） '：[ 
！ ：1 
• i j . 
I ,1!丨. 
'丨r 
To China, the 'high degree of autonomy' enjoyed by HKSAR is delegated from the '：；: 
I:,: 
！) 
central government via Basic Law, and HKSAR is still a local authority under the : 
unitary central govemment'^^. The central government retained certain key powers as 人 
a matter of sovereignty, such as national defense, foreign affairs, power to interpret 
J 
and amend the Basic Law, the appointment of the Chief Executive and principal ；” 
ii 
officials of HKSAR47. Contrary to the practice of the common law system, China 
does not allow the retaining of residual power of Basic Law by HKSAR i.e. central 
government retains all the powers that have not been delegated to HKSAR in the 
Basic Law48. This constitutional arrangement represents the final resort for China: 
the key powers, such as the appointment of the Chief Executive and the interpreting 
of Basic Law will secure her interest in case of difficult situation in Hong Kong. And 
46 See Siu, Weiyun (蕭蔚雲）(1996), A guide to Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao 
Publishing Limited pp 1 to 5; 91 to 103; Siu Weiyun's speech on January, 2004 In (2004) 
AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 20 to 34.[載於(2004) 
愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司’頁二十至三十四]。 
Ibid. 
48 In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office，Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 20 to 34. 
[載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁二十至三十四]。 
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China used this power in early 2004. 
The narration of the three fundamental principles i.e. one country, two systems; Hong 
Kong people administer Hong Kong; high degree of autonomy in China's discursive 
package of the Basic Law match exactly with the discursive logic of state discourse: 
asserting the supremacy of ‘one country’ (socialist China) over ‘two systems' 
(capitalist Hong Kong); the overriding power of central government over the high 
autonomy of the local HKSAR administration and making sure those administering 7. 
i 
Hong Kong are ‘patriots’ who can guarantee China's exercise of sovereignty over | 
vrj 
Hong Kong. On the whole, China's narration of these three basic principles towards | 
Hong Kong implies the unequal power relation between China and Hong Kong, 丨丨 
iV 
stressing that China's power over Hong Kong is not up to debate. :: 
,y \ 
Discursive strategy 3: manipulation of the terms in Basic Law by legal narration i 
L 
The social context after the July demonstration in 2003 was uncomfortable to 
China: retreat of the pro-China forces in Hong Kong and the set back of HKSAR 
administration, together with rising popularity of the democrats. China definitely 
cannot allow Hong Kong to have universal suffrages under this ‘unfavorable’ trend. 
However, as stipulated in Basic Law article 45 and 68, the selection method of the 
Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly 'ultimately' is universal suffrages. So, 
apart from reiterating the authoritative image of Basic Law, China also 'delayed' the 
pace of democratization by manipulating other terms in the Basic Law e.g. stressing 
that universal suffrages have to be attained by ‘gradual and orderly manner', and the 
‘actual situation' of Hong Kong is still not ripe for universal suffrages (see 
paragraphs below). 
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China substantiated these new interpretations by the concrete stipulations or 
principles relevant to the political structure of Hong Kong in the Basic Law. All these 
legal narrations aim at one political purpose: setting more stringent conditions on the 
constitutional development of Hong Kong so as to slow down the pace of 
democratization and denounce universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008s49. They are the 
discursive elements that are substantiated by China through her state discourse in 
view of the social context in Hong Kong after July demonstration in 2003. 
1 
I 
• The executive-led (行政主導)system is a must: g 
i 
China insists that the political structure in Hong Kong must be an executive-led one, :: 
rill 
arguing that the executive-led system can preserve a stable political environment for t; 
'丨丨,，. 
economic prosperity, and is the intention of Basic Law ^^. To maintain the � 
I 
executive-led system, the NPCSC stipulated that, for the election of the Legislative � 
I 
Assembly beyond 2004, half of the seats must remain as functional constituency. The 
•ij 
NPCSC intends to observe whether the cooperation between the executive and j 
legislative branches of the HKSAR can function well under the constitutional 
arrangement of the Legislative Assembly election in 2004 (i.e. half of the legislators 
are elected directly in geographical constituency, while the remaining seats are 
elected by functional constituency of various industries and chambers), and see 
whether this election method can meet the requirement of Basic Law i.e. if the 
49 China also repeated that the right to interpret Basic Law belongs to the NPCSC (See the speech of 
Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC，26出 April, 2004). In fact Lu Ping, the 
ex-director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of China has talked about that during his bitter 
quarrel with Chris Patten: see his speech at press conference, Wen Hui Pao, October 1992. 
50 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉|^)，deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC, 26出 April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong. Also see See Siu, Weiyun (蕭蔚雲)(1996), A guide to 
Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao Publishing Limited pp 128 to 139. 
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executive-led system can work properly，、 
參 The appointment of the Chief Executive by the central government is 
substantial (實質任命） 
China argued that the appointment of the Chief Executive by the central government 
is substantial (實質任命）rather then conventional: China can say no to the candidate 
elected by Hong Kong people^^ 
• Gradual and orderly manner (循序漸進） I 
I 
The principle of 'gradual and orderly manner'(循序漸進）can be traced back to ：丨 
Deng Xiaoping's attitude to general election in Hong Kong, which he discussed at 
i 
the Basic Law drafting committee in 16 April, 1987^^: 丨: 
.丨：丨 
� 
'Even if a general election were to be held, there would have to be a � 
transition period, and preparations for the election would have to be made [ 
Step by step, ’ . 
J, 
I 
Deng's idea was incorporated into Basic Law. The amendment of the selection 
methods of Chief Executive and legislators must be in a gradual and orderly manner 
(循序漸進)，as stipulated in articles 45and 68 of the Basic Law. The NPCSC 
articulated the term ‘gradual and orderly manner' as the reason for arguing that 
holding universal suffrages for the election of Chief Executive and all legislators in 
2007 and 2008 are not consistent with Basic Law, as annexes 1 and 2 of Basic Law 
51 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General ofNPCSC, 26 出 April, 2004. 
52 See Siu Weiyun's (蕭薪雲)speech on 16& January, 2004 In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao 
editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 20 to 34[載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明 
報出版社有限公司，頁二十至三十四]�.Also see Siu, Weiyun (1996)，A guide to Hong Kong Basic 
Law, Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao Publishing Limited pp 78 to 83. 
See (1993) DengXiaoping on the question of Hong Kong, New Horizon Press, HK, pp 46 to 58. 
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stipulate that the universal suffrage is the ‘ultimate，aim, not the targets to be 
achieved in 2007 and 200854. 
• Actual situation (實際情況） 
Basic Law annexes 45 and 68 stipulate that the actual situation of Hong Kong has to 
be considered when amending the selection methods of the Chief Executive and 
legislators. However, what is the actual situation in Hong Kong? The NPCSC has the 
following insights: Hong Kong people do not understand Basic Law and 'one 吻 
I 
country, two systems'; the constitutional status of the Basic Law has not been ；| 
nTI 
established in Hong Kong yet; there are no consensus in the Hong Kong society ；H 
>•！I 丨丨 
towards constitutional development; the primary target for Hong Kong is a stable li! 
55 1 
environment for economic recovery . In a word, the NPCSC denounced the holding :： 
丨、 
of universal suffrages in the years 2007 and 2008 for the Chief Executive and all J 
\ 
legislators by manipulating the term 'actual situation，，and drawing to the conclusion ：人i 
L 
that universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008 are not suitable for Hong Kong. ‘ 
肝I 
• Balanced participation (均衡參與）from all social sectors 
China insisted that in Hong Kong, an economic society, the business and industrial 
sector is the key to ensure prosperity and stability of Hong Kong^^. The NPCSC also 
articulated to the principle of 'balanced participation' to reject universal suffrages for 
the Chief Executive and all legislators in 2007 and 2008, claiming that not all social 
sectors agree on that arrangement: the business and industrial sector opposes to such 
See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC，26出 April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See Siu, Weiyun (蕭蔚雲）（1996)，A guide to Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao 
Publishing Limited pp 128 to 133. 
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arrangement^^. 
With the articulation to stipulations in the Basic Law i.e. 'gradual and orderly 
manner', 'actual situation' as well as principles such as 'balance participation from 
all social sectors' and 'executive-led', China (i.e. the NPCSC) set more stringent 
conditions on the constitutional development of Hong Kong so as to slow down the 
c Q 
pace of democratization . 
I 
Thus, all these legal terms in Basic Law interpreted by China are legal narrations to | 
attain her political ends: China's narration of the principles and concrete stipulations 
\ u 
of Basic Law all serve to ensure that her exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong is i 
‘ i , i 
not weakened (i.e. setting more stringent conditions on the constitutional 
I � 
development of Hong Kong in order to slow down the pace of democratization and J 
I 
prevent the democrats from ‘seizing，power by general election after the setback of ：人 
St 丨— 
local pro-China forces subsequent to the 1 July demonstration 2003). ] 
” 
li 
Paradox of the nodal point: Basic Law 
This discursive strategy, manipulating legal narration, in fact illustrates a paradox of 
the nodal point of state discourse: the supremacy of Basic Law. The supremacy of 
57 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC, 26& April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong. 
58 For example, the amendment of the selection method for the Legislative Assembly, according to the 
annex II of Basic Law, is only required to report to the NPCSC for record (備案)，but the decision 
made by the NPCSC on April 2004 stipulated that this amendment has to report to the NPCSC for 
approval (批准).Besides, according to the annex I of Basic Law, the amendment of the selection 
method of the Chief Executive (CE) merely requires the consent of 2/3 majority of legislators and 
NPC representatives from Hong Kong, the approval of the Chief Executive and then the NPCSC. Yet 
the decision made by the NPCSC on 26^ April 2004 stipulated that only the Chief Executive has the 
right to initiate the amendment of the selection method of the CE. 
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Basic Law can facilitate the implementation of China's state discourse, but ironically 
can also be an obstacle to her political end. China wanted to outlaw universal 
suffrages in Hong Kong by the years of 2007 and 2008，but she also cannot explicitly 
go against the stipulations in the Basic Law: universal suffrages are the 'ultimate 
goals' for the election of the Chief Executive and all members of Legislative 
Assembly. Under the constraints of these stipulations, China herself could only 
manipulate other terms in the Basic Law to ‘delay’ universal suffrages, but cannot 
eliminate (at least in the state's narration) universal suffrages in Hong Kong^^. � 
I 
I 
Discursive strategy 4: articulating to popular consensus in Hong Kong JJ 
"li 丨  
.丨丨‘•! 
. . I 
To put forward her discursive logic in the public discourse of Hong Kong, China has ；: 
'i'f 
to articulate her state discourse to popular public symbols so as to make her 乂 
I 
discourse familiar to the social context of Hong Kong. As Gramsci points out, there 
\ 
. L 
are two 'floors' to political ideology: system of thoughts and everyday conceptions 
(i.e. common sense) (Donald and Hall, 1986). China has been trying to make her ^ 
state discourse familiar to people in Hong Kong by articulating the nodal point of her ‘ 
discourse, the Basic Law, to popular consensus in Hong Kong: prosperity and 
stability (繁榮穩定/。，development of democracy (民主發展产 and the rule of law 
(法治）62, stressing that the above core stones for Hong Kong have all been 
59 Ibid. 
6° See Jiang Zemin's (江澤民）(President of China 1989 to 2002) speech on April 1991 In Zhao 
Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying，Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) Zhongguo ling dao ren tan 
Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 119 [載於：趙睿、張明瑜(主編），宋瑩、 
張培忠(編）(1997)�中國領導人談香港」，香港，明報出版吐，頁一一九] 
61 See the speech of Lu Ping, ex-director of the Hong Kong and Macau Office of China, Wen Hui Pao, 
January 1993 
62 See the speech by Tung Chee Wah, first Chief Executive of HKSAR on April 1997In Zhao Rui, 
Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) Zhongguo ling dao ren tan 
Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 131 to 132.[載於：趙睿、張明瑜(主編）’ 
宋璧、張培忠(編）(1997)�中國領導人談香港」’香港，明報出版社，頁一百三十一至一百三十 
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guaranteed by Basic Law since the transitory period. 
After the handover, the Basic Law becomes an effective mini-constitution in Hong 
Kong. Thus China articulated the supremacy of the Basic Law to existing consensus 
in Hong Kong, the rule of law, and claimed that the rule of law means obeying the 
law, particularly the Basic Law^^, in order to confine the discussion relevant to local 
democratization to the framework of Basic Law.64 During the central - Hong Kong 
conflict over universal suffrages in early 2004，the articulation between Basic Law J； 
i 
and the notion 'rule of law' became the main justification for China to uphold the [j 





As Basic Law serves as the nodal point of China's state discourse, central 乂 
I 
government articulates to other discursive elements (principles and stipulations of 
L 
Basic Law) as part of a discursive package. By articulating the Basic Law to public 
symbols representing existing consensus in Hong Kong (e.g. rule of law), China j 
hoped to make the nodal point of her state discourse more appealing in the local 
public discourse and gain the upper hand in the discursive struggles against other 
challenging discourses. 
Besides, China's state discourse explicitly adopted legal narration to support her 
political end. This discursive strategy is particularly pronounced in the social context 
二] Tung Chee Wah was the first Chief Executive of HKSAR, he was believed as Beijing's favored 
son and handpicked by ex-president Jiang Zemin to be the Chief Executive, thus his speech also 
represented China's idea to a large extent. 
63 See the responses given by China's Premier Wen Jiabao (温家寶)’ Apple Daily, May 2004. 
64 See the speeches and articles composed by Beijing's legal experts, officials, ex-officials and state 
media: In (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 3 to 116 
[載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁三至一百一十六]。 
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in Hong Kong: the belief in the ‘rule of law', the trust of legal professionals. In fact, 
the overt employment of the legal narration of China's state discourse synchronizes 
with a flourishing trend in the public discourse of Hong Kong: the prevalence of 
legal narration in the discussion of political matters due to the supremacy of Basic 
Law and the trust in legal professionals. Both China and local dissidents are trying to 
put forward their political goals by legal narration of the Basic Law. 
I 
Discursive strategy: a summary | 
r 
In a nutshell, this section sums up the four discursive strategies adopted by China to ‘ 
establish her state discourse in Hong Kong: 




2. Setting up unequal power relation between the state and the local inhabitants (or rr 
li 
the citizens), stressing the supremacy of the state when articulating the nodal 
points above; 
3. Legal narration for political ends; 
4. Articulating the state discourse to some existing popular public symbols (e.g. 
'rule of law') so as to enhance public credibility, particularly the articulation 
between those public symbols to the nodal points of the state discourse. 
Basic Law: the nodal point of China's state discourse 
The discursive logic of state ideology i.e. the overriding power of China over Hong 
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Kong (Hong Kong can never be the base of subversion; 'democracy against 
communism' is not allowed) is articulated to the principles and concrete stipulations 
of Basic Law (e.g. retaining the power to interpret and amend the Basic Law by 
China, China's appointment of the Chief Executive is substantial), China aims at 
safeguarding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong by China via legal stipulations and interpretation. The 
notion ‘Basic Law’ articulates with other discursive elements i.e. principles and 
stipulations in the Basic Law, turning the discursive logic of state discourse into legal j" 
narration and assist China to manipulate the local discourse for her political aims (e.g. | 
slowing down the pace of democratization before the handover, outlawing universal 
Ij 
suffrages in 2007 and 2008). Thus, the notion ‘Basic Law’ is the flagship (i.e. nodal f 
I 
point) of China's state discourse towards Hong Kong, which embeds the discursive :: 
logic (the power of China over Hong Kong) by the articulations to other discursive ) 
I 
elements (i.e. principles and stipulations of Basic Law). \ 
Therefore, China has been attempting to establish the legitimacy of Basic Law in J 
Hong Kong, and tries to confine the discussion of local democratization to the 
parameters of Basic Law. China puts forward the 'convergence' discourse (銜接論） 
during the transitory period, urging that political reform before the handover must be 
consistent with the stipulations in Basic Law and used this as a reason to reject the 
speeding up of democratization in Hong Kong before the handover^^. After the 
65 See Lu Ping's (魯平)(ex-Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office) speeches, in Wen 
Hui Pao, 24^ October, 1992 and 4& January, 1993. Besides, also see Zhou Nan's (周南）(ex-Director 
of the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch, the successor of Xu Jiatun) speeches on 8& April 
1991; 12出 June 1992, Ji Pengfai's (姬鵬飛）（Chairmen，Basic Law drafting committee) speech on 28出 
March 1990 in Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) 
Zhongguo ling dao ren tan Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 123 to 125; 230 
to 231 [載於：趙睿、張明瑜(主編）’宋瑩、張培忠(編）(1997)�中國領導人談香港」，香港，明 
報出版社，頁一二三至一二五，二三零至二三一]. 
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handover, China has also been upholding the Basic Law, urging that local 
democratization must follow the parameters within it 66, and manipulating the 
stipulations and principles in Basic Law so as to prevent universal suffrages in Hong 
Kong in 2007 and 2008. 
Section 6.3 
Establishment of state discourse: 
social formation and discursive struggle | 
Discursive contestation is inextricably tied with social formation. The practice of j 
l! 
discursive strategy has to respond to the changing social context, in order to make the 
1.丨: Ii 
discourse more appealing, to seek social support in the discursive struggle as well as :::� 
I 
• i 
back-up any power realignment. Thus, when China put forward her state discourse in ‘> 
I 
Hong Kong, she also adjusted her discursive strategy and discursive elements \ 
employed in accordance with the local social context. China also strengthened her 
position in the power realignment in Hong Kong e.g. United Front works and legal ^ 
enforcement simultaneously, in order to foster the social support for the state 
discourse. 
Changes of the discursive elements employed by the state discourse 
The discursive strategy of China's state discourse is inextricably tied to the social 
formation of both China and Hong Kong. The discursive logic and her intention to 
establish the authoritative image of Basic Law responded to the anti-communist 
66 For example, see the press release by Xinhua News Agency on December 2003: In (2004) 
AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 3 to 5 [載於（2004)愛 
國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司’頁三至五]。 
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feeling in Hong Kong before the handover. After the handover, China has to adjust 
the articulation of nodal point (i.e. Basic Law) in response to the changing situation 
in Hong Kong and the challenging discourses from local dissidents from time to time. 
Thus the discursive elements (i.e. principles and stipulations of Basic Law) 
mobilized by the state discourse may be different before and after handover. 
Nevertheless, the discursive logic (China is the master of Hong Kong) is the political 
end of China's state discourse towards Hong Kong, while the discursive package of J 
Basic Law is the legal narration that incorporates her discursive logic, and facilitates | 
I 
the participation of the state discourse in the local public discourse by articulating the t 
. I 
Basic Law to existing consensus in the society of Hong Kong: prosperity and 丨 
'I： 
stability, desire for democracy and above all, the rule of law (particularly during the ：,• 
central - Hong Kong conflict in early 2004). By incorporating her state ideologies � 
f 
into the legal narration of Basic Law, China attempts to confine the discussion with \ 
regard to local democratization in the public discourse of Hong Kong to the j 
J i 
parameters of Basic Law, in which China herself has the final say on the -H 
interpretation of the principles and concrete stipulations^^. 
Basic Law is the nodal point of China's state discourse towards Hong Kong, yet the 
discursive elements (i.e. principles and stipulations of Basic Law) employed are 
adjusted in accordance with the social formation at different periods of time. As 
demonstrated in figure 5，the articulations between the discursive logic and 
discursive elements inside China's state discourse has been substantiated in line with 
the social formation before and after the handover: 
67 According to article 158 of Basic Law, the interpretation of the content of Basic Law belongs to the 
NPCSC. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The discursive logic of China's state discourse was nurtured under the unfavorable 
context i.e. anti-communist sentiment in Hong Kong, enthusiastic local support to 
democratic movement in the Mainland and the fear of being overthrown by 'peaceful 
evolution' (Tsang, 1997) after the June incident in 1989. China still upheld this 
r o 
discursive logic in early 2004 . What changes after the handover are the discursive 
elements employed by China: she added new interpretation on the principles and 
concrete stipulations in Basic Law so as to ban universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008， 
as well as set more stringent conditions for the future democratization in Hong 1； 
Kong69 in response to the context of Hong Kong, the popular demand for universal I 
suffrages in 2007 and 2008. China deliberately slowed down the pace of 丄 
I 
democratization since she was afraid that local dissidents might seize the 
l|J 
administrative power due to the rise of democrats and the setback of local pro-China ；,； 
forces and HKSAR administration after the l^ t July demonstration in 2003. � 
� 
I 
Articulation between 'rule of law' and 'obey the Basic Law' ] 
I 
H I 
Apart from adjusting the discursive elements that adhere to the nodal point i.e. 'Basic 
Law', China also attempted to enhance the credibility of the whole state discourse by 
articulating the nodal point ‘Basic Law’ to the existing popular consensus in Hong 
Kong , to justify the state discourse and participate in the war of position of local 
public discourse. China has been attempting to take part in the public discourse of 
Hong Kong via the articulation of the state discourse to existing popular thoughts in 
68 See the article written by Xu Chongde (許崇德)，Beijing legal expert in Renminribao, 29^ 
February 2004 [載於（2004)愛國論爭’明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁一百零三頁至一 
百一十二頁 ]�I n (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office，Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 
107 to 112. 
69 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)’ deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC, and the decision 
made by the NPCSC on 26& April, 2004. Also see the elaboration of previous paragraphs and 
footnotes. 
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Hong Kong e.g. desire for democracy and stability, and above all belief of the rule of 
law after the handover. As Gramsci (1971) points out, there are two 'floors' to 
political ideology: 1) system of thoughts and 2) everyday conceptions (i.e. common 
sense). To foster hegemony, ideology must be able to articulate the common sense so 
that it can be effective among the masses, and hence compete with other ideologies 
for legitimacy in society (Donald and Hall, 1986). This is exactly the function of the 
discursive package of Basic Law. 
Before the handover, China always attempted to assert that Basic Law was the 
i 
guarantee of prosperity and stability?。，the safeguard of democratic development i 
j ! 
(because Basic Law stipulates that the ultimate selection methods for the chief 
i'l 
executive and all legislators will be universal suffrage, with gradual and orderly 
I 
manner of development in accordance to the actual situation in Hong K o n g , as ( 
/ 
well as the rule of law . \ 
I 
i 
After the handover, during the controversy over universal suffrage at the 2007 and � 
2008 elections, China responded to mounting local demand for democratization by 
once again asserting that the constitutional development in Hong Kong should 
comply with the parameters of Basic Law. Again, China tried to establish the 
See Jiang Zemin's (江澤民）(President of China 1989 to 2002) speech on April 1991 [載於：趙 
睿、張明瑜(主編），宋璧、張培忠(編)(1997)�中國領導人談香港」，香港，明報出版社，頁一 
—九] In English: Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, Zhang Peizhong (ed) (1997) 
Zhongguo ling dao ren tan Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 119 
71 See the speech of Lu Ping, ex-director of the Hong Kong and Macau Office of China, Wen Hui Pao, 
4& January 1993 
72 See the speech by Tung Chee Wah, first Chief Executive of HKSAR on April 1997 [載於：趙 
張明瑜(主編 t 、張培忠(編)(1997)�中國領導人談香港」’香港，明報出版社，頁一 
百 三 至 一 百 三 十 二 ] In English: Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, Zhang 
Peizhong (ed) (1997) Zhongguo ling dao ren tan Xianggang, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing 
Limited, pp 131 to 132. Tung Chee Wah was the first Chief Executive of HKSAR, he was believed to 
be Beijing's favored son and handpicked by ex-president Jiang Zemin to be the Chief Executive, thus 
his speech also represented China's idea to a large extent. 
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supreme status of Basic Law by articulating it as the guarantee of prosperity and 
stability , and also the concept of the rule of law: 
'Although Basic Law is said to have the support of the Hong Kong people, 
during its practice in the past 6 years, it has been questioned, twisted or 
even slandered nearly everyday, this is an unequivocal truth. Hong Kong is 
a society with legal system, Hong Kong people are proud of the spirit of the 
rule of law, but they can tolerate the formation of such strange phenomena 
of a constitutional law, can ’t this be a paradox?' 
9 
\ 
Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General of the NPCSC, 26出 ] 
April 200474 
7 j, 
Obviously, China attempted to establish the supremacy of Basic Law by articulating 
•‘I 
the narration ‘complying with Basic Law’ to the conventional common sense in , 
I ； 
Hong Kong, ‘rule of law’，hence encapsulating the discussion pertaining to Hong \ 
I.� 
Kong democratization in the local public discourse in the framework and parameters 
of Basic Law, as premier Wen Jiabao puts it in a more explicit way: J 
I 
‘Hong Kong is a society with the rule of law; any matters should follow 
the law, particularly complying with the constitution and Basic Law. ’ 
Wen Jiabao (温家寶)，premier of China, in Apple Daily, May 2004 
From the responses in the public discourse, the articulation to the notion of rule of 
law at least to some extent assists the building of the legitimacy of Basic Law, as a 
73 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC, 26出 April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong. 
Ibid. 
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local critic in Hong Kong, Li Yi (李怡）points out: 
'Most of the people, including the author, though not satisfied with the 
Basic Law, still comply with it due to the spirit of the rule of law: "bad 
law is law”(惡法亦法 
Li Yi (李 1台)，local opinion leader and writer, Apple Daily, 28出 April 2004 
Since the concept of the rule of law is so deep rooted in Hong Kong, the articulation 
fii 
between this convention and the notion of ‘obeying the Basic Law，so far seems to be j 
effective for the establishment of the supreme status of Basic Law (at least in the \ 
public discourse of Hong Kong). Local democrats and pro-Hong Kong papers, ； 
ri 
though criticized China for delaying the pace of democratization of Hong Kong, •：丨 
I'll 
complied with the Basic Law and didn't attempt to denounce the Basic Law during -
； 
the debate on Patriotism and the interpretation of Basic Law in early 2004 (see \i 
t 
I‘� 
chapter 7 for further details). Yet this doesn't mean that there is no resistance against 
the manipulation of 'rule of law’ by China^^. j 
• 
China has been using the above tactic in the discursive contestation in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong in relation to local democratization so as to confine all 
discussion of democratization to the parameters of Basic Law. Besides articulating 
the nodal point of the state discourse, Basic Law, to the popular public symbols in 
Hong Kong e.g. rule of law, China also put forward her state discourse in the social 
formation of Hong Kong: constitutional power to interpret Basic Law, as well as the 
introduction of the United Front works to co-opt social elites and scholars to support 
75 For example, see the editorial of Apple Daily on V^  April 2004，which pointed out that the 
interpretation of Basic Law by the NPCSC in fact, is not consistent with the spirit of the rule of law. 
See chapter 7 for more elaboration about the local resistances. 
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the state discourse, in a bid to enhance her back-up in the discursive contestation of 
the public discourse by strengthen her support in the social formation. 
Legal enforcement of Basic Law 
The articulation of 'rule of law' to the narration ‘obey the Basic Law' in the 
discursive contestation paved the way for China to put forward her state discourse 
via constitutional practice, equipping the Basic Law with legal powers and 
I 
intervening in the social formation of Hong Kong, particular after the handover. With 丨! 
the convention of the rule of law, the opinion leaders and social leaders in Hong i 
Kong tend to follow the laws even though they have different opinions of them (For 
example, see Li Yi's observation in section 7.1). That includes the legal professionals ^ 




One vivid example is the interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPCSC in early ^ 
2004 in relation to the selection method of the Chief Executive and Legislature in j 
2007 and 2008 respectively (see chapter 4 for details). Chinese central government 
asserted that the interpretation has overriding constitutional power and so both the 
Mainland and Hong Kong must obey the law: 
‘ The interpretation by NPCSC pertaining to the stipulations in the annexes 
of Basic Law has the same legal power as the stipulations in Basic Law, 
central or local authority, Mainland or Special Administrative Region 
must all follow and implement them properly. ’ 
Article by commentator (評論員文章)，Reminribao (人民日報)，April, 
2004 
117 
Though the interpretation of Basic Law is so controversial and elicits heated debates 
and diatribes in Hong Kong, especially in the legal sector (Fung 2004), the local 
resistant forces seldom (or never) challenge this constitutional power of the NPCSC 
that is entitled by Basic Law while expressing their grievances against the decision 
made by the NPCSC in 2004: 
‘ The power of interpretation by the NPCSC although is legal, should not • 
be used frequently, or abused: i 
i! 
Editorial of Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報)，29'^  March, 2004 J 
' I 
；! 
‘The chair of the Barrister Association (大律師公會主勘 Edward Chan \ 
(陳景生)said, he disagreed the NPCSC to interpret (the Basic Law) with � 
reference to the initiating mechanism of constitutional amendment, but in / 
accordance to the Basic Law, no matter what is the result, Hong Kong has ) 
to abide by [its decision]: 、： 
News report on the responses of the legal sector to the interpretation of 丨丨 
Basic Law by the NPCSC, Ming Pao, April 2004 : 
In fact, compliance with Basic Law is consistent with the popular consensus of the 
‘rule of law' in Hong Kong, as Li Yi points out explicitly: ‘bad law is law'. Gramsci 
asserts that，intellectuals have moral leadership in society and play a crucial role in 
the building up of hegemony, thus the compliance with the legitimacy of Basic Law 
by the prestigious legal professionals and opinion leaders has added impetus to the 
naturalizing process of the acceptance of, or at least the obedience to，the Basic Law 
in society. 
The interpretation of Basic Law by the NPCSC therefore is an illustration of how the 
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state exerts her discourse via practices (e.g. legal enforcement or other state 
behaviors) other than the war of words. Though, in the case of Hong Kong, one must 
pay attention that the habitual enforcement (i.e. the enforcement and interpretation of 
Basic Law) to a certain extent synchronizes with the ideological incorporation (i.e. 
articulating the state discourse to the notion of 'rule of law,)，and above all, the 
existing popular consensus in society (i.e. the 'rule o f l a w ’ ^ . 
United Front works 
Apart from legal enforcement, China has also been engaging in the United Front j 
1' 
works i.e. cultivating her local allies in Hong Kong by offering benefits (economic 
interests and political prestige e.g. membership of the National Political Consultative : 
w 
I 
Conference 全國政協委員)，punishment (e.g. blocking the entry to the Mainland � 
\ 
market) and ideological communication. With the cultivating of allies, China has � 
more partners to assist the state discourse in the discursive contestation in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong. 
The Chinese Communist Party has been cultivating her leftist supporters in Hong 
Kong since 1920s when Dr Sun Yat-sin (孫逸f山，艮口孫中山）was still a l i v e ? ? . Since 
the transitory period, under the keen efforts of Xu Jiatun (許家屯)，an ex-director of 
Xinhua News Agency (Hong Kong branch) who was active and with liberal mind, 
China has strengthened the United Front works in Hong Kong and the cooption of 
various local social sectors: the media industry (also see Chan and Lee, 1991; Lee 
76 However, there are still resistances and criticisms against the state discourse based on the concept 
‘rule of law', see chapter 7 for more details. 
77 See Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1， 
United Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 66 to 69 
78 Ibid, pp 295 to 318 
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and Chu, 1998)，business and industrial sectors, capitalists, the middle class^^; 
consolidated and strengthened the network of grassroots and working class^^ and 
Hong Kong's affiliated parties that supported China^^ China also attempted to co-opt 
those elites by inviting them to be involved in the drafting and consultation of the 
Basic Law and the future political structure of HKSAR since 
With regard to the United Front works, an exemplar is the case of Jimmy Lai (黎智 
英) .He has owned a successful clothing retailing chain in the Mainland since the [ 
I ' 
1990s. He also established the Next Magazine and Apple Daily in the early 1990s. ij 
The latter became the most critical Hong Kong paper against China. Lai's businesses ；:: 
•II fji 
in China were either forced to close or be sold under official or official related ’ 
丨 
pressures subsequently, and it was generally believed that the pressures were 
somewhat due to his ownership of the Next media group (see Sze, 1999 for further 
\\ 
details). On the other hand, China also made use of her political influence to co-opt , 
the business giants in Hong Kong, and introduced investments from the Mainland to , 
Hong Kong in order to enhance her influence in the social formation in this city . 丨 
The efforts of China seemed to become more extensive in Hong Kong. In fact, during 
China's bitter dispute with the last governor of Hong Kong Chris Patten, many local 
political elites who had been promoted by the colonial Hong Kong government in the 
past (such as Allen Lee 李鵬飛84) and business leaders (such as Li Ka Shing 李嘉 
Ibid, pp 119 to 140 
80 Ibid, pp 141 to 150 
81 Ibid, pp 151 to 192 
82 Ibid. 
“ X u Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1，United 
Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 119 to 140 
84 See news report of Wen Hui Pao, 19出 January 1993 
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誠85) sided with China and echoed China's arguments in the public discourse of 
Hong Kong. Even some opposition forces in Hong Kong became milder in their 
criticism of China (Lo, 1997). 
United Front works among the media industry 
Media is an important platform as well as a player of the public discourse, thus China 
has also been engaging in the co-opting of the Hong Kong media since the transitory 
period. The Xinhua News Agency (Hong Kong branch) was described as the ‘second 
power center' during the transitory period, providing news sources and contacts with I 
the Hong Kong media in order to counteract the efforts of the Government : 
•I 
Information Service department of the colonial Hong Kong government (Chan and � 
Lee, 1991). Some officials of the colonial Hong Kong government also felt the ^ 
\ f 
pressure of the United Front works, the Xinhua News Agency was like it was the run ii 
up to election everyday in their challenge of the credibility of the existing Hong 
Kong govemment86. Besides, the Xinhua News Agency also tried to extend China's 
influence from the local leftist papers to other commercial papers, such as Ming Pao 
Qn 
and Hong Kong Economic Journal by private contacts or information leaking . 
Media ownership after the handover 
In fact, China's influence in the Hong Kong media industry has been enhanced 
See news report of Wen Hui Pao, 13& November 1992 
86 See Emily Lau (1991), Emily Lau's Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Open Magazine, pp 318. Also see 
Emily's observation of the activities conducted by the Chinese communist regime in Hong Kong 
during the transitory period, pp 281 to 314. 
87 Xu Jiatun (1993), Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun，s Hong Kong Memoirs), vol 1, United 
Daily News, Hong Kong, pp 295 to 318 
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during and after the eve of the handover. Numerous owners of the Hong Kong media, 
for example, Ho Sai-chu (f可世柱）from Sing Tao Daily (rightist paper before the 
handover, but gradually shifted to be pro-Beijing in the late transitory period. In 1999, 
the original owner of Sing Tao Daily, Sally Wu 胡f山 sold her shares of the Sing Tao 
group to an investment bank, but the Sing Tao group finally was bought by Ho 
Sai-Chu, a Hong Kong business giant), Ma Ching-kwan (馬澄坤）from Oriental 
Daily, Chan Wing-kei (陳永祺）from Asia Television, Hong Kong (ATV) became 
members of the National Political Consultative Conference (全國政協委員）in 2003. 
Besides, many other owners of the Hong Kong media also have business ties with j 
China, such as Robert Kouk (享P鶴年）from the South China Morning Post (Lee and ： 
Chu, 1998). The media ownership pattern of Hong Kong, which most owners of the 
•：! 
I< 
media have to a certain extent political and business ties with China, raises the 
concern over the inclination of the journalistic paradigm in Hong Kong towards ( 
ji 
Beijing (Lee and Chu, 1998; HKJA, 1999) : 
Concerns over journalistic paradigm in Hong Kong after handover 
While China's allies became stronger among the ownership of the Hong Kong media, 
some incidents also drew social attention to the journalistic paradigms in Hong Kong 
under the rising influence of China. For example, in 2001 a presenter of Radio 
Television Hong Kong (RTHK) was accused by the pro-China Wen Hui Pao for his 
comments that Tibet was a country. Afterwards, RTHK released a statement in 
agreement that Tibet is a definite part of China, and added that the segment was 
‘lacking in impartiality' (HKJA, 2001). Besides, Asia Television (ATV) also started 
calling the president of Taiwan Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁）the 'Taiwan's leader' 
instead of ‘Taiwan's president' in 2001. These evidence induced concerns whether 
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the media of Hong Kong has the tendency to practice 'self-discipline'(自律）in order 
to maintain 'political correctness'(政治正確)，particular with reference to the issues 
of Taiwan and Tibet which are highly sensitive for Beijing, in a bid to prevent any 
clashes with China (HKJA, 2001). 
In fact, China has been refusing the Apple Daily reporters' entry into the Mainland to 
gather news (yet the reporters from Apple Daily still enter China as ordinary Hong 
Kong citizens, and collect information with the help of other journalists and their 
private s o u r c e s , . With the rise of China and growing significance of Chinese news, ^ 
the blockade to enter China is a big consideration to the media, as well as the 二 
journalists. The concern over China's influence to media industry is in fact not just 
‘:f 




Power dependency nature of media professionalism 
I 
Besides the United Front works, media professionalism also plays a dual role in the 
formation of state hegemony. There are some built-in news values amongst 
journalists during news-gathering and selection, balanced-reporting, objective 
reporting, news worthiness and other news typology (Tuchmen, 1978). While some 
of them can ensure the variety of news sources to a certain extent (e.g. the belief of 
balanced reporting encourages journalists to seek alternative views), news value on 
the other hand would lead to the power-dependency nature of the media and 
journalists, as the official sources are treated as 'objective' news, comments given by 
88 Private sharing from local reporters; for the interests of the informants, their identities will not be 
revealed. 
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powerful social groups or persons will be regarded as ‘news-worthy，，resulting in 
journalistic deference for those powerful groups in society (e.g. see Allan, 1999; 
Curran, 2002; McNair, 2003; Benett et al.，2004; Lee, 2004; Boyle et al, 2004). 
In Hong Kong, with the flourishing China's influence, the media industry now put in 
a lot of efforts and ensures coverage of Chinese news and news sources from China 
(Lee and Chu, 1998). The power dependency nature of the media may offer impetus 
to the formation of China's state hegemony in the public discourse in Hong Kong 
I 
after the handover. Though during the July demonstration in 2003, the outbreak of j 
'people power’ (local grievances against the HKSAR administration in Hong Kong) ； 
.i 
shocked the journalistic paradigms of the media, steered them away from the 丨 
；f 
II 
pro-China side (Chan, 2004)，without sustained leadership of that sudden surge of 
.I 
I 
'people power,，its influence over the media didn't last long, especially as the local 
aspiration of democratization was curbed by China in early 2004. With the 
emergence of a robust state power center (i.e. China) in the public discourse, the 
journalistic paradigms of the media became 'normalized' (i.e. clinging to the state 
power center). During the debate on Patriotism, most of the local press prioritized 
China's official opinion in their coverage and avoided sharp confrontation with the 
central government (HKJA, 2004). 
The ist July demonstration and subsequent United Front works 
However，the July demonstration in 2003 was a big blow to the United Front 
Works of China in Hong Kong, the liaisons departments and units in Hong Kong 
failed to detect the huge local discontent and send warnings to the central 
government in advance, that prompted the central government to arrange for the 
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representatives of various social sectors to visit Beijing (訪京團)in order to alleviate 
local discontent89，and re-organize the Central Liaison Office (中央駐港聯絡辦公 
室，中聯辦）to re-activate the United Front works in Hong Kong^^. China also 
offered CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 更緊密經貿關係，a 
trading arrangement similar to FTA, Free Trade Agreement, giving special 
concessions such as tax exemptions for some goods and services originated in Hong 
Kong) to Hong Kong, and also allowed Mainlanders from some better-off regions 
(e.g. Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong province) to visit Hong Kong by individual " 
applications (the Individual Visit Scheme IVS 個人遊)，in order to provide a boost j 
s 
to the Hong Kong tourist and retail industries, in a bid to alleviate local discontent 5 
•I 
and co-opt business and professional elites through kick starting the economic L 
ji 
recovery in Hong Kong. 
.f| i 
Effects of the United Front works? 
During the central 一 Hong Kong discursive contestation over universal suffrages in 1 
2007 and 2008, apart from the legal experts and officials from China, some local 
scholars, businessmen and legal professionals also echoed China's state discourse, 
offering arguments for the decision made by the NPCSC^^ Besides, there were 
internal cracks among local democrats with reference to the responding strategy 
towards the central government, particularly over whether the democrats should join 
89 See news report of Sun Daily, August 2003; political analysis in Apple Daily, October 2004 
90 See news report of Hong Kong Economic Times, 3 December 2003. 
91 For example, see the article written by Kennedy Wong (黃英豪)，solicitor and vice-convener of 
New forum (a local concern group) on Wen Hui Pao, 14& December 2004; comments made by Prof. 
Albert Chen (陳弘毅）from the Law faculty of the University of Hong Kong in Apple Daily, April 
2004; opinion given by Prof. Leung Mei-fung (梁美芬）from the Law faculty of the City University of 
Hong Kong in Ming Pao, 17^ January 2004, and news report about the response of tycoons to the 
interpretation of Basic Law by the NPCSC: Li-Ka shing (李嘉誠)，Peter Wu (吳光正)’ Ronnie Chen 
(陳啓宗)’ Hong Kong Economic Journal, Ming Pao, Wen Hui Pao, 27* April 2004 
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the ‘visiting tours' offered by Beijing^^. Except Apple Daily, the print media in 
general tended towards the pro-Beijing end of the political spectrum during the 
debate on Patriotism in early 2004 (HKJA, 2004). 
It is difficult to argue that the above phenomena have nothing to do with the United 
Front works (including communication and interaction with local elites) conducted 
by China since the July demonstration, though it maybe imprudent to conclude 
that the United Front works are very effective just by the above evidence since the 
I 









The case study of China's state discourse illustrates how a state discourse is 
：丨 
established in a newly incorporated territory, and how the state adjusts the discursive 
strategy in line with changing social formation. The discursive logic of China's state 
discourse i.e. its philosophical moment has to be articulated and represented by | 
numerous discursive elements (i.e. principles and stipulations of Basic Law) around 
the nodal point of ‘Basic Law,, and China articulates this nodal point with existing 
public symbols in Hong Kong that represent existing consensus in this society (e.g. 
'rule of law') in order to make the state discourse more appealing under the social 
context of Hong Kong. 
With the changing social formation after the handover, particularly the rise of local 
92 See news report of Apple Daily, 26& October 2004; October 2004. Besides, central government 
also attempted to co-opt some fractions among the democrats: officials from the liaisons office have 
lined up with some members of the Article 45 concern groups (see news report: Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, April 2004)，and created some ill-feelings among the democrats (see news report: Ming 
Pao, 12'^ April 2004', November 2004). 
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democrats and the retreat of local pro-China forces after the July demonstration in 
2003, China has to substantiate the meanings of the discursive elements (i.e. employ 
more principles and stipulations of the Basic Law) within the Basic Law discursive 
package, in order to formulate the argument against universal suffrage in Hong Kong 
in the name of 'in accordance with the Basic Law，. Besides, China also strengthened 
her social influence simultaneously as the back-up to the state discourse in Hong 
Kong by the co-option of social elites, media and legal enforcers of the Basic Law. 
m 
1 i 
Thus, the formation of the state discourse is an on-going dynamic process vis-a-vis ^ 
the changing social formation. The discursive elements employed, the nodal point ] 
4 
jt 
selected and the public symbols articulated in the state discourse are sensitive to the ！' 
：[ 
i 
corresponding social and historical context, so that the discursive logic i.e. { 
philosophical moment of the state discourse can be transformed to narrations that are | 
丨I 
familiar to the society, and hence has the opportunity to enter into the everyday 




THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE OF HONG KONG: 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE HANDOVER 
After examining the state discourse of China towards Hong Kong and how she 
attempts to build it up in the public discourse of Hong Kong, this chapter will 
m 




• How does the public discourse in Hong Kong serve to build up or resist ！ 
China's hegemony over Hong Kong? (RQ2) 丨 
I, 
I 
The following chapter focuses on how the public discourse in Hong Kong responds j 
to China's state discourse before and after the handover, so as to draw insights to 
whether public resistance against the China's state ideology has changed after the 
resumption of sovereignty of China over Hong Kong, as well as the possible reasons I 
behind this difference. The retreat of the resistant forces in the public discursive 
contestation would offer impetus to the building up of state hegemony in the public 
discourse, which is the possible preliminary step for the formation of hegemony. 
Section 7.1 
Power structure and war of position in the public discourse 
The discursive struggle in the public discourse is in line with the power realignment 
in social formation. The power structure in a society determines which social groups 
are powerful enough to take part in the discursive struggle in the public discourse. 
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Only those social groups that are powerful enough can mobilize enough political 
influences and economic resources, or possess the skills and intellectual power to 
utilize the public symbols, in order to manipulate or attract media exposure and take 
part in the public discourse. 
State power is an indispensable party in the power structure of a society. She 
possesses the constitutional power to set the rules in society, as well as the 
implementation of such rules. Besides, other influential parties e.g. business giants, fl 
.1 
concern groups from civil society also attempt to take part in the discursive struggle J 
V 
T 
in the public discourse in order to ensure that their interests could be heard by society, ! 
including the state. Whether the state could build up her hegemony over the public 
I 
discourse, to a certain extent depends on her relative power against the dissidents and 
other social forces in the society. | 
I 
If the power structure of a society is scattered, different power centers (i.e. the j 
powerful groups in the society) would be on a fairly equal base to struggle with each 
j 
other. Under this circumstance, different social forces can have various choices of 
power centers to adhere to. They may attack a power center explicitly by clinging to 
another rival power center, which results in a pluralistic public discourse with 
various voices in the discursive struggle. 
On the contrary, if the power structure of a society is monolithic, with a major power 
center which enjoys an overt comparative edge over other social groups, then the 
power realignment in the society most probably would be inclined to that power 
center. Different social forces, even for the dissidents, have to be, to certain extent, 
subject to the influence e.g. rules or even coercive forces from that major power 
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center. The dissidents have to rely on themselves, and there are very few power 
centers available for them to adhere to when resisting the dominant force. Under this 
circumstance, the resistant discourses in the public discourse may still exist, but may 
not be as robust as those in a pluralistic power structure. 
However, the power structure of a society is ever-changing: the internal split of state 
power may divide a state power center into several rival camps; the alliance between 
the state and other social elites e.g. business giants may consolidate the state power ^ 
I, 
center; the rise of civil society may give rise to other competing power centers (e.g. ！ 
V 
T 
NGOs, opposition camp); the outbreak of social events and movements also have an I: 
» 
impact on the power realignment of social power, and hence the discursive struggle ！ 
！ 
in the public discourse, including the formation of state hegemony and the magnitude � 
of resistance forces. ； s 
Section 7.2 
！ 
Power structure and war of position in Hong Kong: before the 丨 
handover 
The power structure in Hong Kong in the transitory period before the handover is 
basically a dual-structure: the British colonial administration is the one that held the 
state power in Hong Kong, but her influence was diminishing with the rise of China, 
the 'future master' of Hong Kong at the time (Tsang, 1997; Chan and Lee, 1991). 
This shifting of influence between Britain and China over Hong Kong became more 
pronounced approaching the handover. During this period of dual power structure, 
both Britain and China tried to control the agenda of Hong Kong, particular over 
democratization, and resulted in tumultuous power struggles. 
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Constitutional review VS drafting of Basic Law 
British colonial Hong Kong government had launched the constitutional review since 
the mid-1980s, but China simultaneously initiated the drafting of Basic Law to set 
out the parameters of the political structure of HKSAR. The maneuvers of Britain 
and China incited many local social forces in Hong Kong to take part in 
democratization by either establishing concern groups to push colonial Hong Kong f 
government to introduce direct elections in Hong Kong (e.g. Meeting Point, Hong J 
Kong Affair Society), or taking part in the drafting committee and consultative I 
committee of Basic Law, and urging that everything relevant to the political structure f 
of Hong Kong has to be consistent with the parameters of Basic Law (the pro-China j 
camp and business groups). The struggle between these two state power centers j 
resulted in heated debate in the public discourse in Hong Kong over local 
democratization. 
Democratic handover (民主回歸)： 
Some local democrats utilized the constitutional review launched by the colonial 
Hong Kong government to put forward their demands through this discourse. They 
showed consent to the handover, but urged both China and Britain to listen to the 
voices of people in Hong Kong and offer a more representative local government, so 
to maintain the confidence of Hong Kong people. They articulated the local demand 
for democratization to the state discourse i.e. discourse of convergence (see 
paragraphs below), arguing that the democratization was not contradictory to the 
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Basic Law or China's interests^l During the debate over the introduction of direct 
election in Hong Kong in 1988, some local concern groups suggested that 
democratization was in accordance with the state discourse so to persuade China to 
consent to direct election in Hong Kong as soon as possible: 
'Admittedly, the political system of the future Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) will be decided by the Basic Law. Yet we 
all hope that, while respecting Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, 
political reforms in the transitional period and the political system of the 
future Hong Kong SAR will be based on public opinion; and in this way, 
y 






Commentary written by Albert C. Y. Ho Cf可俊仁)，Vice-president, The ‘ 
丨. 
Hong Kong Affairs Society (now the vice-chair of Democratic Party), 
South China Morning Post, 28''' May 1987 I 
i 
The mild democrats made use of the constitutional review launched by Britain, 
I 
i. 
petitioned for democratization in the name of public opinion, urged both China and j 
I 
Britain to listen to the voices of Hong Kong people and offer Hong Kong a more 
representative govemment^'^. 
Britain: constitutional base for a 'democratic handover' 
The ‘democratic handover' discourse put forward by local democrats, to a certain 
extent echoed the narration of another power center. Britain and the colonial Hong 
93 See Yeung Sum (楊森）(Chair of Meeting Point, a local political concern group, now the ex-chair 
of the Democratic Party) (1988) Xianggang min zhu yun dong (香港民主運動)，Hong Kong, Wide 
Angle Press Ltd, pp 115 to 116; 125 to 128 
94 Ibid, pp 107 to 110; 133 to 136; also see news report about Meeting Point, South China Morning 
Post, May 1987; and news report about Hong Kong Observers (a local concern group urging for 
direct election in 1988)，South China Morning Post, 15& June 1987. 
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Kong government, that appealed to the public opinion of the local society as the 
reason for launching constitutional review since the mid-1980s (Roberti, 1996; Tsang, 
1997; Hook, 1997). Britain regarded the offering of democracy to Hong Kong as an 
act of fulfilling her moral responsibility to this colony: fighting for the best for Hong 
Kong before the handover (Roberti, 1996)95. The exemplar of this discourse, Chris 
Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong who came to Hong Kong in 1992，was 
determined to speed up the democratization of Hong Kong even under furious 
attacks from China, many local social elites and business sector in Hong Kong 
i, 
(Cheng, 1995; Ku, 1999). He, as the advocate of the discourse of ‘democratic ；' 
1 
handover', articulated the democratization of Hong Kong to the popular demand of ； 
Hong Kong people to justify his proposed political reform: 
I 
‘So the pace of democratization in Hong Kong is --- we all know --- I 
necessarily constrained. But it is constrained, not stopped dead in its ‘ 
tracks The Basic Law provides for a steady increase in the number of 
those directly elected to the Legislature. It does not visualize stagnation. ! 
What is more, and this was doubtlessly recognized by those who drafted 
Basic Law, the community wants a greater measure of democracy. 
Whenever the community is asked, that is the answer it gives. ’ 
Chris Patten, Governor Policy Speech, 1992, Hong Kong Government 
Printer 
Patten wisely articulated his political reform to the demand for democratization of 
Hong Kong people, while refrained from denying the Basic Law and the discourse of 
95 Also see the speech delivered by Queen Elizabeth II at the opening of parliament at June 1987. Her 
Majesty the Queen said: 'They (the UK government) will fulfill their responsibilities to the people of 
Hong Kong and will continue to cooperate with the Chinese government to carry out the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration.', see news report from South China Morning Post, 26 June 1987. According to the 
news report, Queen's addressing on British responsibility to Hong Kong is the response of Britain to 
China's attempts to deny direct election in Hong Kong in 1988. 
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convergence directly. The tune was similar to those sponsors of the discourse 
'democratic handover': putting forward of local democratization while avoiding 
direct confrontation with Communist China (though Patten failed finally to avoid 
direct confrontation with China, see chapter 5). In fact, in general, Patten's effort to 
speed up democratization was cheered by much of Hong Kong media, even on the 
July 1997，the editorials of Hong Kong Economic Journal gave credits to Patten, and 
a caption of Apple Daily on 30^ June 1997 also paid tribute to this last governor of 




Convergence discourse (銜接論） | 
However, the China side (Chinese government and her allies in Hong Kong), in order 
I 
to gain the upper hand in the discursive struggle with reference to democratization, ) 
tried to avoid being led by the local democrats over the design of the future political 
system of HKSAR, and put forward the 'convergence' discourse (銜接論）urging 
that all domains, including political reforms should comply with the parameters of 
Basic Law, even when the Basic Law was still being drafted. The discourse of 
convergence put forward by China requested that political reforms before the 
handover should comply with the parameters of Basic Law to ensure a smooth 
transition96, in order to put an end to democratization before 1997 due to the 
suspicions towards Britain's motive in turning Hong Kong into an independent or 
semi-independent political entity. This discourse was orchestrated by local pro-China 
96 See the speech of Zhou Nan: In Zhao Rui, Zhang Mingyu, (Chief ed), Song Ying, Zhang Peizhong 




forces97 and business s e c t o r ^ , claiming that 'rapid' democratization before the 
handover, such as introducing direct election in 1988，might breach the Basic Law, as 
asserted by Vincent Lo (a local businessman who has been active in local politics): 
‘Changes in 1988, if any, should only involve the fine-tuning of the 
existing system and direct elections for 1988 would be a premature move 
as this will be a new development which may impinge on the Basic Law.， 
Vincent Lo, Convener, the Business and Professional Group, Basic Law " 
T 
Consultative Committee, South China Morning Post, 28 May 1987 
During the bitter quarrel with Chris Patten's political reform package in the early 
i 
1990s many local pro-China forces, prominent tycoons and business organizations 
. ! 
echoed China's accusation of Chris Patten, and upheld the convergence discourse, 
.. 丨i 
claiming that Chris Patten's political reform violated the parameters of Basic Law as j 
well as the foundation of the co-operation between China and Britain^^. I 
This is the key discourse put forward by China, supported by local pro-China forces 
and the business sector, as the reason to delimit the democratization process in order 
to slow down the pace of democratization before the handover. China also attempted 
to consolidate the nodal point of her state discourse, Basic Law, by putting forward 
this ‘convergence’ discourse, arguing that the Basic Law guaranteed the cherished 
97 For example, see Dorothy Liu's (member of Basic Law drafting committee) opinions on the news 
report oiSouth China Morning Post, 4& June 1987. 
98 For example, see the commentary written by Vincent Lo (羅康瑞)，the business and professional 
groups, Convener, Basic Law Consultative Committee, South China Morning Post, 28& May 1987. 
99 For example, see the comments given by pro-China elites such as Dorothy Liu (廖瑶珠）in Wen 
Hui Pao, December 1992; Tarn Wei-chu (譚惠珠）in Wen Hui Pao, 10出 October 1992; Lee Fu-sian 
(李福善）in Hong Kong Economic Journal, 19& December 1992; also see remarks made by local 
business tycoons in Hong Kong: Lee Ka-shing (李嘉誠）on Wen Hui Pao, 13" November 1992; 
Vincent Lo (羅康瑞）in Wen Hui Pao, 18& November 1992; the statement made by the Chinese 
General Chamber of Commerce (香港中華總商會）in Wen Hui Pao, 16* November 1992. 
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values in Hong Kong, including democratic development, as a response to the 
discourse ‘democratic handover' put forward by democrats and the colonial Hong 
Kong government. 
Alternative power center: Britain 
However, some local democrats rejected the convergence discourse by questioning 
why the democratization of Hong Kong must be limited by Basic Law. Since the 
I' 
constitutional power before the handover was still in the hands of Britain, they 
adhered to this power center, petitioned Britain to speed up the democratization 1' 
before the handover regardless of the drafting of Basic Law. During the controversy 
over whether direct election should be introduced in 1988，some local legislators and | 
I 
democrats kept questioning whether local democratization should be limited by J 
Basic Law by arguing that the Joint Declaration signed between Britain and China j 
had not set constraints with regard to this issue^^ .^ 
During the early 1990s, the reforms launched by Patten, though incited furious 
responses form China and her allies in Hong Kong, offered an institutional base for 
local democrats to refute the parameters of Basic Law in the discursive struggle in 
the public discourse. The constitutional power held by Chris Patten's administration 
provided a power center for local democrats to adhere to and refute the 
‘convergence’ discourse put forward by China. When advocating Chris Patten's 
effort to speed up the democratization of Hong Kong in the early 1990s, Martin Lee, 
100 For example, see the opinions given by Selina Chow (周梁淑儀）and Szeto Wah (司徒華）against 
the convergence discourse on news report of South China Morning Post, 1 July 1987; news on Martin 
Lee's (李柱銘）comments on South China Morning Post, 9 July 1987; editorials of South China 
Morning Post, 5& February 1987; 3广 May 1987 
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an outspoken Hong Kong legislator at that time, demonstrated local resistance 
against the Basic Law when discussing the pace of democratization: 
'Basic Law is not an eternal truth' 
‘7b constrain the post-97 political structure into a fixed framework (of 
Basic Law) is not realistic: 
Martin Lee, legislator, (now ex-chair of Democratic Party of Hong 
Kong), Wen Hui Pao, 22"^ October 1992 ； 
A local democrat from UDHK (United Democrats of Hong Kong 港同盟：local | 
political party advocating democratization. It merged with another political 
organization, Meeting Point 匯黑占 in the early 1990s and established the Democratic 
Party of Hong Kong 民主黨）indicated local opposition against the convergence 
I 
discourse or even the parameters in the Basic Law with reference to democratization 
even more vividly: 
'The people in the feudal age loved women who had small feet; women 
had to bind their feet to a three-inches length, now somebody use the 
Basic Law as a long foot-binding cloth with bad smell, hoping the 
democratic development of Hong Kong is constrained, making it (i.e. the 
democratic development of Hong Kong) into a strange small 
foot asking Hong Kong people to "cut their feet to fit the shoes ” (肖�J足 
適勵’ limited by the Basic Law.' 
Huang Zhen-xia (黃震遐)，member of UDHK, Ming Pao, 23October 
1992 
Thus，the convergence discourse before the handover failed to incorporate local 
discussion of democratization into the framework of Basic Law. The legitimacy and 
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status of Basic Law in Hong Kong were frequently challenged by some local 
democrats and other opinion leaders who continued to question whether the 
democratization of Hong Kong should be limited by Basic Law. And the resistance 
against the convergence discourse and Basic Law, to a large extent, clung to the 
alternative power center in Hong Kong other than China, Britain. 
Prosperity and stability (繁榮穩定)： 
« 
While some local democrats adhered to Britain (adherence is not equal to 
i 
unconditional support), some local business giants gradually chose the alternative ‘ 
power center, China. The business groups worried that rapid democratization would 
only resulted in excessive welfare and political disturbance, harming stability and | 
I . . i prosperity, since full democratization would mean the end of their privileges in the | 
political system (White III, 2001). The doubts expressed by the local business sector 
over democratization induced heated debate between them and local democrats over 
whether democratization or the introduction of direct election would jeopardize 
economyioi. 
The business groups, increasingly the local pro-China forces, clung to the 
‘convergence，discourse put forward by China, argued that rapid democratization 
might breach the parameters in the Basic Law, so as to resist the articulation put 
forward by Britain and the colonial Hong Kong government, that only 
democratization can secure the investors' confidence in Hong Kongi02 (Lo, 1997) 
i� i See news reports by South China Morning Post, July 1987; 30& June 1987; 8& June 1987 and 
31 St May 1987. 
102 For British articulation of 'prosperity and stability', see exemplar, Policy Speech of Chris Patten 
1992, Hong Kong Government Printer 
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(also see chapter 6 for the attacks of the local business sector on Chris Patten's 
reform). 
Democracy against communism (民主抗共)： 
Apart from the power center provided by Britain, there was already a strong resistant 
force against Communist China in the power structure in Hong Kong before the 
handover, the conventional anti-communist feeling. Some radical democrats (such as : 
I 
Martin Lee and Szeto Wah), articulated this anti-communist feeling to the handover, 
upheld another discourse in response to the handover, which was the one that I 
antagonized China most, ‘democracy against communism'(民主抗共)，advocating 
that Hong Kong must establish a representative government before the handover in 
I 
. . . I 
order to build up a democratic barrier against China's penetration after 1997: ； 
‘Mr Szeto Wah said he was even more convinced that direct elections for 
the legislative council next year (i.e. 1988) would be the safeguard of 
Hong Kong's “high-degree autonomy“ after 1997. "Bear in mind, after 
1997 although most things are said to be unchanged, the mother 
government behind us is not a democratic government in real sense ” Mr. 
Szeto said: 
News report on Szeto Wah (司徒華)，legislator, (now the chair of the 
Hong Kong Alliance in support of Patriotic Democratic Movement 香港 
市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會’簡稱支聯會and member of Democratic 
Party), South China Morning Post, 22"^ June 1987 
Another prominent democrat, Martin Lee even articulated the discourse ‘democracy 
against communism' to the Joint Declaration in order to justify this discourse: 
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‘Somebody said "democracy against communism “(民主抗共)is not 
practical However the Sino-British Joint Declaration has already 
stipulated that socialism will never practice in Hong Kong. Establishing a 
democratic political system, in order to avoid practicing communism in 
Hong Kong, isn，t this consistent with the spirit of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration?'' 
Martin Lee, legislator, (now ex-chair of Democratic Party of Hong Kong), 
Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 1988 
After the 4【卜 June incident in 1989, due to the buoyancy of furious local sentiment ] 
inflamed by the Tiananmen massacre, the discourse ‘democracy against communism' 
was even more popular in Hong Kong, reflected by the defeat of local leftist forces in 
I 
the Legislative Council election in 1991. The confidence of Hong Kong people in 
China dropped to the lowest due to the brutal crackdown of the student movement in j 
Beijing (Tsang, 1997, also see chapter 5). Besides, the split of central authority in ‘ 
Beijing at that time also induced the retreat of China's state power in Hong Kong, 
further reducing her power to curb the resistant discourses at that moment. 
This discourse, together with enthusiastic support to the democratic movement in the 
Mainland in Hong Kong since the eve of the June incident, ignited China's 
anxiety over the democratization of Hong Kong, who was concerned that 
democratization might turn the Hong Kong administration over to the hands of 
'unpatriotic' dissidents thus converting Hong Kong into a Trojan horse. 
The prevailing discourses with regard to the democratization of Hong Kong before 
the handover are summarized in fig 6. Due to the dual-power structure, the presence 
of Britain and China as two state power centers in the society in Hong Kong, 
basically no particular party could enjoy explicit comparative edge over the others in 
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the discursive struggle in local public discourse. Local dissidents could cling to the 
constitutional review and reform launched by Britain and the colonial Hong Kong 
government, to seek an institutional base to put forward their demands for 
democratization, attack China's state discourse, and refute the supremacy of Basic 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* Group of 190: including opinion leaders from concern/ pressure groups, scholars 
and members from the Basic Law Drafting committee and the Basic Law 
Consultative committee, promoting democratization in transitory period 
** United Democrats of Hong Kong, a local pro-democracy political party, merged 
with Meeting Point and established Democratic Party. 
*** Group of 71: members from the Basic Law Drafting committee as well as the 
Basic Law Consultative committee, many of them upholding 'convergence' 
discourse and rejecting rapid democratization before the handover. 
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Section 7.3 
Power structure and war of position in Hong Kong: 
after the handover 
From dual to monolithic power structure 
After the handover, with the disappearance of British power, China became the only 
state power center in Hong Kong. With the implementation of Basic Law, which is 
the mini-constitution in Hong Kong, China enjoys overriding constitutional power in 
Hong Kong. She scrapped the Legislative Council elected in 1995，and established a 
Provisional Legislative Assembly to take over the remaining tenure of the former 
after 1997. She also possesses the right to interpret and amend Basic Law, and her 
interpretation and decision over Basic Law has overriding constitutional power in 
Hong Kong. This regaining of constitutional power and the United Front works make 
China a flourishing power center in the society of Hong Kong. 
Besides, social attention shifted to the socio-economic conditions of HKSAR 
immediately after the handover, due to the Asian financial storm and the subsequent 
collapse of property prices, stock market and economic downturn, the political 
agenda became less prominent as a public concern during the early years of Tung 
Chee Wah's Chief Executive of HKSAR) administration^On the other hand, 
the central government in Beijing also seldom appeared in the public discourse in 
Hong Kong since the handover (except the right of abode issue in 1999^ "^^ ). Therefore, 
103 See HKU pop site: http://hlaipop.hlai.hk/ (Index of agenda that the citizens concern) 
104 In 29, January, 1999, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) made a ruling, granted the 
children of Hong Kong people who stayed in the Mainland the right of abode in Hong Kong. The 
controversy is: the CFA claimed that the court of Hong Kong should not follow the decision of 
National People Congress (NPC, national legislative body of China) if the latter breached the Basic 
Law. This ruling statement antagonized the central government, since this implied that the court of 
Hong Kong can judge, or even challenge NPC authority and decisions. This issue gave rise to a series 
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democratization was not a prominent agenda in local public discourse in the first few 
years after 1997. 
'People power，in the July demonstration: quasi 'power center，for local 
democrats 
However, the July demonstration in 2003 gave a nasty shock to China's 
representatives in Hong Kong, the Tung administration as well as pro-China forces. 
Six-year's accumulation of discontent against Tung's governance and social hardship 
induced this tremendous and unprecedented social movement against the HKSAR 
government and pro-China forces, offered a chance for local democrats to regenerate 
their declining influence since the handover, that was reflected by their victory in the 
District Council election in November of 2003. 
The ‘people power' (Chan, 2004) demonstrated in the July demonstration 
suddenly became a quasi ‘power center' for local democrats to adhere to, and put 
forward their demands for the speeding up of local democratization in the name of 
‘public opinion'. This 'people power' was a quasi ‘power center' in the sense that it 
did not embody any formal institutions, yet this outbreak of social discontent gave a 
shock to the power structure in Hong Kong: the retreat of pro-China forces and the 
HKSAR administration, the advancement of local democrats, and above all, as a 
temporary tangible nodal point for the democrats to articulate their discourses and 
advocate local democratization in the name of ‘public opinion'. With mounting 
popular support for universal suffrages for the election of the Chief Executive and all 
of debates in the public discourse in Hong Kong with the vocal participation of the central government, 
particularly pertaining to the NPCSC ’s (National People Congress Standing Committee, standing 
committee of the national legislative body of China) interpretation of Basic Law in June 1999 to 
nullify the abode right of many abode right seekers. (See Fung, 2004 for more details) 
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legislators in 2007 and 2008，local democrats and their sympathizers upheld the 
discourse 'public opinion first' and urged the central government (i.e. China) and 
local administration to speed up the democratization and follow the popular demand 
for universal suffrages (i.e. the ‘public opinion first，民意爲先 discourse). 
Public opinion first (民意爲先） 
The ist July demonstration in 2003 gave weight to the voice of the citizens in Hong 
Kong, people power (discourse of public opinion) became crucial in the public 
discourse afterward (Chan, 2004). Many democrats and scholars interpreted this 
huge demonstration and the subsequent defeat of the pro-China camp in the District 
Council election (November 2003) as indicators of mounting local desire for 
democratization^This articulation was a powerful discursive strategy to vocalize 
the local desire for democratization even though China tried to alleviate the 
discontent and lower the local political demand in Hong Kong by offering economic 
benefits, as illustrated by the editorials of pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily, 
and a centric paper Ming Pao: 
‘ Yes, the 尸'July demonstration was the event that occurred four months 
ago, the social confrontational sentiment has now been alleviated. 
However, as we have been reiterating, what the citizens wanted in the 产 
July demonstration was not merely the stepping down of particular 
officials, not merely abandoning the enactment of “bad law (the Bill of 
National Security in the fulfillment of the requirement of Article 23 of 
Basic Law) “ but more important was the right to be the owners of our 
home (當家作主).Before getting and realizing this right, the citizens will 
continue to stand out, and certainly continue to voice out. The very high 
See news report of Apple Daily, Ming Pao, Hong Kong Economic Journal and Oriental Daily, 24& 
November 2003 (the date after District Council election); January 2004 (the date after 广 January 
demonstration in 2004) and 12^ April 2004 (the date after the demonstration against the interpretation 
of Basic Law by the NPCSC). 
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voting rate yesterday (i.e. the District Council election on the 
November 2003) illustrated that the citizens have not forgotten the 尸'July 
demonstration, or the willingness to be the owners of our home. Can the 
Chief Executive and HKSAR administration still pretend not to be able to 
listen to the strong outcry for democracy like this? We think the Chief 
Executive and HKSAR administration only have one choice before this 
strong outcry of democracy: cancel all appointed seats in the District 
Council at once, and launch constitutional review as soon as possible, let 
the citizens elect the Chief Executive in 2007! ’ 
Editorial, Apple Daily, 24出 November 2003 
‘Even with recovering economy and improved social environment, 
thousands of people went to the streets on the r' January (2004), 
demanding the speeding up of democratization, and universal suffrage for 
the Chief Executive in 2007, the HKSAR administration and central 
government absolutely can 't ignore this message: 
Editorial, Ming Pao, January 2004 
The ist July demonstration in 2003, subsequent social events (the District Council 
election, the January demonstration in 2004) as well as the provided 
discursive elements to articulate with and represent the voice of people in Hong 
Kong for democracy i.e. public opinion in the discursive contestation relevant to 
democratization. It was crucial for the democrats, scholars and other opinion makers 
(e.g. editorials) to articulate to this (mediated) public opinion of Hong Kong so as to 
put forward democratization, particularly when they were bargaining the state 
discourse (which has the constitutional power as back up), the local business sector 
1 此 The polls showed a popular support to having universal suffrages to elect the Chief Executive and 
all legislators in 2007 and 2008 respectively in Hong Kong society since the July demonstration 
(see www.hkupop.hku.hk), and the polls offered an important discursive elements for the articulation 
with the public opinion, for example see the editorial of Ming Pao, January 2004. 
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and pro-China camp during the central — Hong Kong confrontation in early 2004^ '^^ . 
Practical constitutional needs (政帘!l需要） 
Besides demanding democratization in the name of public opinion, local 
pro-democracy politicians, scholars and some other media also articulated 
democratization to the poor governance of the Tung administration (Tung Chee Wah, 
the first Chief Executive of HKSAR) since the handover, thus pointing out that only 
through universal suffrages as a mean for the local government to ensure popular 
mandate by general election would restore the ruling legitimacy that the HKSAR 
administration has been losing in post-handover era . The experience of the widely 
recognized maladministration of the Tung government provided a strong impetus to 
this discourse: 
‘He (C. H. Tung) doesn't have the mandate of the people, the so-called 
“heed the pressing concerns of the citizens 急市民所急、想市民戶斤想” 
and "care for the elderly ” seemed to be written by S. K. Lau 劉兆佳 for 
him (i.e. C. H. Tung). Cutting the comprehensive assistance for the elderly 
by 11%, but the civil servants can have their pay cut next year based on 
the "zero-zero-three“ agreement, that's a strange development. Only a 
strange political system breeds strange development. Up to this point, 
Hong Kong people have still not woken up? Still arguing whether 
democracy is needed? Still arguing whether the mandate of the people is 
needed? Still arguing when to have the mandate of the people?' 
107 For example, see editorials of Apple Daily, 28the January 2004; February 2004; 12& April 
2004; also see comments given by local democrats in the news reports of Apple Daily in those days 
above. 
108 For example, see the comments made by Allen Lee (李鵬飛)，a local prominent commentator, 
Hong Kong Economic Journal, 2"'' January 2004; Also see the speech made by Martin Lee (李柱銘) 
(ex-chair of Democratic Party) when he attended the testimony held by US congress on March 2004, 
in Wen Hui Pao, 6出 March 2004; opinions made by Alan Leong (梁家傑)(member of Article 45 
concern group), Hong Kong Economic Journal, April 2004; commentary written by Yeung Sum 
(楊森)’ Apple Daily, April 2004; editorials of Apple Daily December 2004; February 2004; 
20出 February 2004; 29* February 2004; editorials of Ming Pao, 11出 February 2004; 6出 April 2004; 
editorials of Hong Kong Economic Journal, 1 J a n u a r y 2004; 17^ January 2004. 
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Allen Lee (李鵬飛），local prominent commentator, Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, January 2004 
'The past six and a half years of painful experience already fully proves 
that the existing strange political system is the source of all instability. 
Just imagine, if the chief executive is not chosen by a small clique, but by 
universal suffrage, Mr. Tung, whose performance is poor and who knows 
nothing about the situation of the citizens should have stepped down in 
July of 2002, then the crises afterwards such as SARS and the enactment 
of Article 23 wouldn 't become the political crises that were out of control, 
the citizens wouldn ’t have amassed so much grievance, and the 尸'July 
demonstration would not have taken place.‘ 
Editorial, Apple Daily, 28& April 2004 
The widely recognized poor governance of C. H. Tung gave the local pro-democracy 
forces ‘concrete’ evidence to reject the existing election mechanism for the Chief 
Executive, thus articulated ‘poor governance' to the non-democratic election system, 
and argued that democratization (i.e. universal suffrages in 2007/ 2008) was the 
solution to the existing administrative problems: by general election, the Chief 
Executive would be held accountable to the people as well as the legislature, 
therefore solving the executive-legislative deadlock. 
Prosperity and stability (繁榮穩定） 
In response to the mounting local demand for universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008, 
China attempted to divert the social attention in Hong Kong by arguing that Hong 
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Kong had to concentrate on economic r e c o v e r y T h e business tycoons echoed this 
discourse and pointed out the political arguments over democratization would do no 
good to the stability and economy of Hong Kong^^ .^ Some pro-business politicians 
also expressed doubts that democratization might lead to excessive welfare and ‘free 
lunch’ since the political parties would use those means to obtain votes^^^ Yet the 
democrats and pro-democracy forces counter-argued that most prosperous countries 
and regions are democratic^ 
Presence of China's state discourse: power center for local rivalries of 
democrats to adhere to 
The ist July demonstration in 2003 resulted in the rise of local democrats in the 
public discourse of Hong Kong, however, it soon induced large-scale opinion war 
waged by the state power, China. With rising influence and the constitutional power 
she possessed in Hong Kong after the handover, China reiterated that local 
constitutional development (i.e. democratization) must be conducted under the 
parameters of Basic Law, China substantiated her discursive package of Basic Law in 
accordance with the social context of Hong Kong at the time by initiating the opinion 
war of the debate on Patriotism. She also made use of her constitutional power to 
interpret the Basic Law in early 2004 and banned the popular demand for universal 
suffrages in 2007 and 2008 in order to prevent the local democrats from ‘seizing 
109 See speech by the spokesmen of the Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs of the State Council, 
17^ January 2004; and the talks offered by Premier Wen Jiabao to delegations from Hong Kong and 
Macau on March 2004 [載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部，明報出版社有限公司，頁十三至 
十四、一百 h 六 ] �I n English: (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial office, Ming Pao 
Publishing Limited, pp 13 to 14, 116. 
MO See the news reports on the comments given by Ronnie Chen (陳啓宗）and Stanley Ho (f可鴻藥） 
on Hong Kong Economic Journal, Ming Pao, Wen Hui Pao, 20& Febuary 2004; 27& April 2004; and 
Li Ka-shing's (李嘉誠)opinions in the news report of Apple Daily, 19^ March 2004 
� See news report on comments by James Tien (田北俊)，chair of Liberal Party, on Hong Kong 
Economic Journal, 7& February 2004. 
"2 For example, see the article written by Albert C. Y. Ho (vice chair of Democratic Party) on 28^ 
April 2004. 
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power' through general election. 
The presence of China in the public discourse in Hong Kong was crucial to local 
leftist and the HKSAR administration. The pro-China forces that lost their credibility 
after the July demonstration could adhere to this power center and attack the 
popular local democrats. And above all, the local business giants could also take this 
opportunity to put forward some contradictory discourse against democratization: 
that rapid democratization is harmful to stability. It was extremely difficult for those 
discourses that were contradictory the public support for universal suffrages in 2007 
and 2008 to appear in the public discourse in Hong Kong after the July 
demonstration in 2003. Yet the presence of China provided a robust state power 
center for those pro-China forces and business giants to adhere to, and put forward 
those discourses that against popular public opinion. 
From dual to monolithic power structure 
In a nutshell, the discursive struggle in the public discourse in Hong Kong after the 
handover is conducted under a monolithic power structure, with a single flourishing 
state power center, China, after the retreat of Britain. In general, the local dissidents 
can only rely on their own credibility and limited constitutional power (i.e. seats in 
the Legislative Assembly) to take part in the discursive contestation against China's 
state discourse. With the back-up of overwhelming constitutional power and 
flourishing economic achievement, China's state discourse becomes more 
pronounced in the public discourse of Hong Kong. 
However, the July demonstration in Hong Kong brought a sudden shock to the 
power structure in Hong Kong: the retreating of pro-China forces and HKSAR 
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administration and the advancement of local democrats gave rise to the discourse 
‘public opinion first', and allowed the democrats to articulate their aspiration of 
democratization to the general support of Hong Kong people. The poor governance 
of Tung's administration also provided a solid nodal point to the discourse ‘practical 
constitutional need,, allowed the democrats to argue for democratization as a solution 
to the executive-legislative deadlock. 
Yet, since the dissidents were not able to consolidate this 'people power' (the 
outbreak of local discontent against the HKSAR government) into a sustainable 
supporting force and establish a solid ‘power center' against China, they could not 
stand firm before the large-scale ‘strike back' by China in early 2004. China's state 
discourse intervened in the public discourse in Hong Kong through the state media, 
Chinese officials and scholars, which offered a state power center for the local leftists, 
business giants and the HKSAR administration to adhere to, and counter-argue 
against the local public support for universal suffrages. The details of the discursive 
struggle in the public discourse in Hong Kong between China and local civil society 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Discursive struggle between the state discourse and dissidents from the local 
civil society 
The state discourse counter-argued the discourses produced by local dissidents above 
as follows: 
With regard to the discourse 'practical constitution needs (supporting universal 
suffrages as a means to guarantee the legitimacy of HKSAR administration): 
China argued that the political system in Hong Kong should be 'executive-led' in 
1 1 'J 
accordance with Basic Law . To maintain the executive-led system, the NPCSC 
stipulated that for the election for that Legislative Assembly beyond 2004, half of the 
seats should remain as functional constituency, so as to observe whether the gearing 
(another word?) of the executive and legislative branches of Hong Kong met the 
requirement of Basic Law i.e. an executive-led system"4. in other words, universal 
suffrage for all legislators is impossible in 2008 for the sake of the executive-led 
principle. 
With regard to the 'public opinion first' discourse: 
China argued that the public opinion was divided and there were no consensus with 
See Siu Weiyun's (蕭蔚雲）speech on 16* January, 2004 [載於（2004)愛國論爭，明報編輯部， 
明報出版社有限公司’頁二十至三十四]�I n English: (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao editorial 
office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 20 to 34. 
114 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General of NPCSC, 26出 April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong, Also see chapter 5. 
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regard to whether universal suffrages should be held in 2007 and 2008^^^ China also 
employed the principle of ‘balanced participation' from her discursive package of 
Basic Law to argue that Hong Kong was not ripe for universal suffrage since the 
business and industrial sector, that was the key player of Hong Kong economy, was 
still doubtful about this^^^ (Simultaneously, the business and industrial sector also 
expressed doubts over the impact of universal suffrages on stability and economy, 
echoing the state discourse “？). 
In a word, China determined to confine the discussion of democratization to the 
parameters of Basic Law, established its supreme status by articulating the concept 
‘rule of law’ with ‘obeying the Basic Law’，and then manipulated the interpretation 
of the principles and concrete stipulations in the law to refute the popular demand for 
a quicker pace of democratization, particularly regarding universal suffrages in 2007 
and 2008. 
Local resistance: the war of position of certain key stipulations in the Basic Law 
In fact, the meaning of ‘rule of law' is debatable, but the research focus of this thesis 
is not to define what is and what is not 'rule of law，，but scrutinize how the concept, 
or in fact the sign 'rule of law’ is defined and articulated in the public discourse of 
Hong Kong, so as to offer insights to how various parties, including China, local 
dissidents, opinion leaders and legal professionals contested for the articulation of 
115 Ibid, also see Siu Weiyun's (蕭厨雲）speech on 16* January, 2004 [載於（2004)愛國論爭’明報 
編輯部，明報出版社有限公司’頁二十至三十四]�In English: (2004) AiGuoLunZhen, Ming Pao 
editorial office, Ming Pao Publishing Limited, pp 20 to 34. 
"6 Ibid. 
"7 See news report on the response of tycoons to the interpretation of Basic Law by the NPCSC: 
Li-Ka shing (李嘉誠)，Peter Wu (吳光正)，Ronnie Chan (陳啓宗)，Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
Ming Pao, Wen Hui Pao, 27山 April 2004 
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this conventional consensus in Hong Kong in order to put forward their discourse. 
As what happened before the handover, China's state discourse encountered 
tremendous resistance in the public discourse of Hong Kong, particularly pertaining 
to her definition of the principles and concrete stipulations in Basic Law^^ :^ 
• Gradual and orderly manner: China said that, in accordance with this principle, 
holding universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008 would not appropriate; but 
democrats and the resistant forces argued that Hong Kong already has 20 years 
of experience of democratization since the transitory period^ 
• Actual situation: China said that the actual situation in Hong Kong was that 
Basic Law is still not respected; however democrats argued that the actual 
situation was that Hong Kong people had the economic base and educational 
level to have universal suffrages, that would solve the existing constitutional 
problems i.e. legitimacy of HKSAR administration; accountability of local 
.120 
government . 
The articulation to the 'rule of law' and the narrative cracks 
Although the state discourse has been articulating the Basic Law to the existing 
popular consensus in Hong Kong, 'rule of law', in order to establish the supreme 
status of the Basic Law in Hong Kong (at least in the public discourse), and in 
"8 For example, see the editorials of Apple Daily, 28^ April 2004; Editorials of Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, 4出 February 2004; February; 17出 April 2004 
"9 News reports of Martin Lee's comments in: Ming Pao, 20" January 2004; Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, January 2004; editorial oiApple Daily, January 2004 
12° For example, see the editorials of Apple Daily, 4& December 2004; January 2004; April 
2004; opinions made by Alan Leong (梁家傑）(member of Article 45 concern group), Hong Kong 
Economic Journal, April 2004 
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general even the resistant forces (at least in the public discourse) are also compliant 
to the Basic Law due to the spirit of ‘rule of law,，this articulation is not seamless: 
narrative cracks (i.e. loopholes of the narration of the state discourse) (Ku, 2001) 
appeared as the local democrats and legal professionals accused China of 
manipulating legal narrations for political ends, and adding her own interpretations to 
the Basic Law and violating the 'rule of law’ in Hong Kong^: 
'Basic Law has not stipulated what is 'patriotic and loving Hong Kong (愛 
國愛港)’’ it is unrealistic to define this from a legal perspective... to be 
honest, the hidden meaning is: to ensure that those administers of Hong 
Kong are acceptable to the central authority., 
Audrey Eu (余若薇)，Senior Council, member of Article 45 concern group, 
Ming Pao, 17& Feburary 2004 
‘Ronnie Tong (湯家麟’ member of Article 45 concern group, pointed out 
that universal suffrage is a political problem instead of a legal one, but the 
central authority adopts a legal approach to solve it.. 
News report of responses of the legal sector to the interpretation of Basic Law 
by the NPCSC, Apple Daily, 7出 April 2004 
Besides, though the resistant forces seldom challenged the right held by the NPCSC 
to interpret the Basic Law, they argued that the interpretation of the NPCSC was 
inconsistent with, or even destructive to the rule of law in Hong Kong, as the 
'interpretation' was actually amendments to the concrete stipulations in support of 
China's interests 122: 
121 Also see the article written by Michael Davis, law professor from the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, member of Article 45 concern group, in Apple Daily, 26^ March 2004; article written by Li Yi 
(李怡)，a local critic, in Apple Daily, 28出 April 2004 
122 Also see the news reports of the comments given by the legal sector (Chair of Bar Association), 
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'Just think about this, if the NPCSC can freely and proactively interpret 
the articles in Basic Law in accordance with her political needs and aims, 
adding new content and stipulations to the Basic Law, then the whole 
Basic Law will be degraded to a tool of the ideology of the central 
government and lose its objectivity and authoritativeness. Therefore, the 
rule of law in Hong Kong will be at stake, the foundation of 'one country, 
two systems ’ will be fragile. ’ 
Editorial, Apple Daily, the 广 April 2004 
The above examples indicate how local resistant forces articulated the 'rule of law' to 
the Basic Law. They showed no objections to obeying the Basic Law, yet they put 
forward other meaning with this articulation: the interpretation of the NPCSC 
weakened the authoritativeness of the Basic Law and thus jeopardized the rule of 
lawi23. 
Resistance against the state discourse: before and after the handover 
However, the greatest difference between the resistance to the state discourse (i.e. 
China's discourse) before and after the handover is that challenges against the ruling 
of the Chinese regime i.e. the central government, as well as the Basic Law are rare 
after handover (when compared with the discourse ‘democracy against communism' 
and contention that the democratization of Hong Kong shouldn't be limited by the 
scholars (Prof. Johannes Chan, Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong) and local democrats e.g. 
Audrey Eu, Martin Lee, Ronnie Tong: Hong Kong Economic Journal, 27^ March 2004; Apple Daily, 
April 2004; editorials of Apple Daily, 29" March 2004;广 April 2004; Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, 27^ March 2004 
123 In fact, some local opinion leaders continuously challenge the articulation to 'rule of law’ by 
China. For example, Hung Chien-tien (洪清田)，a local commentator, criticized that 'rule of law' 
should include due procedures in the legislative and judicial process, an openness of such procedures 
and a monitoring mechanism to supervise the power of the governmental bodies. Yet in China's 
discourse, the meaning of 'rule of law' is lacking in such important elements. See his article on Hong 
Kong Economic Journal, 9& June 2005. 
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Basic Law before the handover, see section 7.2 above). Although there are narrative 
cracks of the state discourse with regard to the articulation to 'rule of law’，most of 
the resistant forces still articulated to the Basic Law (instead of rejecting it) when 
resisting the state discourse, arguing that universal suffrage is not contradictory to the 
Basic Lawi24: 
'According to Article 45 of Basic Law，the Chief Executive has to be 
elected by universal suffrage ultimately. That is the direction of the whole 
political development of the Hong Kong, the universal suffrage of the 
Chief Executive is the ultimate aim; if Hong Kong elects the Chief 
Executive in 2007, which is just attaining this goal earlier, and is not 
contradictory to Basic Law. ’ 
Editorial, Apple Daily, the December 2003 
Besides, the democrats and resistant forces refrained from criticizing the whole Basic 
Law directly (or even stressed the obedience to Basic Law). Neither did they express 
explicit open challenges to the ruling of central government. They even occasionally 
try to placate China that Hong Kong had no intentions to confront with the central 
authority when petitioning or arguing for universal suffrages in Hong Kong, even 
1 ^ c 
though during the central — Hong Kong confrontation in early 2004 : 
‘In a nutshell, even though Hong Kong practices universal suffrage, the 
control of Hong Kong by the central government is still solid, the powers 
and influence of the central government are not weakened. Under this 
situation, how can Hong Kong become an independent political entity? 
124 Also see news report of the opinions of legal professionals and legislators: Audrey Eu, Martin Lee, 
Yeung Sum, Apple Daily, Hong Kong Economic Journal, Ming Pao, 1 J a n u a r y 2004. 
125 Also see editorials of Apple Daily, February 2004; April 2004; in fact Martin Lee also 
reiterated that Hong Kong people have no intentions to be independent from China and praised 
China's President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in his testimony in US congress, see his speech: 
Wen Hui Pao, March 2004. 
161 
This concern of the central government is unnecessary. ’ 
Editorial, Apple Daily, March 2004 
‘Please shouldn ’t say the stuff that hurts the people of Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong people fighting for democracy are unpatriotic, are supporting 
"democracy against communism ”，want "to get to the top quickly 步到 
位 by civil disobedienceMost of Hong Kong people, who are born, 
brought up, live and work in Hong Kong are patriotic and love Hong 
Kong, we are willing to pay for and shoulder responsibilities for China 
and Hong Kong. The proposed constitutional reform is acceptable to the 
Basic Law, is absolutely legal without any infringement. ’ 
Alan Leong (梁家傑)，Senior Council, member of Article 45 concern 
group, Ming Pao, March, 2004 
'We just want to seek effective governance, maintain prosperity and 
stability and let Hong Kong people live comfortably and work happily 
together under the framework of Basic Law.' 
Margaret Ng (吳靄儀)，Senior Council, member of Article 45 concern group, 
Ming Pao, April, 2004 
As indicated by the excerpts above, the local resistant forces during the central -
Hong Kong confrontation deliberately avoided challenges to the ruling of the central 
authority, or the exercise of sovereignty by China over Hong Kong when criticizing 
China's rejection of universal suffrages in 2007 and 2008 in Hong Kong. They even 
agreed that the participation of the central government in the constitutional 
development of Hong Kong was positive and necessary^^^. On the contrary, the 
resistant discourse ‘democracy against communism' that was popular in Hong Kong 
126 For example, see editorials of Apple Daily, 4& December 2003 
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before the handover was an overt rejection to the communist Regime in China，as 
well as an attempt to resist China's influence in Hong Kong by establishing a 
democratic barrier (see section 8.2 below). However, this discourse is now 
deliberately denied by Alan Leong 梁家傑(see excerpt above). 
Besides, China has been utilizing Basic Law as her discursive tool (as well as a 
constitutional tool after the handover) to slow down the pace of democratization of 
Hong Kong since the transitory period to early 2004 (and afterwards?). Before the 
handover, there were some local resistant forces that disagreed with the limitation of 
local democratization by Basic Law (see section 7.2 above). However, during the 
controversy over universal suffrages in early 2004，the resistant forces complied with 
Basic Law instead of rejected it. Though they might have different articulations with 
regard to the principles and stipulations in the Basic Law, they never rejected the 
supremacy of the Basic Law in Hong Kong (at least in the public discourse). 
Section 7.4 
Retreating resistance against China in the public discourse 
The discursive boundary of the resistant forces against China's state discourse in the 
public discourse of Hong Kong pertaining to local democratization has retroceded: 
from resisting the central regime (communist regime in China) as well as the Basic 
Law to the level relevant to local regime i.e. the political system of HKSAR only 
(see the indicator relevant to the resistant force against state power in figure 3 in 
chapter 4). Before the handover, the radical democrats put forward the discourse 
'democracy against communism' to refute the communist regime as well as her 
exercise of influence in Hong Kong during the discussion of democratization, but 
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after the handover in early 2004, the resistant forces in the public discourse refrained 
from confronting the central government (i.e. China) when fighting for universal 
suffrages. The focus of resistance shifted to constitutional matters within the HKSAR 
(see the discourse ‘practical constitutional needs). Besides, the resistant forces also 
complied with Basic Law when arguing for universal suffrages in early 2004, instead 
of refuting the whole Basic Law, as the radical democrats did during the Sino-British 
confrontation over Chris Patten's reform in the early 1990s. 
However, it may be imprudent to conclude that local resistance to the communist 
regime in the public discourse of Hong Kong has totally disappeared after the 
handover. The existence of the HKAPDM 支聯會 after the handover is already an 
indication of the continuation of resistance to the communist regime in Hong Kong. 
During the central - Hong Kong confrontation in early 2004，local opinion leader 
and democrats still articulated the difference between ‘state，and the 'Chinese 
Communist Party', arguing that 'patriotic' means loving the state, but not the party: 
‘Mixing up party and country nevertheless is not the case of the majority 
of the world. This is unacceptable to the Hong Kong people who have 
received the western education, know what civic right is and have some 
perception about human right and the rule of law. ’ 
Lin Xinzhi (林行止)，local opinion leader and writer, Hong Kong 
Economic Journal, March 2004 
‘Somebody said I'm not patriotic, but I will ask whether patriotism means 
loving the (Communist) Party? I agree with the national culture and the 
people of the whole society. What I don ’t love is the dictatorship of one 
party and the domination of leaders. ’ 
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Albert Ho (何俊仁)，legislator, vice-chair of Democratic Party of Hong 
Kong, member of Democratic Party and the Hong Kong Alliance in 
support of Patriotic Democratic Movement (HKAPDM 支聯會)，Ming 
Pao, 8& Feburary 2004 
The democrats deliberately expressed another meaning of ‘patriotic，，loving the 
motherland but not the Chinese Communist Party, so as to justify the existence of 
HKAPDM, which objects to the dictatorship by the Communist Regime in China. 
Key Hndings 
Although local resistance against the Communist Regime still exists in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong, it has definitely weakened after the handover during the 
war of position pertaining to democratization, because of: 
• The disappearance of the discourse ‘democracy against communism' from 
before the handover; 
• The compliance with (or even obedience to) the Basic Law, which supremacy 
China has been stressing in Hong Kong. 
Instead of challenging the ruling of the communist regime and the Basic Law，the 
focus of the resistance in the public discourse shifted to the local regime after the 
handover i.e. political system that stipulates the power and formation of the HKSAR 
administration. The lowering of social resistance against the state (China) in the 
public discourse actually indicates an advancement of the state discourse from China 
in the war of position in the public discourse of Hong Kong after first couples of 
years since the transitory period, which maybe a tendency for the formation of state 
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hegemony in the public discourse, a crucial step of the formation of state hegemony 
in a society. 
Discursive struggle and power structure 
The retreating of local resistance, particularly the compliance with Basic Law, may 
be the preliminary tendency for the formation of state hegemony in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong. With the shift of power structure of Hong Kong from a dual 
to monolithic one after the handover, social forces that are able to stand against 
China directly are diminishing in Hong Kong, implying that the local dissidents have 
less power centers to adhere to when resisting China's state discourse. For example, 
local democrats could adhere to Chris Patten's administration，supporting the 
political reform launched by Patten and refuting the 'convergence' discourse in early 
1990s before the handover. After the handover, when China gained the constitutional 
power and the right to interpret Basic Law, local dissidents did not have any other 
power center on par to adhere to (neither they are powerful enough to refute China's 
constitutional power under the framework of Basic Law). Except during the 
occasional outbreak of 'people power' in the July demonstration in 2003, local 
democrats have not been able to offer robust support to resist China's state discourse. 
The case of the discursive struggle in the public discourse Hong Kong pertaining to 
local democratization thus is a vivid illustration of the dynamics of power structure 
in society and the discursive struggle in the public discourse. The shift of power 
structure affects the relative strengths of the participants of the public discourse, 
resulting in corresponding impact on the discursive struggle in the public discourse. 
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However, this does not imply that the discursive struggle is necessarily the dependent 
variable to the power structure. Power centers and their allies have to pay attention to 
their discursive strategy so as to articulate their discourses to the prevailing public 
symbols that represent the existing consensus in society and hence strengthen the 
appeal of their arguments. On the contrary, the participants who have less power 
back-up could also try to gain public attention and credibility by skillful framing. As 
the discussion in chapter 3 shows, the popular discourses in the public discourse can 
enhance the moral leadership of their sponsors and give impetus to them in the power 
realignment in the society. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ELABORATION OF FINDINGS 
AND EXTENDED DISCUSSION 
This chapter will elaborate the findings in previous chapters with the analytical 
model constructed in chapter 3, and offer insights to the formation of state hegemony 
in the public discourse through the building up of China's discourse in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong. Apart from applying Gramsci's hegemony to scrutinize the 
establishment of China's state discourse and the formation of hegemonic tendency in 
the public discourse in Hong Kong, the policy applications observed from this case 
study and the lesson leamt i.e. the role of professionalism in the hegemonic 
formation are also discussed. 
Retreating resistance against China in the public discourse in Hong Kong 
After the handover, the resistant forces against the state discourse put forward by 
China in the public discourse of Hong Kong has been weakening gradually: from 
refusing to accept the communist regime (i.e. the discourse ‘democracy against 
communism') and the legitimacy of Basic Law to focusing on the discursive 
struggles over the local regime i.e. the political system of the HKSAR. The Basic 
Law has become a legitimate base for the discussion of local democratization and 
China's supremacy in Hong Kong that has been recognized in the public discourse of 
Hong Kong gradually after the handover, even in the narration of the local democrats, 
professionals and dissidents. This scenario is different from the discussion of local 
democratization before the handover, when the status of the Basic Law was 
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frequently challenged and refuted. 
The development of the public discourse of Hong Kong with reference to the 
discussion of local democratization demonstrates a preliminary tendency of the 
establishment of state hegemony: the ruling of the state i.e. China (Communist China) 
over Hong Kong is to a certain extent naturalized with the lowering of the resistant 
level against China in the public discourse i.e. disappearance of the discourse 
‘democracy against communism' and the emergence of compliance with Basic Law. 
Resistance still exists in the public discourse after the handover, but is not as hostile 
towards the ruling of Communist China as before the handover, and the forces refrain 
from direct confrontation with the central government. 
The rise of China's state discourse and the naturalization of its nodal point i.e. Basic 
Law in the public discourse of Hong Kong, indicate the preliminary tendency of the 
formation of China's state hegemony. Though it is far to conclude there is such 
hegemony since resistances against China's state discourse are still fierce in both 
public and private discourses of Hong Kong, an important discursive element of 
China's discourse i.e. its nodal point (Basic Law) is becoming common sense in the 
public discourse. This ‘achievement’ should not be underestimated, as the naturalized 
authoritative image of Basic Law may become a useful discursive tool for China to 
substantiate her state discourse through articulating other discursive elements to this 
nodal point in future discursive contestation. 
Nevertheless, why China's state discourse becomes popular in the public discourse of 
Hong Kong? 
1 6 9 
Section 8.1 
Social and discursive formation: 
Application of analytical model 
State power: back-up of China's discourse 
The formation of state hegemony depends on the solidarity within state power. 
Discursive formation is inextricably tied with the power realignment of the social 
formation, as social parties (including the state) need power back-up in order to join 
the discursive contestation in the public discourse. 
Throughout the transitory period and post-handover years, China has been lining up 
allies to sponsor the state discourses by United Front works: offering business 
interests, political titles to those favorite social elites and blocking 'unfriendly' 
businessmen's entry to the Mainland market as a punishment e.g. Jimmy Lai. China 
also gained an overriding constitutional power in Hong Kong in accordance with the 
Basic Law after the handover, thus acquiring a solid back-up to the Chinese state 
discourse in the discursive contestation in the public discourse of Hong Kong. 
Thus, maintaining a coherent, persistent and solid state power is crucial to the 
building of state hegemony. If fractional struggle within the state appears, the state 
discourse would be fragile and self-contradictory, offering opportunities for resistant 
discourses in the public discourse. During the climax of the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, 
due to the conflicts among the fractions inside the central authority in Beijing, there 
was no coherent direction from the central government. Even the leftist press in 
Hong Kong criticized China's maneuvers against the crowds (Chan and Lee, 1991; 
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Fung, 1999). However, except that particular moment, China in general has 
maintained a coherent state discourse towards Hong Kong, especially during the 
contestation with her 'rivalries' e.g. Chris Patten in the early 1990s and local 
outspoken dissidents such as Martin Lee and Szeto Wah in early 2004. 
Historical and social context: the rise of China and downturn of Hong Kong 
The strength of state power depends not only on the efforts and solidarity of the state, 
but also the corresponding historical and social context. Hegemony is the historical 
bloc that dominates the articulation of common sense of a society (Hall, 1988; 
Grossberg, 1996; Barker, 2003), thus to scrutinize the formation of hegemony, 
reflexive examination of the relevant historical and social context is indispensable. 
The formation of hegemony frequently depends heavily on whether the historical 
moment and social context are favorable or not, such as the development of 
Thatcher!sm in Britain that coincided with the prevailing trend of privatization and 
marketization in the economic and public sectors, which then penetrated into the 
everyday social understanding (Hall, 1988). 
The historical trajectory since the 1990s has basically been encouraging to China, 
whilst the time after the handover has been tough for Hong Kong: 
• China has been enjoying an economic boom since the 1990s, together with 
enhanced international prestige and influence. In fact since the 1990s, Hong 
Kong people, including a range of industries and professional services, have 
gradually begun to seek business opportunities in the Mainland due to the rise of 
China; 
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• Hong Kong suffered from the financial crisis since 1998, which resulted in the 
slump of property prices and the stock market. This together with the ineffective 
policies and directions set by the Tung administration e.g. the erratic housing 
policy and the failed attempt to develop a hi-tech manufacturing base further 
intensified the economic and social hardship suffered by people in Hong Kong. 
The above historical moment and social context basically further reinforced the state 
power of China over Hong Kong, and enhanced the position of the Chinese state 
discourse in the public discourse of Hong Kong. 
The shift of bargaining power: rising China and weakening Hong Kong 
The handover of the sovereignty over Hong Kong to China already implies that 
China is equipped with overriding constitutional power in Hong Kong that she didn't 
enjoy (or was limited by Britain and the colonial Hong Kong government) before 
1997. The constitutional power enabled China to practice her constitutional rights 
(the interpretation of the NPCSC) in order to implement the state discourse, and 
offered China more political resources i.e. appointment of the seats in the local 
governmental or consultative bodies and to conduct the United Front works in Hong 
Kong. 
The gaining of constitutional power together with the rise of economic power make 
China more resourceful to adjust her policies towards Hong Kong, especially in the 
increasingly important role played by China in the economy of Hong Kong. The 
offer of economic interests such as CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement) and the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) do not only co-opt the business 
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elites and are appreciated by people in Hong Kong, but pose a serious cultural 
challenge to the conventional anti-communist sentiment in Hong Kong: how can 
Hong Kong people enjoy the benefits offered by the central communist regime whilst 
look down on her simultaneously^^^? 
The challenge to the anti-communist sentiment (the lowering of hostile sentiment 
against Beijing) is constructive in the building of moral leadership of China in Hong 
Kong. This should be a decisive factor for the disappearance of the discourse 
‘democracy against communism' after the handover. 
Economic factor: carrot and stick 
Though rectifying the economic determinism of traditional Marxist theory, the notion 
of hegemony does not nullify the importance of economic factors in the gaining of 
social support (Mouffe, 1979). China's maneuvers against the popular demand of 
universal suffrage after the July demonstration in 2003 gave an illustration of how 
a state alleviates political and social discontent by offering economic interests i.e. the 
tactic of 'carrot and stick'. 
China offered IVS and CEPA to Hong Kong in August and September 2003 
respectively and the proportion of Hong Kong people who trusted the central 
127 Apart from the policies such as CEPA and IVS, there are also other indications showing the rise of 
Chinese economic power in Hong Kong. For example, since 1993，enterprises from the Mainland 
have issued HKD 905 billion in the Hong Kong Stock market, accounting for half of the total amount 
of capital issued from 1993 to 2003. Up to February 2005, enterprises from the Mainland and 
enterprises that have businesses in the Mainland accounted for half of the total number of listed 
companies in the Hong Kong Stock Market (see the report of Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 26^ 
March 2005; the official website of the Hong Kong Exchange 香港交易及結算所有限公司’港交所： 
www.hk.ex.com.hk) 
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government rose from around 40% to 50% in the third and forth quarters in 2003 
according to the polls, but this figure dropped to around 40% gradually in the first 
and second quarters of 2004 when China initiated the debate on patriotism and 
outlawed the popular demand for universal suffrage (see footnote 128). Thus, China 
seemed to hedge against the political and social risks she took for banning the 
popular demand of universal suffrage (stick) by offering economic interests (carrot). 
The alleviation of political and social discontent by the offer of economic interests by 
China, to some extent, enabled her to maintain state prestige in Hong Kong even 
under harsh criticisms by the democrats and dissidents during the debate on 
patriotism and universal suffrages. 
The rise of popularity of China and impact on her moral leadership 
The rise of China and growing importance of her influence in Hong Kong gave 
impetus to the popularity of the central government in Hong Kong, as indicated by 
the polls since the handover: the proportion of the Hong Kong population who trust 
the central government has increased since 1998 (just 28% of the Hong Kong 
population trusted the central government initially). Though this figure dropped to 
two ebbs, in April of 2003 (the controversy over the enactment of the Bill of National 
Security for the fulfillment of the requirement in the Article 23 of Basic Law) and 
April of 2004 (after the debate on Patriotism and the interpretation of Basic Law by 
the NPCSC), it rose again to around 50% (i.e. around 50% of the Hong Kong 
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population trusted the central government) after about half a year . Furthermore, 
128 See the polls conducted by Dr. Robert Chung from the University of Hong Kong: 
www.hkupop.hku.hk. In fact, this figure dropped to around 40% after the interpretation of Basic Law 
by the NPCSC in April 2005 pertaining to the length of tenure of the elected Chief Executive in July 
2005. Up to the completion of this thesis, it is too soon to see whether the figure will rebound as 
before. 
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the popularity ratings of Chinese leaders, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao，are very high, even higher than those of all local officials from the HKSAR 
administration (except Donald Tsang) and legislators (including the democrats and 
legal professionals) 
The disappearance of the discourse ‘democracy against communism' due to the rise 
of China and her flourishing influence over Hong Kong, as well as the rise of her 
popularity, are crucial for China to overcome the conventional anti-communist 
feeling in Hong Kong and restore her moral leadership. Besides, China has also been 
building up her moral leadership by co-opting or nurturing credible sponsors for the 
state discourse e.g. local scholars and professionals. China changes her own official 
representatives: from the old-fashioned ‘guards of laws'(護、法)：e.g. Xu Chongde (言午 
崇德)，the late Xiao Weiyun (蕭蔚雲）to some 'new faces', such as Qiao Xiaoyang 
(喬曉陽）（deputy secretary-general of the NPCSC), Wang Zhenmin (王振民） 
(professor of law from the University of Tsing Hua ) who are more acceptable to 
people in Hong Kong (or at least less detestable than the leftists and old-fashioned 
scholars from Beijingfo. As Gramsci (1971) points out, cultivating intellectuals who 
specialize in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas is important for the 
building of hegemony. Only with the efforts of credible and skillful intellectuals, the 
state can formulate a discourse that articulates to the consensus of the society, in 
order to get the upper hand in the war of position in the public discourse. 
129 Hu Jintao has been receiving from 67.3 to 71.9 points from the late 2003 to early 2005; while the 
figures for Wen Jiabao range from 70.6 to 74.4 (full mark: 100). Except Donald Tsang (Chief 
Secretary of HKSAR when the polls were conducted, now he is the Chief Executive), the rates of all 
officials and legislators are lower then those of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. 
130 See the editorial of Ming Pao, February 2004; commentary written by Kitty Poon (潘潔)，a 
local commentator in Hong Kong Economic Journal, 1 A p r i l 2004. 
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Articulation to public symbol that represents existing consensus 
The improvement of China's popularity and her efforts to project a professional 
image assisted her to implement the state discourse via legal narrations since early 
2004. Her discursive package of the Basic Law is aimed at articulating with the 
consensus in Hong Kong i.e. ‘rule of law，，so to facilitate the participation of the 
state discourse in the fight for hegemonic status in Hong Kong. Only those 
discourses which can articulate to the popular thoughts of the society can be 
understood and accepted by the masses, and thus join the discursive contestation in 
the public discourse (Donald and Hall, 1986). 
From dual to monolithic power structure: impact on the journalistic paradigm 
As discussed in chapter 7, the retreat of Britain left China the only state power center 
in Hong Kong. Local dissidents lost an alternative power center to adhere to when 
resisting China's state discourse. Without the existence of another state power center, 
the social groups in Hong Kong could not choose another master to follow, or on the 
other hand, they didn't need to worry about the sanctions imposed by Britain when 
luring favors from China. In a word, the disappearance of this major competitor 
facilitates China to put forward her state discourse over Hong Kong. 
The shift of power structure in Hong Kong from dualistic (two power centers: China 
and Britain) to monolithic (one power center: China and her ruling bloc), is followed 
by China's United Front works towards the media: encouraging affiliation with 
China from the media owners in Hong Kong (Lee and Chu, 1998; HKJA, 1999) and 
imposing embargoes against those 'unfriendly' media from gathering news in the 
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Mainland. There is evidence of the 'self-discipline' and 'political correctness' of the 
Hong Kong media after the handover, particularly pertaining to sensitive issues e.g. 
Taiwan and Tibet (HKJA, 2001); and the newspapers tended to lean towards the state 
discourse during the debate on Patriotism in early 2004 (HKJA, 2004). 
However, there are still some pro-Hong Kong papers that are critical of China e.g. 
Apple Daily and Hong Kong Economic Journal after the handover. Besides, the 
professionalism in Hong Kong media also allows the dissidents to put forward their 
discourse into the media discourse due to the principle of balanced reporting 
practiced by journalists (e.g. even Wen Hui Pao, a leftist paper contains some reports 
about the democrats, also see Lee, 1998 on professionalism among the journalists in 
Hong Kong). 
Resistant forces: the struggling with China 
Rise of civil society in Hong Kong 
Whilst the influence of China has been rising in Hong Kong, the local civil society 
also flourished during the last decades. The initial development of the civil society in 
Hong Kong before the handover was mainly state-driven (Ip, 1997): the colonial 
Hong Kong government promoted many community activities so as to alleviate 
social ill-feelings and divert discontent after the riots in the 1960s. The formation of 
a local identity since the 1970s and public attention paid to social problems also 
nurtured various pressure groups and the growth of non-government organizations 
(NGOs). The constitutional review launched by the colonial government since the 
mid-1980s led to a boom of concern groups and political organizations which are 
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aimed that advocating democratization (Ip, 1997). The emergence of concern groups, 
pressure groups and non-governmental organizations, together with the enhancement 
of educational level in the past years, laid down a fertile soil for nurturing the civil 
society of Hong Kong. 
Besides, Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong, changed the conservative 
style of his predecessors and introduced some new concepts to the public discourse 
of Hong Kong during his tenure before the handover, accountability and transparency 
(Flowerdew, 1997). Patten often visited citizens, went to the legislative council and 
appeared in front of the media to answer questions directly. He also launched the 
project of 'performance pledges' (setting performance targets for every government 
departments), held the government accountable to the citizens and made the 
operation of government more comprehensible to the public. This new style altered 
the past colonial ruling style that stressed secret dealings between the government 
and elites, and raised public concern over the work done by the government 
(Flowerdew, 1997). 
Thus in the 1990s, the society of Hong Kong has changed from the 1980s: the civil 
society had to a large extent been flourishing, and Hong Kong was 'politicalized' 
(rise of public concern over governmental and political matters) (Ip, 1997). This 
trend has been carried on since the handover. The gradual loss of public trust over 
Tung's administration stimulated social concern over his governance and various 
social groups and citizens tried to put forward their demands to the HKSAR 
administration via the media (e.g. phone-in programs) and petitions. After the July 
demonstration in 2003，many concern groups were formed to speak out on the 
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interests of different social groups and political and social demands 
The rise of civil society in Hong Kong through the decades offers bedrock for the 
plurality of the public discourse even in the face of rising influence from China. 
Therefore, though the resistance against the ruling of the communist regime and 
Basic Law has weakened in the discursive contestation in the public discourse, the 
state discourse encountered tremendous counter-frames against the interpretations of 
the principles and concrete stipulations of Basic Law. Besides, local democrats also 
enjoy certain constitutional power with their seats in the Legislative Assembly and 
therefore still have some power back-up. 
Local leftists: jeopardizing China's moral leadership 
Besides the rise of civil society, the democratic camp is also comparatively more 
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popular then the traditional pro-China political forces . When China attempted to 
articulate her state discourse to the concept of 'rule of law，，democrats, local scholars 
and legal professionals also reasserted their articulation to the 'rule of law，，as well 
as their interpretation of the stipulations in the Basic Law, which resulted in robust 
� For example, the New Forum (新論壇）and Synergy (新力量網絡）aimed at representing the 
collective voices of the middle class, professionals and scholars; Democratic Force (民主動力）and 
Democratic Development Network (民主發展網絡）are established by scholars, which advocates 
democratization of Hong Kong; the People pipe (七一人民批）and the Federation of Secondary 
School students (中學生聯盟）are formed by teenagers to raise the concern of young people over 
public matters. 
132 Among the political parties/ groups, the Article 45 concern group (四十五條關、注'組）(a group that 
consists of professionals and scholars advocating universal suffi-ages in Hong Kong) has been the 
most popular one in Hong Kong from the late 2003 to early 2005; except the Federal of Trade Unions 
(FTU 工聯會)(an union with a pro-China background), the democratic camp i.e. Democratic Party 
(民主黨）；Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People Livelihood (HKADPL 民協）on 
average enjoyed a higher popularity than the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong 
(DAB 民建聯）(the major pro-China political party in Hong Kong), see polls conducted by the Dr. 
Robert Chung from the University of Hong Kong: www.hkupop.hku.hk 
179 
resistance challenging China's interpretation of Basic Law even though the 
supremacy of Basic Law that China has been stressing was respected by all sides. 
On the contrary, China's traditional representatives or supporters in Hong Kong, the 
leftists, are notorious due to the conventional anti-communist feelings in Hong 
Kong 133. Besides, the leftist leaders often antagonize the public, damaging the image 
of China in Hong Kong^ "^^ . Also, China's official representation, the HKSAR 
administration under the leadership of C. H. Tung, was notorious for its bad 
governance 135. In fact, the direct intervention from the central government in the 
controversy of universal suffrages in Hong Kong implied that China was lacking her 
own credible local intellectuals to fight for the state discourse, so she had to do it 
herself. 
Though China is attempting to co-opt some local opinion leaders and intellectuals 
and sending 'new faces' i.e. Chinese officials or scholars who are more skillful in 
their manipulation of professional legal narration rather than the local leftists or 
old-fashioned scholars from Beijing, in order to put forward the state discourse, it 
still takes tremendous time and effort to regenerate the local pro-China forces. The 
133 Local leftists in Hong Kong have been regarded as trouble makers since the leftist riots in 1967， 
and have been given negative titles such as 'little leftist'(左仔）and 'bucolic communist' (土共）in 
Hong Kong since then (See Xu Jiatun (1993)，Xu Jiatuan Xianggang Huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong 
Memoirs), vol 1，pp 91 to 94). 
134 For example, Tsang Hinchi (曾憲梓)’ a member of the NPCSC，called Martin Lee 'the betrayer of 
the Chinese 漢奸）when the latter attended the testimony held by the US congress with regard to the 
democratization of Hong Kong in March. This kind of behavior by prominent figures of the pro-China 
camp induced huge ill-feeling in the society in Hong Kong, see commentary written by Lin Xinzhi (林 
行止）in Hong Kong Economic Journal, 8 出 March 2004; editorial of Ming Pao, 20 出 February 2004 
135 The proportion of Hong Kong population who trusted the HKSAR government dropped 
consistently since the handover, and from 2003 to early 2004 at just around 30% or lower proportion 
of population trusted the HKSAR government. The figure rose again since the late 2004. See the polls 
conducted by Dr. Robert Chung from the University of Hong Kong: www.hkupop.hku.hk . C. H. Tung 
stepped down in March 2005. The post of the Chief Executive then was acted by Donald Tsang, the 
Chief Secretary at that moment. Tsang became the Chief Executive in June 2005. 
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challenge of reengineering the local pro-China forces thus will be a crucial factor for 
the maintenance of the state discourse in future. 
However, C. H. Tung stepped down in March 2005 and the popular official, Donald 
Tsang 136，a popular official who originally was the Chief Secretary, became the Chief 
Executive of HKSAR in June 2005. If the HKSAR administration could become 
popular persistently, then China would have a credible helper to promote her state 
discourse in Hong Kong who will serve to foster state hegemony in local public 
discourse. On the other hand, the enhanced popularity of the central government and 
Chinese leaders in Hong Kong after the handover may offset some adverse effects 
brought about by the notorious leftists to the state discourse, therefore assisting 
China to gain credibility in the advancement of the state discourse in the discursive 
contestation in the public discourse of Hong Kong. In fact, even the local dissidents 
and resistant forces also tried to avoid direct confrontation with the central 
government and Chinese leaders when resisting the state discourse since the opinion 
war about Patriotism in 2004. 
As illustrated by the analytical model in chapter 3, the hegemonic formation in the 
public discourse is subject to the dynamics between discursive and social formation. 
The establishment of China's state discourse over the public discourse in Hong Kong 
is a vivid case study of such dynamics during hegemonic formation. With the 
flourishing social power of China and her discursive efforts, cultivating moral 
leadership and articulating her state discourse to the popular consensus of Hong 
136 The popularity rate of Donald Tsang often is the highest among the government officials, after he 
took the post as the acting Chief Executive, his popularity rating is high, above TOmarks (full mark: 
100)，higher then the mark yielded by the most popular legislator in the democratic camp, Audrey Eu. 
See the polls conducted by Dr. Robert Chung from the University of Hong Kong: 
www.hkupop.hku.hk . 
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Kong, particularly 'the rule of law', local resistance against the communist regime 
has been weakened after the handover (the disappearance of the discourse 
‘democracy against communism') and the supremacy of Basic Law has largely been 
established in the public discourse of Hong Kong. The retreat of resistance to the 
state discourse in the discursive contestation of the local public discourse, to a certain 
extent is the preliminary tendency of the formation of state hegemony: the ruling of 
China over Hong Kong and the legitimacy of Basic Law are becoming a naturalized 
‘common sense’ in the local public discourse in this newly incorporated city. 
However, the rise of civil society in the past decades and the conventional hatred 
against the local leftists still enable local dissidents to take part in the discursive 
struggle in the public discourse in Hong Kong. The emergence of the preliminary 
tendency of the formation of China's state hegemony in the public discourse of Hong 
Kong under the dynamics between social and discursive formation is summarized in 
figure 8 below, which is modified from the analytical model in chapter 3 in 
accordance with the case study of Hong Kong: 
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Figure 8: Formation process of state hegemony in the public 
discourse (Context of Hong Kong) 
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The application of the analytical model above illustrates the dynamics between 
discursive contestation and social power realignment during the hegemonic 
formation of China's state discourse in the public discourse in Hong Kong. It aims to 
provide an analytical framework to study how a state attempts to build up her state 
hegemony, and provide a groundwork to scrutinize the hegemonic formation process 
in the public discourse: identifying the factors, namely moral leadership, popular 
consensus in society, journalistic paradigms and the social power realignment, and 
analyze their roles in the dynamics between the social formation and discursive 
contestation for the hegemonic formation process. 
Section 8.2 
Application of hegemony and policy implications 
The case study of the establishment of China's state discourse in the public discourse 
in Hong Kong also offers an illustration of the application of hegemony at policy 
level. As discussed in chapter 6, Communist China was abhorred in Hong Kong 
before the handover. However, to a certain extent, she is able to gradually alleviate 
this anti-communist feeling and lower the social resistance in the public discourse in 
Hong Kong after the handover. Though as discussed in previous section, the 
historical and contextual factors, the rise of China and the downturn of Hong Kong, 
play a crucial role, still, China's discursive strategies should also be analyzed so as to 
offer insights to how a socialist state can establish her state discourse in an advanced 
capitalist city. 
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Moral leadership is crucial to the discursive contestation 
Gramsci (1971) stresses that moral leadership is crucial in the formation of 
hegemony, since it is the crux to win the active consent of the subjects, and the role 
of the credible intellectuals in the cultivation of moral leadership and the synthesis of 
different interests in the society into a common ideology is also crucial . Since the 
beginning of the transitory period before the handover, this is the most serious 
problem that Communist China has to overcome when establishing her state 
discourse in the public discourse of Hong Kong. Communist China herself has been 
unpopular, while her allies, the leftists, are also irritating for the people of Hong 
Kong. Thus China has sent some 'new faces' (e.g. Wang Zhen-min 王振民 and 
Qiao Xiao-yang 喬曉陽）to replace the old-fashioned Chinese scholars since the 
April of 2004, in order to present a more 'rational' and professional image before the 
eyes of the Hong Kong people. Therefore, choosing appropriate figures to represent 
the state before the media (same as other social forces) is crucial for hegemonic 
formation. 
Setting up authoritative and convincing 'nodal points' 
Another discursive strategy employed by China is the setting up of authoritative and 
convincing ‘nodal points' for the state discourse. Nodal point is the main discursive 
element that is articulated by other discursive elements of a discourse (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985). To establish its discourse and fight for hegemonic status in the public 
discourse, the state has to set up some 'nodal points' in accordance with the social 
context, and try to articulate these nodal points to some other existing public symbols 
which represent the prevailing consensus in the society. Without establishing some 
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authoritative and convincing nodal points for other discursive elements to articulate 
with, the state discourse would lose it selling points in the public discourse. 
China has been establishing the authoritative image of the Basic Law in the public 
discourse in Hong Kong, and employed ‘Basic Law’ as the key nodal point of her 
state discourse, turning the political aims into legal narrations during the discursive 
struggle against local dissidents. This discursive strategy coincided with the social 
context of Hong Kong, the belief in ‘rule of law’ and the prestige and credibility of 
legal professionals. Most of the people in Hong Kong respect the law. Thus when 
China narrated 'rule of law' as ‘obey the Basic Law’ during the controversy over 
universal suffrage in early 2004，even the legal professionals, opinion leaders and 
local dissidents didn't refute it since the Basic Law has already been effective since 
1997. China tactfully articulated ‘Basic Law’ to a popular public symbol 'rule of law’， 
thus enhanced the credibility of her state discourse, as indicated by the following 
excerpt: 
‘Hong Kong people can only oppose the NPCSC in its interpretation of 
Basic Law, but cannot question the legal power that the NPCSC has; 
Hong Kong people can only ask the central authority to consider the 
political factors of the HKSAR, to resolve the differences between the 
central authority and Hong Kong people by political coordination, rather 
than by using such power (i.e. the power to interpret the Basic Law), to 
exclude Hong Kong people from the constitutional review by "using a 
giant rock to crush a crab 大石壓死蟹”.Therefore, when Hong Kong 
people opposes to the interpretation of Basic Law, they know who is 
greater [i.e. the central government] and what should be given priority 
[i.e. the power held by the NPCSC]!‘ 
Kitty Poon (潘潔)，commentator, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
April 2004 
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The wisdom to use 'rule of law’，a popular concept that advocates the obedience to 
the law, is an effective and justified discursive tool for the state to suppress resistance 
(in the name of restoring the 'rule of law’ and social order from chaos)^. To build 
up hegemony, articulating a popular consensus is decisive since it is the key to 
making the discourse understandable and acceptable to the laymen (Donald and Hall, 
1986), and the concept of 'rule of law' is a discursive tool appropriate for the ruling 
bloc to justify their usage of legal power to put forward the state discourse. 
Section 8.3 
Professionals and hegemonic formation 
The case study of Hong Kong is unique in that a socialist state (China) attempts to 
build up her state discourse, or even tries to establish hegemony in the public 
discourse of an advanced capitalist city (Hong Kong). Communist China was 
notorious in the society of Hong Kong before the handover, but she could build up 
her state discourse, and even formulate a kind of hegemonic tendency in the public 
discourse of this capitalist city i.e. the supremacy of Basic Law after the handover. 
There is a lesson from this extra-ordinary case study --- the crucial role played by 
professionals in the formation of hegemony. 
During the central - Hong Kong confrontation in early 2004，the role of 
professionals is crucial for both sides: China and the local dissidents. Professionals 
from both camps contributed significantly in the discursive contestation. China 
137 For example, during the strikes of coal miners in Britain in 1985, the Thatcher's administration 
suppressed the workers in the name of 'rule of law': obedience to the law is a must, the government is 
justify to restore the law and order (see Barker, 1990) 
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employed legal professionals from Beijing and local scholars to put forward her 
interpretation over the principles and stipulations in Basic Law. On the other hand, 
the legal professionals in the democratic camp (particularly the Article 45 concern 
group) took an indispensable place to rebut the interpretation of legal jargons in 
Basic Law that advocated by China's camp. 
The Article 45 concern group, established by a group of legal professionals and 
scholars who advocate universal suffrages, has received the highest support among 
political parties/ groups/ organizations in Hong Kong consistently since their 
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establishment in late 2003 . In fact, local legal professionals have been playing an 
important role in various social events in Hong Kong recently: the controversy over 
the enactment of the Bill of National Security for the fulfillment of the requirement 
of the Article 23 of Basic Law, the July demonstration in 2003 (Chan, 2004). 
On the other hand, China also presented some ‘new faces' who are more skillful in 
using professional legal jargons credibly, for instance Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽， 
deputy Secretary-General of the NPCSC) and Wang Zhenmin (王振民，law professor 
from the University of Tsing Wah ) to replace old-fashioned scholars such as the late 
Prof. Siu Weiyun (蕭蔚雲）and Prof. Xiao Tienren (召天任）in the discursive 
contestation between the state discourse and other resistant forces in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong in late March 2004. China also tries to co-opt local legal 
professionals and scholars to support her state discourse (see chapter 6). 
The crucial role played by legal professionals in the discursive contestation in the 
138 See the polls conducted by Dr. Robert Chung from the University of Hong Kong: 
www.hkupop.hku.hk. 
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public discourse reflects another inherent lesson in the building up of hegemony, the 
significance of professionals. Gramsci (1971) states the importance of intellectuals in 
the formation of hegemony as follows: 
‘A human mass does not "distinguish ” itself, does not become 
independent in its own right without in the widest sense organizing itself; 
and there is no organization without intellectuals, that is without 
organizers and leaders, in other words, without the theoretical aspect of 
the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence 
of a group of people 'specialized' in conceptual and philosophical 
elaboration of ideas. 
But the process of creating intellectuals is long, difficult, full of 
contradictions, advances and retreats, dispersals and regroupings, in 
which the loyalty of the masses is often sorely tried [...].， 
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (1971) 
The formation of hegemony relies heavily on ‘the existence of a group of people 
"specialized" in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas'. They are the 
backbone of hegemonic formation: experts who formulate discourses that articulate 
with the popular consensus of the society. They are the ‘generals，who play the key 
roles in the discursive contestation. 
Professionalism and formation of hegemony 
In modem society, this group of people is the professionals. Under the myth of 
professionalism in an advanced capitalist city such as Hong Kong, those who are 
credible in formulating and interpreting knowledge that result in discursive power in 
the war of position for hegemonic formation are certainly the professionals. They 
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enjoy an authoritative image and elicit public trust in the disciplines that they 
specialize in, and possess the intellectual power to synthesize knowledge that is 
relevant to their areas of expertise. 
Thus the role of professionals in the discursive contestation in the public discourse 
during the process of hegemonic formation is significant. The expert language and 
professional image enable the professionals to monopolize the meaning construction 
in their respective fields to various degrees. The power to create meaning is exactly 
the key to produce the tools (e.g. legal jargons) in discursive struggles, which is 
crucial to the building of hegemony. 
Contextual contingency of moral leadership 
However, there are sources of social credibility other then professional expertise: 
religion, interpellation of nationalism, racial and ethnic fraternity. Thus the power of 
professionals in the hegemonic formation is contingent, subject to the social and 
historical contexts, including the relative credibility of professionals to other social 
leaders. In fact, though the legal professionals in Hong Kong enjoy prestigious status, 
their pursuit of democracy is echoed by Bishop Zhen (陳日君)，leader of the 
Catholic church in Hong Kong who is an influential religious figure. During the 
July demonstrations in 2003 and 2004, his appeal encouraged thousands of Catholics 
to join the rallies. 
Hence, the creation of social meanings is not totally based on knowledge synthesis 
by professionals but also on faith and trust. Moral leadership is a contextual 
contingency: the influence of religions, the modernization of society, education level, 
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class formation are all determinants in the pattern of moral leadership. 
On the other hand, professionals are specialists in particular disciplines. This implies 
their ability to create meanings and knowledge in a variety of subjects: accountants 
in the interpretation of companies' performance, doctors in medical and health care 
issues and lawyers in legal disputes. In the case of Hong Kong, the rise of legal 
professionals in the discussion of democratization, to a large extent, is due to the 
emerging authoritative status of Basic Law and the prevailing consensus of 'rule of 
law，，both transmute the issue of democratization into a legal matter. 
However, the role of professionals in the hegemonic formation should not be 
overlooked. They are the group of people who holds the key role in synthesizing, 
interpreting or even producing knowledge in modem society, and knowledge 
production is the crux of creating social meanings and reality. Outsiders and laymen 
are not usually able to adopt the expert language and join in the discursive struggle 
with the professions. Therefore the role of professionals is crucial to hegemonic 
formation, though the actual influence of particular type of professionals is 
situational. 
Legal professionals in discursive contestation: the case of Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is an advanced capitalist city which citizens trust professionals. The 
common sense of 'rule of law' and the flourishing supremacy of Basic Law, may lead 
to the rise of legal professionals, in future discursive contestation in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong with regard to political affairs (including democratization). 
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After the handover, by articulating to the prevailing consensus 'rule of law’，China to 
a large extent has established the supremacy of Basic Law in the public discourse. 
Since political affairs (including democratization) are largely covered by Basic Law, 
the corresponding discursive contestation thus eventually is confined to the 
parameters of Basic Law, including the public discussion about democratization. 
Future discussion of democratization in Hong Kong would most probably be under 
the framework of Basic Law, and be dominated by the legal professionals, who are 
the most credible in Hong Kong in the production of legal knowledge or 
interpretation of the principle and concrete stipulations in Basic Law. 
Thus, whether the democrats and dissidents can advance in the war of position 
against China's state discourse in the public discourse depends on whether the 
democratic camp can elicit the help of enough professionals to sponsor the 
democratization discourses, framing the local aspiration of democratization in a way 
not contradictory to the parameters of the Basic Law. 
However, it seems that China also knows the importance of professionals in her 
discursive war against the local democrats in Hong Kong, and for the democrats and 
people in Hong Kong, future discursive war against the state discourse is not an easy 
one: 
'Would the rise of professional elites (in the Mainland) imply an easier 
China-Hong Kong interaction? Not really. Professional knowledge and 
language are just tools; there is a set of political ideals and values. Moreover, 
elites also have to be censored by the existing system and constrained by the 
reward and punishment system. 
On the contrary, Hong Kong is a city where professionals are respected. It is 
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more difficult and challenging for Hong Kong people to identify the threads of 
thoughts of political interaction advanced by professional knowledge and 
language. For instance, there is a discrepancy between the magnitude of the 
resistance to the debate on Patriotism and the interpretation of Basic Law by 
Hong Kong people. ’ 
Kitty Poon (潘潔commentator, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 15^ April 
2004 
During the central - Hong Kong confrontation in early 2004，the debate on 
Patriotism was handled by some old-fashioned Beijing scholars (e.g. Xu Chongde 
言午崇德）who stressed ideological concepts: articulating to Deng Xiaoping's speech 
in 1987 and the state discourse that was formulated before the handover, while those 
‘new faces' (e.g. Wang Zhenmin 王振民 and Qiao Xiaoyang 喬曉陽）responsible 
for the interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPCSC (e.g. Qiao Xiaoyang) 
emphasized legal narration when putting forward the state d i s c o u r s e 1^ 9. 
Though the ‘new faces' seem to be more acceptable than the former old gentlemen in 
the eyes of Hong Kong people, the risk of jeopardizing the local democratization is 
no less: the interpretation of Basic Law is setting legal constrains on Hong Kong's 
future constitutional development, while the debate on Patriotism is just an opinion 
wari40. In fact, China already practiced this tactic of ‘legal narration for political end' 
in the controversy over universal suffrages in Hong Kong in early 2004, and began to 
let 'professional' officials and scholars to represent China in the discursive war. 
139 See the speech of Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽)，deputy Secretary-General ofNPCSC, 26 出 April, 2004. 
This speech aimed at explaining why NPCSC decided to interpret Basic Law with regard to the 
constitutional development in Hong Kong. 
See the commentary written by Kitty Poon in Hong Kong Economic Journal, 1 A p r i l 2004 
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Since the political structure of Hong Kong involves the Basic Law, therefore future 
relevant discursive contestations would be largely led by the legal professionals from 
both China (and her local ruling allies) and Hong Kong pertaining to the 
interpretation of relevant stipulations in Basic Law. And this occurred again in early 
2005: C. H. Tung stepped down from the post of the Chief Executive of HKSAR, 
and the tenure of his successor, be it the remaining tenure of Tung's term (2 years) or 
another new term (5 years) arouse heated debates in Hong Kong. 
Again, China practiced the tactic of 'legal narration for political end': employing 
legal experts (including the 'new faces', e.g. Qiao Xiaoyang 喬曉陽 from Beijing, 
and some other legal professionals in Hong Kong) to argue for her political aims by 
legal narration. The Chinese government suggested that the tenure of the successor of 
C. H. Tung should be 2 years. The main participants of this discursive contestation 
were also legal professionals (from China, the local society and democratic camp of 
Hong Kong). The public discussion of political matters (including democratization) 
of Hong Kong, to a certain extent, is becoming a war of words with reference to legal 
jargons and phrases in the Basic Law, with the rise of legal professionals from both 
the central government and the civil society of Hong Kong. 
Section 8.4 
Reflections on this thesis 
The observations and discussions above are not the end of the story for hegemony. 
Hegemony should be able to penetrate into all walks of life in the society, and 
become naturalized in the everyday practices of the people (Hall, 1988). The 
colonization of the public discourse by a particular discourse (say, the state discourse) 
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doesn't necessarily imply the successful building of hegemony. As James C. Scott 
points out, the subjects who are in disadvantaged position before the ruling bloc 
would very often pretend to be compliant in the public discourse, however, they 
might resist the dominating discourse in everyday practices (Scott, 1985; 1990). The 
hegemonic tendency in the public discourse (i.e. absence of overt resistance in the 
public discourse) may just be an act of the subordinates to avoid persecution from the 
powerful ruling bloc and thus preserve themselves: the resistant forces may be 
formulating the ‘hidden transcript' (compliance with the official transcript, but 
manipulation of the details and content of it so as to twist the meanings of official 
transcript) (Scott, 1990). 
Public discourse: important step for the formation of hegemony in society 
Scott's arguments indicate that the study of public discourse is not the end of the 
study of hegemony. However, this doesn't nullify the significance of public discourse 
in the analysis of hegemonic formation. 
Public discourse is where the social parties (including the state: e.g. China) compete 
for moral leadership by articulating their own discourses to the prevailing consensus 
in society. For the formation of state hegemony, if the state is not able to gain the 
upper hand in the war of position in the public discourse, then it would be naive to 
believe that her state discourse can penetrate into the everyday life of the people: this 
scenario indicates that the resistant forces are strong enough to resist the state 
publicly. On the contrary, resistant forces also have to appear in the public discourse 
if they want to disarticulate the state hegemony and rearticulate a new popular 
consensus for the society. 
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Thus, though James C. Scott provides some revelation for the study of everyday 
resistance and the ‘hidden transcript', the significance of the public discourse in the 
formation process of hegemony is not nullified: colonizing the public discourse is an 
important step for the building up of a state hegemony, and also a crucial step for the 
resistant force to disarticulate the state hegemony (or state discourse). The discursive 
contestation in the public discourse is a vivid illustration of how the state (ruling bloc) 
competes with the resistant forces in the articulation with the prevailing consensus in 
society in order to gain moral leadership, which is vital for the building, or 
disarticulating of state hegemony. 
Therefore, the ambition of this thesis is not to argue that state hegemony has been 
formed (manipulated by China) in Hong Kong, but provides insights into the crucial 
step of the whole hegemonic formation process: the formation of state hegemony in 
the public discourse. 
Resistant strategy of local dissidents: hidden transcript 
Scott's remarks also offer a reminder to the study of hegemony: the strategy played 
by the resistant forces should be taken into account when scrutinizing the discursive 
contestation between the dominant discourse and resistant forces. In the case study of 
this thesis, the war of position between China and the resistant forces against the 
state discourse in Hong Kong, one may argue that during the central 一 Hong Kong 
confrontation in early 2004 with regard to the controversy of universal suffrages in 
Hong Kong, some of the local dissidents in fact did practice the tactic of ‘hidden 
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t r ansc r ip t ’ 141’ avoiding direct confrontation with the central authority (i.e. China) and 
Basic Law, so to prevent themselves from being stigmatized as 'supporting Hong 
Kong independent', 'anti-communist' and 'breaching the Basic Law，. By doing so, 
China may have fewer discursive tools to attack the democrats and deny the 
democratization process of Hong Kong. 
Hence, the gradual disappearance of the discourse 'democracy against communism' 
and the compliance with Basic Law of the dissidents after the handover, in this sense, 
may not indicate a tendency of the formation of state hegemony in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong, but the success of the democrats in their tactics of ‘hidden 
transcript，： nullifying the discursive tools i.e. stigmas imposed by China on Hong 
Kong democrats in the past, for instance 'supporting Hong Kong independent', 
‘anti-communist’ and 'breaching the Basic Law’. 
The above rebuttal is interesting and insightful. However, there are other evidence 
and arguments that should lead to the conclusion that the tendency of the formation 
of state hegemony in the public discourse of Hong Kong does exist: 
Firstly, there is rising popularity of the central government and Chinese leaders in 
Hong Kong, in particular, the popularity of Chinese leaders is even higher than those 
of the democrats. This illustration gives strong support for the rising moral leadership 
of China over Hong Kong since the handover. In fact, Prof. K. M. Chan, a local 
scholar who is actively involved in advocating local democratization, also admitted 
141 Private discussion with Prof. K. M. Chan, associate professor from the department of sociology, 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong; Prof. Chan is a member of Democratic Development Network 
(DDN), an organization which advocates the democratization of Hong Kong. He is a proactive 
supporter of the democratization movement in Hong Kong for many years. The author would like to 
thank Prof. Chan for his kind assistance and insightful advice. 
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that the discourse ‘anti-communism' is 'losing her market' in the political arena of 
Hong Kong. The tactic of ‘hidden transcript' is the response of some democrats in 
accordance with the rising popularity of China in Hong Kongi^�. 
Secondly, there is no evidence that the legal professionals (e.g. Barrister Association), 
pro-Hong Kong newspapers (i.e. the Apple Daily and Hong Kong Economic Journal) 
and critical opinion leaders are colluding with the democrats and practicing the tactic 
of ‘hidden transcript，(neither are the democrats powerful enough to do so). The 
compliance shown by those legal professionals and opinion leaders to the supremacy 
of Basic Law, as confessed by Li Yi (李 1台，a critical local opinion leader) and the 
Chairman of Barrister Association Edward Chan (陳景生，now the post is occupied 
by another Senior Councilor) in early 2004, is due to the spirit of the rule of law: in 
accordance with the Basic Law, the interpretation of the NPCSC cannot be 
overridden. Their response to a certain extent indicates that part of the state discourse, 
the supremacy of the Basic Law, is able to articulate to the notion ‘rule of law’ in 
Hong Kong, and their compliance with Basic Law involves some degree of 
ideological incorporation, though they still show resistance to other parts of state 
discourse e.g. the interpretation of some principles and concrete stipulations of Basic 
Law. 
Nevertheless, the rebuttal of ‘hidden transcript' provides a further revelation on the 
study of hegemony, particularly on the resistant strategy before a dominant discourse. 
This provides a critical reminder to those studying public discourse as well as 
everyday discourse that when scrutinizing the hegemonic formation, the hegemonic 
tendency (compliance or obedience) may actually be an act performed by the 
142 Private discussion with Prof. Chan Kim-man 
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subjects to avoid coercion from above. Instead of a genuine hegemony, this scenario 
may just be the result of the resistant strategy: 'hidden transcript' practiced by the 
subjects (Scott, 1990). 
The notion of 'hidden transcript' allows us to reflect on the resistant strategy 
practiced by some democrats in Hong Kong, yet there is other evidence indicating 
the hegemonic tendency: the rising popularity of China and Chinese leaders (even 
though China curbed the local aspiration of democratization), which implies a 
flourishing moral leadership of China in Hong Kong after the handover. Besides, 
though full democratization has not been attained in Hong Kong yet, citizens still 
enjoy various forms of freedom. They do not need to practice the tactic of 'hidden 
transcript' during the polls if they do resist China, and many polls in Hong Kong are 
conducted by independent research institutes. The popularity of China reflected in 
the polls thus should not be interpreted as the tactic of ‘hidden transcript' by Hong 
Kong people. 
The rise of the moral leadership of China in Hong Kong, together with the 
compliance shown by the legal professionals, editorials of some pro-Hong Kong 
papers and opinion leaders to the Basic Law (due to the spirit of rule of law), provide 
evidence indicating that there is a weakening challenge to the ruling of the 
communist regime and the compliance with Basic Law in the public discourse after 
the handover, to a certain extent, is the preliminary tendency of the formation of state 
hegemony, at least on the level of public discourse. 
Until the state discourse can become a naturalized 'common sense' in the everyday 
life of Hong Kong people, one cannot conclude that the state hegemony is forming. 
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Yet, the ambition of this thesis is not to study the forming of hegemony, but to 
scrutinize an important step of hegemonic formation, the discursive contestation for 
hegemonic status in the public discourse. Public discourse is where various 
prominent social forces (including the state) struggle for leadership status, where the 
state represents her discourse to the society and where the resistant force disarticulate 
the existing hegemony (or the dominating discourse) before the whole society. Thus 
public discourse is a strategic discursive battlefield for the formation or 
disarticulation of hegemony. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, the rise of China's state discourse and the naturalization of its nodal 
point i.e. Basic Law in the public discourse of Hong Kong, indicate the preliminary 
tendency of the formation of China's state hegemony after the handover. The 
disappearance of the discourse ‘democracy against communism 民主抗共’ and the 
emerging compliance to Basic Law in the discursive struggle in Hong Kong public 
discourse, are evidence that illustrates social resistance against the ruling of the state, 
China, is weakened in the representation of the public discourse. 
The establishment of the supremacy of Basic Law in the public discourse of Hong 
Kong results in the flourishing trend of resolving conflicts (including political 
conflicts e.g. democratization) via legal narration. The discussions of political issues 
in the public discourse are frequently diverted to arguments over the principles and 
concrete stipulations in Basic Law. Therefore the discursive contestation in the public 
discourse of Hong Kong in future has the tendency of being led by legal 
professionals, who are credible (have the moral leadership) to articulate legal 
knowledge and narration of Basic Law in Hong Kong. 
Substantiation to the concept of hegemony 
Gramsci's idea of hegemony roots from the context of Italian society of the 1930s. 
Subsequent studies elaborate, apply and substantiate this notion in accordance with 
particular social and historical contingencies. 
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The case study of Hong Kong offers empirical evidence for the significance of 
professionals to hegemonic formation. Gramsci (1971) points out that the building of 
hegemony requires ‘the existence of a group of people "specialized" in conceptual 
and philosophical elaboration of ideas'. And the role of this group of people is played 
by professionals in advanced capitalist societies. Social trust of professionals e.g. 
lawyers, accountants, doctors...etc is powered by their authoritative images in the 
society; as well as their intellectual power and moral leadership to synthesize 
knowledge in their specialized fields. Their role is indispensable for the justification 
of existing ruling, or the disarticulation of the prevailing hegemony through 
introducing knowledge from the resistant perspective. 
State hegemony formation in Hong Kong 
However, it is not possible to conclude that China has successfully built up her state 
hegemony in the public discourse of Hong Kong though she is able to do this 
partially: the establishment of the supremacy and legitimacy of Basic Law in the 
local public discourse. Whether the state discourse put forward by China, apart from 
establishing the supreme status of Basic Law, can foster her hegemonic force further 
in the public discourse of Hong Kong, depends largely on whether China can co-opt 
local professionals and nurture skillful professionals in order to put forward her state 
discourse under the framework of Basic Law via legal narration. On the contrary, the 
local resistant force may also have to rely more on the local professionals to sponsor 
their discourses in the discursive contestation against the state discourse under the 
framework of Basic Law. 
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Even if China can ultimately 'colonize' the public discourse of Hong Kong i.e. the 
state discourse is successfully ‘naturalized, (i.e. being taken for granted) in the public 
discourse, we still cannot conclude that the state hegemony of China is successfully 
formed in Hong Kong. Hegemony should be able to penetrate into everyday life of 
the people, and be naturalized in every walk of life in order to obtain the active 
consent of the inhabitants (Hall, 1988). One must pay attention to whether the state 
discourse formulated by China can receive the consent of the citizens of Hong Kong 
in their everyday understanding and conversations i.e. private discourse, before make 
a judgment on whether China can successfully build up her state hegemony in Hong 
Kong. 
Limitations 
There are also two limitations in this study due to restricted time, budget and 
recourses: 
Insufficient interviews with the participants in the public discourse of Hong 
Kong 
Due to the tremendous efforts required to deal with textual analysis and the limits of 
time and budget, the author is not able to carry out extensive interviews with the 
participants in the public discourse of Hong Kong, such as democrats, legal 
professionals, leftists or even Chinese officials. Their face to face testimonies should 
be able to add invaluable first hand experience and observations on the discursive 
contestation for democratization in Hong Kong from the transitory period to 
post-handover years. In fact, the private discussion with Prof. K. M. Chan offered the 
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author valuable information on the resistant strategy practiced by some democrats in 
the discursive contestation in public discourse, the ‘hidden transcript' that 
re-articulates the jargons of state discourse into other meanings which are consistent 
with universal suffrages, to avoid being stigmatized as 'anti-communist'. This first 
hand observation from the participants of the public discourse cannot be easily 
gained from textual analysis. 
The hegemonic formation process is still going on 
Hegemonic formation is a long process of war of position which may last for years or 
even decades. The establishment and maintenance of the state discourse by China 
will certain go on beyond the completion of this thesis. This study captures the public 
discourse with regard to the discursive contestation over the democratization of Hong 
Kong of transitory period before the handover and the controversy of universal 
suffrages in 2004 after the handover, and provides some preliminary findings 
pertaining to the hegemonic formation process in the public discourse. Whether 
China can continue to put forward and consolidate her state discourse in the war of 
position in the public discourse of Hong Kong, and whether the local dissidents can 
resist or strike back in the discursive contestation over local democratization, still 
have to be explored in future years. 
Further research 
Research on private discourse 
For further research pertaining to the formation of state hegemony in Hong Kong by 
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China, apart from studying the public discourse, it is also crucial to study the private 
discourse of Hong Kong people. Only when the state discourse is 'naturalized' in 
everyday life can the establishment of state hegemony in Hong Kong be regarded as 
successful. Research focus could also be on the dynamic between the public and 
private discourses so as to examine how the state discourse penetrates the everyday 
life of the people in Hong Kong via mediation in the public discourse. 
Criteria for hegemonic formation 
In accordance with the case selected in this study, democratization of Hong Kong 
and the building up of state hegemony by China, the level of social resistance in the 
public discourse is cited as the measurement of the hegemonic formation process. 
However, the assessment of hegemonic formation depends on different cases and 
contexts. For example, for the scrutiny of social discussion on economic and social 
issues, the assessment tools for hegemonic formation maybe different from those for 
political issues. 
Nevertheless, the crux of the measurement of hegemonic formation is the notion of 
encapsulation, whether the range of discussion and understanding of an issue is 
narrowing with the formation of 'common sense' that is taken for granted. Further 
research of hegemony can explore the criteria for the assessment of hegemonic 
formation, so as to provide more indicators for illustrating the process of the 
encapsulation during discursive contestation. This is also a possible direction for 
future researchers on the resinicization of Hong Kong in various aspects. 
-End of thesis -
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